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Historical Introduction 
Rebecca Haynes 
The articles which follow are the product of a conference held at the 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College 
London in 1999 on the history and contemporary affairs of Moldova, 
Bessarabia and Transnistria. Most of the papers deal with the 
Transnistrian dispute, as it developed over the course of the 1990s, but 
others consider economic conditions in the Republic of Moldova and 
Romanian policy towards the Jews during the Second World War. 
A common point in many of these articles is the issue of the Republic 
of Moldova’s relations with the Russians and Ukrainians, both inside and 
outside the Republic, and of Romania’s own relations with Moldova. 
Underlying this issue is the question of national identity. Are the 
Moldovans and Romanians ‘one nation’, and if so, what implications 
follow for statehood? Or is there a distinct ‘Moldovan’ identity, which 
justifies the maintenance of a separate Moldovan state? And if a distinct 
‘Moldovan’ identity exists, is it connected in any way with the Moldovans’ 
historic ‘co-habitation’ with the Slavonic peoples both west and east of the 
Dnestr river? 
In seeking to write a historical introduction to these essays one issue 
becomes clear. The Moldovans’, and indeed the Romanians’, often 
complicated relations with the Ukrainians and Russians are not simply the 
product of Moldova’s incorporation within the Soviet Union after the 
Second World War, but stretch back to the very foundation of the prin¬ 
cipality of Moldova in the Middle Ages. It is for this reason appropriate 
to consider the issue of identity in contemporary Moldova, and the 
Transnistrian dispute, in a long-term historical perspective, and not simply 
as a product of more recent events. 
This historical introduction will, therefore, concentrate overwhelm¬ 
ingly on the period up to the Second World War. For the Soviet Union’s 
involvement in Moldova in the post-war era, and the unfolding of the 
Transnistrian dispute, the reader can do no better than to study Charles 
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King’s seminal book. The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics 
of Culture, (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2000). 
Finally, I would like to thank those who made possible the original 
‘Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria’ conference, as well as the publication 
of this volume. These include the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
through whose generosity the conference took place. I would also like to 
thank Professor Michael Branch, former director of the School, and 
Professor George Kolankiewicz, the current director, who have made 
possible the publication of this volume. My thanks are also due to 
Professor Dennis Deletant and Dr Martyn Rady at the School for offering 
their comments on the following text. 
* 
The history of Moldova poses problems of both a practical and an intel¬ 
lectual nature. Amongst the former, is the lack of reliable historical data 
and basic information regarding Moldova. This is itself largely a result of 
the region’s history, which, on account of its frequent wars, changes of 
government and disputed sovereignty, has made accurate and continuous 
record keeping impossible. In addition, the country’s main centres of 
scholarly activity, the monasteries, have suffered themselves through war 
and plunder over the centuries. The historian is thus left with a number 
of often conflicting and incomplete accounts with which to develop his 
narrative. 
The intellectual problems confronted in writing a history of Moldova, 
however, pose even greater challenges. The first of these is the problem of 
territorial definition. Today ‘Moldova’ commonly refers to the Republic 
of that name which declared its independence from the Soviet Union 
in 1991. The Republic lies between the Prut and Dnestr rivers and is 
bordered by the Romanian state in the west. It is otherwise surrounded 
entirely by Ukrainian territory. ‘Moldova’ is also, however, the name 
of the eastern part of the modern Romanian state. The two ‘Moldovas’ of 
today previously constituted the principality of Moldova which was 
founded in the fourteenth century and which in the nineteenth century 
joined with Wallachia to form the kingdom of Romania. The lands of the 
present-day Republic of Moldova were a part of the principality of 
Moldova until 1812 when they were annexed by Russia. The reader may 
well wonder what the relationship is between the principality of Moldova 
and ‘Moldavia’, a name often found in English-language histories of the 
area. ‘Moldavia’ is, however, simply the Latinized form of Moldova, and 
gained currency in Europe only from the eighteenth century onwards. 
There is also the frequent use in historical literature of the name 
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‘Bessarabia’ to refer to the lands between the Prut and Dnestr rivers 
which were seized by Russia from the principality of Moldova in 
1812. Bessarabia is the Latinized form of the Romanian Basarabia, the ety¬ 
mology and meaning of which we will explain further below (pp. 74-5). 
The area of the modern Republic of Moldova only, however, corresponds 
in part to the area of nineteenth-century Bessarabia. 
The second intellectual problem regarding the history of the Republic 
of Moldova is the question of national description and of language, which 
since the nineteenth century has been generally understood as the badge 
of identity. Most historians and commentators in Romania have argued 
that the ‘Moldovan’ language, adopted as the Republic’s official language 
in 1994, is a dialect of Romanian and, therefore, describe the language as 
‘Romanian’ and the people of Moldova as ‘Romanians’. Many people in 
Moldova would concur with this view and regard themselves as being thus 
‘Romanians’. 
Moldovan nationalists within the present-day Republic argue, how¬ 
ever, that although closely related to the Romanians, the Moldovans form 
a distinct ethnic and linguistic group, with a separate historical devel¬ 
opment. Complicated as they are, however, these problems of definition 
are by no means unique to Moldova. Throughout Eastern Europe, both 
historic ‘rights’ to territories and national identities are often subject to 
intensive scrutiny and debate. Indeed, the problems of Moldovan history 
are the problems of East European history writ small. The example of the 
Republic of Moldova’s Ukrainian neighbour, whose territory and identity 
are still hotly contested, is a further illustration. Not only is the territory 
of Ukraine also a historically ‘contested space’, but Ukrainian identity 
itself retains an ambiguity, being variously presented as Ukrainian, Little 
Russian and Ruthene.1 
The task of writing a history of Moldova is rendered yet more difficult 
by the partialities of the secondary historical literature. In geographical 
areas where territorial ‘rights’ and national identities are disputed, all 
historical statements carry political resonances. Thus, to describe the 
majority-inhabitants of nineteenth century Russian-ruled Bessarabia as 
‘Romanians’, as many Romanian historians are wont, is to imply their 
affinity with the Romanians living west of the River Prut and to justify 
their incorporation into the Romanian state in 1918. Soviet historians, on 
the other hand, often denied any relationship between the Romanian¬ 
speaking inhabitants of Bessarabia and the Romanians, and referred to 
them as ‘Moldovans’. In this way they were able to justify the separate 
path taken by Moldova east of the River Prut during and after the Second 
World War. 
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For Western historians and commentators, on the other hand, Moldova 
and the region to which it belongs, has long been considered as part of 
Europe’s ‘periphery’. Cut off from the cultural and political influences that 
have created modern Europe, the area is often regarded as a ‘backwater’ 
and little more than a curiosity. In reality, however, the principality of 
Moldova was, as it emerged in the medieval period, far from being on the 
periphery of ‘Europe’. Both the principality of Moldova, and its sister-prin¬ 
cipality of Wallachia (known as ‘Jara Romaneasca’ to the Romanians) 
were subject to the major European political and cultural currents of the 
time. In particular, the principalities were both the recipients of, and con¬ 
tributors to, the store of Byzantine Orthodox learning and culture both 
before and after the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Far from being on 
Europe’s ‘periphery’, the principalities developed out of, and were at the 
heart of, European Orthodox civilization. 
The influences which fed the creation and development of the two 
principalities were not, however, identical. In the Middle Ages Wallachia 
was considerably more dominated by the Catholic Kingdom of Hungary 
than Moldova, as well as by the Serbian and Bulgarian South Slavs. It was 
largely on account of its proximity to the Balkans that Wallachia was 
incorporated into the religious and cultural sphere of Byzantium in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In subsequent centuries, the Greek- 
Byzantine influence in Wallachia was especially strong. Moldova, on the 
other hand, while subject to similar cultural movements, was heavily influ¬ 
enced by Orthodox currents stemming from Kiev and the lands of 
Poland-Lithuania. In more recent centuries, Russian military and cultural 
influences have also been a major factor in Moldova’s development. While 
being united to Wallachia by language, therefore, other cultural influences 
have pulled Moldova northwards and eastwards and have shaped a 
different history. 
The Early History and the Foundation of the Principality 
of Moldova 
In the fourth and third centuries BC, the lands which comprise present- 
day Romania and the Republic of Moldova were inhabited by Thracian 
tribes, known as the Getae and Dacians. These tribes already had links 
with the ancient Hellenic world through the Greek colonies situated on 
the coast of the Black Sea. These included Tyras (later Cetatea Alba), 
on the mouth of the Dnestr estuary, which had been established in the 
sixth century BC. The future Romanian lands subsequently fell under 
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Roman control. In 106 AD, the Romans, led by Emperor Trajan, 
destroyed the kingdom of the Dacians and divided these lands between 
the Roman provinces of Dacia and Moesia Inferior. The latter included 
within it the Black Sea coastal strip between the rivers Prut and Dnestr 
where Trajan’s Wall was built, remnants of which are still visible. The 
territory of the present-day Republic of Moldova remained, however, 
outside the Roman Empire. Although Dacia and Moesia Inferior were 
subject to romanization and colonization, Roman rule in the area proved 
relatively short-lived. As a result of barbarian attacks, the Roman legions 
withdrew south of the River Danube in 273 AD, leaving the native inhab¬ 
itants north of the river to their fate. Organized political and cultural life 
was not to re-emerge in the area for over a millennium. Nevertheless, the 
period of Roman rule left in its train a population sufficiently romanized 
to have adopted a language based on vulgar Roman Latin which forms 
the basis of modern Romanian. 
The centuries following the withdrawal of the Roman legions were 
marked by the ebb and flow of nomadic tribes who traversed, or made 
their temporary home, on the lands of present-day Romania. The territory 
which was later to make up the Moldovan principality, although consisting 
of wooded mountains to the north, and bounded by the high peaks of 
the Carpathian mountains to the west, consists mainly of hilly plains, 
extending down to a plateau on the Black Sea coast. As an extension of 
the Eurasian steppes, the plains of ‘Moldova’ acted as an open road 
for the barbarian tribes which sought to plunder the riches of the Roman 
and Byzantine empires. Following the division of the empire at the end 
of the third century, East Rome (later Byzantium) retained control of 
the fortifications on the lower Danube limes. The barbarians, however, 
repeatedly succeeded in breaching the Danube defences and bore down 
on the Roman cities of the Balkan peninsula, frequently threatening 
Constantinople itself. 
The third century had already been marked by the arrival of the 
Germanic Goths, and these were followed by assorted tribes of Huns, 
Gepids, and Avars. The subsequent arrival of the Slavs in the Danube 
Basin and the Balkan peninsula in the late sixth century and the Bulgars 
in the seventh century was to have a profound effect on the romance¬ 
speaking population which had been left behind in old Roman Dacia, 
cutting them off from direct contact with the Byzantine empire for many 
centuries. 
It is at this point appropriate to discuss the so-called ‘Daco-Roman 
continuity theory’. According to this view of Romanian ethno-genesis, the 
modern Romanians are descended from the Dacians, who intermarried 
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with the Roman colonists and eventually adopted their language. The 
‘Daco-Romans’ remained in Dacia following the withdrawal of the 
Roman legions in 273 AD and, so it is argued, retained their Latin identity 
and tongue in the face of subsequent barbarian invasions through their 
timely retreat into the mountains of Transylvania. This argument, put 
forward most strongly by Romanian historians in the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, was used to justify the creation of the 
modern Romanian state by claiming a continuous and substantial 
Romanian presence north of the Danube from Roman times onwards. 
Such historians have usually also denied that the Slavs exercised any 
important influence on the development of the Romanian nation. In a 
work for foreign consumption, published in 1925, Nicolae Iorga, 
Romania’s most famous historian and also its most prolific, argued that 
the Slavonic influence on the Romanians following the Balkan invasions 
‘is not supported by a study either of the historical sources or of national 
customs and language’.2 
This view of Romanian origins came to dominate Romanian histori¬ 
ography, particularly during the 1980s under the Ceau$escu regime.3 
Nevertheless, a number of leading Romanian scholars had long recog¬ 
nized the importance of the Slavonic influence in Romanian identity and 
culture. Romania’s first major Slavicist, Bogdan P. Hasdeu, born in 
Russian-ruled Bessarabia in 1838, argued that the Romanians were a 
product of a fusion of Thracians, Dacians, Romans and Slavs and had 
developed as a distinct people on both sides of the Danube river. 
According to another argument, now associated with Hungarian histo¬ 
rians, but previously expounded by a number of eminent Romanian 
historians such as Radu Rosetti (1853-1926) and Gheorge Bratianu 
(1898-1953), the ‘Romanians’ were not the descendants of the early 
Dacians but of a romance-speaking population from the Balkans who only 
arrived north of the Danube many centuries after the withdrawal of the 
Romans. On this basis, Rosetti argued that the Romanians were, in fact, 
‘romanized Slavs’ who fled north of the Danube to escape the grasping 
hands of Byzantine tax-collectors. According to Bratianu, contacts 
between the romanized population north and south of the Danube did 
not cease with the formal withdrawal of the legions in 273 AD. The arrival 
of the Slavs in the Balkans in the late sixth century, however, modified 
the nascent ‘Romanian’ language and forced part of the romanized 
population to flee north of the Danube.4 
Whatever the historical veracity of these different theories regarding 
the ethno-genesis of the Romanian people, the Slavs, although eventually 
absorbed into the romance-speaking population in the Danube Basin, 
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have left a strong imprint on the Romanian language. Many Romanian 
placenames, and almost one-fifth of the vocabulary in modern Romanian, 
is of Slavonic origin. Moreover, it was, as we shall see, largely through 
their Slavonic neighbours that the inhabitants of the future Moldovan and 
Wallachian principalities were to become incorporated into the religious 
and cultural life of Orthodox Christian Byzantium. 
The Slavs, however, were by no means the last of the barbarian tribes 
to enter the territory of, and have an influence upon, the future princi¬ 
pality. The ninth century saw the arrival of the pagan Hungarians in the 
Danube Basin, who within the space of only several hundred years had 
created a flourishing kingdom and embraced Catholicism. The foundation 
of the Moldovan principality, as it turned out, was to be intimately bound 
up with the continued expansion of Hungarian royal authority in the 
region. The Hungarian invaders were followed by the Turkic Pechenegs 
in the tenth century, and by another Turkic tribe, the Cumans, in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, which made its temporary home between 
the Siret and Dnestr rivers, within the lands of the future Moldovan princi¬ 
pality. Like the Slavs, the Cumans had a lasting effect on many Moldovan 
placenames and were responsible for the names of a number of towns, 
which were to become important in the future principality, including 
Tighina, Hotin and Chisinau.5 
The Hungarian kings had already secured control over the Transyl¬ 
vanian region in the tenth century, and thereafter began to expand the 
kingdom beyond the Carpathian mountains. King Andrew II (reigned 
1205-1235) continued King Stephen’s policy of Catholic proselytizing 
in the Danube Basin through his conversion of the pagan Cumans. 
Andrew then created a Catholic bishopric of ‘Cumania’ with its seat at 
Brasso (Rom. Brasov), later (and erroneously) identified with the see 
of Milcovia which was constituted in the fourteenth century. The area of 
the bishopric of Cumania covered roughly the south-west of the future 
Moldovan principality, north-east of the future Wallachia and south-east 
Transylvania.6 
The last of the major barbarian onslaughts into central and eastern 
Europe was the Tatar invasion of 1241 which brought the activities of the 
Catholic bishopric of Cumania to a halt. It was to be another century 
before the Hungarians were able to re-establish Hungarian supremacy 
east of the Carpathians. This was achieved as a result of the successful 
expedition led by King Louis of Anjou in 1345 who founded the Milcovia 
bishopric shortly afterwards. 
According to numerous Moldovan chroniclers from the sixteenth 
century onwards, the Moldovan ‘foundation myth’ runs roughly as 
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follows. In 1359 a certain Drago$ came down, or, ‘dismounted’ (Rom. 
descalecat) from the mountains of Transylvania or Maramure$ on to the 
uninhabited plains east of the Carpathians while hunting the wild aurochs 
(a type of bison). During the hunt, Drago§’ favourite hound, Molda, was 
drowned in a river. Drago§ and his followers, therefore, named the river 
‘Moldova’ in commemoration of the hound and subsequently named 
their new country after the river. Drago§ took the auroch’s head as his 
heraldic shield, which became the symbol of the new principality.7 
Historians have found it hard, however, to disentangle myth and legend 
from the events. Different opinions exist regarding not only the date 
of the principality’s foundation, but also its dramatis personae. As one 
historian has written, ‘according to some Moldova is founded by Drago§, 
according to others by Bogdan. According to some, Drago$ is the son of 
Bogdan, while according to others Bogdan is one of the descendants of 
Drago$’.8 According to Dennis Deletant and many Hungarian historians, 
Drago§ probably began his rule in Moldova in fief to the Hungarian crown 
and as a vassal of King Louis. Meanwhile Bogdan, generally regarded as 
the first independent ruler of Moldova, secured his control in 1363 and 
reigned until around 1367.9 
Two Hungarian documents give us indications of the principality’s 
emergence and are amongst the earliest documents in which the name 
‘Moldova’ is recorded. In 1360, King Louis conferred upon Drago§ six 
villages in the Hungarian county of Maramure§ as recompense for his 
military service in Moldova against ‘rebellious Vlachs’ (‘plures Olachos 
rebellantes’).10 Five years later, in 1365, Louis conferred upon Bale, 
Drago§’ grandson, estates in Maramure$, that had formerly belonged to 
Bogdan, who was now in ‘occupation’ of Moldova.11 It seems that Bogdan 
had entered Moldova and ejected the ‘pro-Hungarian’ Sa§, Drago§’ son, 
and repulsed various Hungarian attempts to re-establish King Louis’ 
authority in Moldova, including one by Bale, Drago?’ grandson. Bogdan’s 
territory, however, extended only from the Carpathian mountains to the 
Siret river, with the town of Baia as the seat of his court.12 
What then were Bogdan’s motives in entering Moldova, ejecting its 
pro-Hungarian ruler and establishing himself as an independent ruler? 
It is likely that Bogdan, who by all accounts was an adherent of the 
Orthodox church, fled from Maramure$, together with other Romanian- 
speakers in order to escape from the strong Catholic proselytizing which 
was taking place in Transylvania and Maramure$ under Hungarian aus¬ 
pices in the fourteenth century.13 Indeed, far from being uninhabited 
lands, as the chroniclers claim, the lands east of the Carpathians may 
already have become a place of refuge for Romanian-speakers, and others, 
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of the Orthodox faith well before Drago$’ ‘foundation’ of the principality. 
Both archaeological and historical evidence suggest that a significant 
Romanian-speaking population had already established itself in the area 
in the centuries before the arrival of Drago§, Bogdan and their followers. 
The Byzantine chronicle of Nicetas Choniates records the seizure of 
Andronicus Comnenus by ‘Vlachs’ on the borders of Galicia in 1164.14 
Archaeological excavations have revealed a long continuity of settlement 
by Romanian-speakers east of the Carpathians, as well as interchange, 
through the mountain passes, with the Romanian-speaking population in 
Transylvania and Maramure$. In other words, migration east of the 
Carpathians was gradual, and probably occasioned by a mixture of 
religious persecution and economic motives.15 
The seventeenth-century Moldovan chronicler, Grigore Ureche, des¬ 
cribed Drago§ and his followers as pdstori, in other words, shepherds.16 It 
is certainly possibly that some of the Romanians who migrated east of the 
Carpathians were, as Ureche suggests, shepherds following a trans- 
humance lifestyle. Others were, however, settled agriculturalists living 
under the authority of a local village leader, a cneaz, who was himself 
subject to the authority of a leader with military and judicial authority, 
the voevod.17Significantly, both these terms for expressing important 
social institutions are of Slavonic origin, which is evidence for the 
Romanian-speakers’ co-habitation with, and eventual absorption of, the 
Slavonic peoples with whom they lived. 
In addition to the Slavonic migrations of the sixth and seventh centuries 
into the Balkans, the ninth and tenth centuries saw the movements of East 
Slav Ruthenes from the Kievan Rus’ lands into what was to become 
northern Moldova. Much of the territory of the future Moldovan princi¬ 
pality was subject to the influence of the Kievan Rus’ principality during 
the tenth and eleventh centuries, and from its appanages following the 
break-up of Kievan Rus’ in the mid-eleventh century. In particular, 
the authority of the Galician principality probably stretched as far as the 
Middle Dnestr and the upper reaches of the Prut river. At the close of 
the twelfth century, the principalities of Galicia and Volhynia were united 
and continued to exert a degree of authority over the future Moldovan 
lands. Moreover, the Hungarian country of Maramure$, where Bogdan 
had owned his estates before becoming ruler of Moldova, was clearly 
inhabited by Ruthenes, as well as Hungarians and Romanian-speakers, 
well before the fourteenth century. 
It seems, therefore, that many Ruthenes were already established in 
village communities before the ‘foundation’ of Moldova in the fourteenth 
century. A folk-memory of the Ruthene presence east of the Carpathians 
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may be preserved in the legend that when Drago§ entered the plains of 
Moldova he found only one man living there. This was a certain Ruthene 
named Etzko who sustained his existence entirely on the produce of his 
bees.18 
In addition to the Slavonic population, it is clear that both Hungarians 
and German Saxons were also present in Moldova well before the 
fourteenth century. The Saxons, in establishing themselves as miners and 
traders, were responsible for founding a number of urban settlements, 
including those later known to the Moldovans as Baia, Siret and Suceava, 
which successively housed the Moldovan princely court in the late 
fourteenth century.19 According to a Saxon historian writing in the late 
nineteenth century, there were also family ties between the new princely 
family and the Saxons. Thus we are told that Drago§ and his followers 
entered Moldova with many Hungarians and Saxons. Drago$ thereafter 
took a Saxon for his wife and their son was named Sa$, meaning Saxon, 
in her honour.20 
We will now briefly discuss the etymology of the principality’s name, 
which is probably linked to Moldova’s economically important Saxon 
population, although a number of other fanciful suggestions have been 
put forward. Adam Neale, for example, a British visitor to Moldova in the 
early nineteenth century, claimed that the principality was named after 
the ancient god Zalmoxis, the ‘eternal priest’ or Mollah. ‘Moldavia’ was 
thus a corruption of Mollah-div-ia, meaning ‘territory of the immortal 
Mollah’.21 More plausibly, the historians Constantin and Dinu Giurescu 
have argued that ‘Moldova’ is a derivation of molid, a Romanian word 
meaning a spruce-tree, and a reference to the evergreen forests which 
covered most of Moldova in the medieval period.22 Other scholars, 
however, claim that the name is Germanic in origin, in keeping with the 
early presence of these people in the area, stretching right back to the 
period of the Gothic invasions in the third century AD. Thus, it has been 
argued that the principality did indeed take its name from the River 
Moldova (a tributary of the Siret river) but that this derives not from the 
name of Drago$’ hound but instead from the Gothic word mulde (or 
molda) meaning ‘loose earth’.23 The name would thus correspond to the 
German name for the river in Bohemia, Moldau (Vltava in Czech), and 
to the River Mulde, a tributary of the Elbe, on the banks of which the 
fortress of Colditz was constructed. 
The presence of German colonists and traders in Moldova at the time 
of its foundation suggests one reason for Hungarian interest in the region, 
namely its economic and commercial worth.24 The lands of the future 
Moldova had long been an important trading route for goods coming from 
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north-west Europe (Flanders and the Hanseatic ports) and from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea and thence to Byzantium or the Mediterranean. Even 
in remote antiquity, this route had been used for the transportation of 
amber from the Baltic to the Hellenic cities. Genoese and Venetian 
traders had established a number of trading colonies on the Black Sea by 
the fourteenth century of which two were to become particularly 
important for the future principality: Kilia (Rom. Chilia, originally a 
Byzantine foundation) on the mouth of the Danube, and Maurocastro 
(Rom. Cetatea Alba, originally the ancient Greek trading colony of Tyras) 
on the mouth of the Dnestr. Both towns were important for the shipping 
of grain and other foodstuffs from the Danube plain to Byzantium, as well 
as cloth coming from northern Europe, and for the export of Byzantine 
‘luxury’ goods to central and northern Europe. During the fourteenth 
century, authority over the ‘Moldovan’ lands, which linked the Black Sea 
ports to the rest of central and northern Europe, was contested by the 
Hungarian and Polish monarchs, who sought to secure control over the 
nascent principality and its trade to their own advantage. 
The Hungarian king, who had already secured his suzerainty over 
the principality of Wallachia, founded by Basarab I in c. 1330, sought 
control over the lands to the south and east of the Carpathians in order 
to regulate the trade from Hungary and Transylvania which passed 
along the Danube river to the Black Sea. The port of Chilia on the 
Danube mouth with its links to Constantinople was particularly coveted 
by the Hungarians and their Wallachian vassals. Even after Bogdan’s 
successful bid for independence from Hungarian vassalage in the 1360s, 
the Moldovan principality continued to be subject to Hungarian politi¬ 
cal pressure. A new power was, however, rising on the principality’s 
northern border. In the 1340s, the expanding Polish kingdom had taken 
control of the principality of Galicia-Volhynia, together with the city of 
Lvov, an important economic centre for German traders which was 
linked to the Hanseatic ports in northern Europe. It was only natural 
that the Polish king should cast his eye over the Moldovan lands which 
linked Lvov to the Black Sea port of Maurocastro (Rom. Cetatea Alba), 
with its large Genoese trading community. The foundation and devel¬ 
opment of the Moldovan principality in the fourteenth century was, 
therefore, played out against the background of Hungarian and Polish 
economic and political rivalry in the area. The Moldovan rulers’ close 
relations with the Polish kingdom yielded, however, an effective counter¬ 
weight to Hungarian attempts to reassert political hegemony over the 
Moldovan lands. 
As well as being contested by the Hungarian and Polish kingdoms, 
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Moldova was also the subject of competition between Roman Catholic 
and Byzantine Orthodox Christianity. It will be recalled that Bogdan, who 
secured Moldova’s independence from Hungary, was of the Orthodox 
faith. Hungarian Catholic pressure, however, contined to threaten the new 
state and Bogdan’s son and successor, Lafcu (reigned 1365-c. 1375) duly 
underwent a ‘conversion’ to Catholicism, which was probably politically 
motivated.25 Lafcu’s conversion was rendered necessary by the union of 
the Hungarian and Polish crowns under Louis of Anjou in 1370, which 
lasted until Louis’ death in 1382 and which put a temporary end to 
Moldova’s strategy of ‘balancing’ between Hungary and Poland. In addi¬ 
tion, considerable pressure was exerted at this time by Franciscan and 
Dominican missionaries. In 1370, therefore, Lafcu made a direct request 
to the pope, asking him to establish a Catholic bishopric at Siret. The pope 
duly agreed and placed the bishopric under immediate papal control. 
Lafcu’s decision to make a personal appeal to Rome, thereby avoiding the 
mediation of the Hungarian ecclesiastical authorities, together with his 
decision to move his court to Siret, was designed to ensure the indepen¬ 
dence of Moldova from Hungarian control. At the same time, Lafcu 
placated King Louis through his espousal of the Catholic faith. That 
Lafcu’s acceptance of Catholicism was politically motivated, rather than 
genuine, is suggested by his wife and daughter’s continued adherence to 
Orthodoxy. Furthermore, on his death Lafcu was buried not at Siret, 
but in the church of St Nicholas in Radaufi, where his father, Bogdan, 
had established an Orthodox bishopric, which served as the principality’s 
de facto metropolitanate. 
Lafcu’s successor, Petru Mu$at I (reigned c. 1375-1391), founder of the 
house of Mu$at which reigned in the principality until the end of the 
sixteenth century, was also of Orthodox faith. This did not prevent Mu$at, 
however, from seeking the very closest political relations with Catholic 
Poland, as a counter-weight to Hungary. Following the death of Louis of 
Anjou in 1382, the Hungarian and Polish kingdoms were once again 
separate, but in 1386 the crowns of Poland and Lithuania were united. In 
the following year, Petru Mu§at paid homage to the Polish-Lithuanian 
king, Wladislas Jagiello I, as his feudal overlord. Through his treaty with 
Poland, Mu$at and his boyars swore to fight for the Polish king against his 
enemies. Cordial relations between the two countries were sealed by 
Murat’s marriage to Wladislas’s sister. 
Crucial as these links were in securing Moldova’s continued inde¬ 
pendence from Hungary, Petru Murat’s oath of fealty to the Polish- 
Lithuanian king imposed a limit on his independence. Nevertheless, the 
territorial extent of the principality continued to grow with the extension 
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of the border to the River Dnestr in the north through the incorporation 
of the fortress of Hotin, wrested from Tatar control. The royal court was 
once again transferred, this time to Suceava which was to become the seat 
of the future Moldovan Orthodox metropolitanate.26 
The creation of the metropolitanate in the 1380s did not come about 
without conflict between the Moldovan ruler and the patriarch of 
Constantinople. Despite his allegiance to Orthodox Christianity, Mu$at, 
like the Orthodox princes of Kiev, attempted to secure a degree of eccles¬ 
iastical autonomy for himself. The metropolitans of Kiev were often 
nominated by the rulers of Kiev and only subsequently confirmed by 
the patriarch of Constantinople. In similar fashion, Mu$at made his own 
appointments, designating his relative, Iosif, a monk from Neamf monas¬ 
tery founded by Mu$at in 1383, to serve as the first metropolitan. Iosifs 
colleague, Meletie, was appointed as bishop of Radaufi. Both were 
consecrated by the metropolitan of Galicia, based at Halych, on the Upper 
Dnestr, whose authority, despite the Polish kingdom’s increasingly 
Catholic complexion, ran along the whole course of the Dnestr river. 
This proved unacceptable to the patriarch of Constantinople who, despite 
his wish to establish a metropolitanate in Moldova as a bulwark against 
Catholicism, sought to appoint a Greek, through whom he could exert 
control. The issue was only resolved after the death of the two chief 
protagonists. In 1401, shortly after the accession of Alexander the Good 
(reigned 1400-1432) to the Moldovan throne, the new patriarch confirmed 
Iosifs appointment as the head of the metropolitanate of Moldova and 
Suceava. As its name suggests, the metropolitanate’s see was based at 
Suceava, the princely capital.27 
As we have seen, however, there was clearly an Orthodox tradition in 
the Moldovan lands even before Bogdan began his reign in the mid¬ 
fourteenth century. The Byzantine emperors were rarely able to secure 
direct or sustained political or ecclesiastical control over the lands of the 
future Moldovan and Wallachian principalities.28 The area was never¬ 
theless within the ‘sphere of influence’ of Byzantine traders and diplomats, 
as well as Byzantine Orthodox missionaries and the numerous monastic 
foundations in the Balkans, Black Sea region and the Crimean steppes.29 
The South and East Slavs had been successfully converted to Orthodox 
Christianity during the ninth and tenth centuries. Although there were 
remnants of Christian communities dating back to Roman times in the 
Danube Basin and delta, most of the Romanian-speakers in the region 
were probably converted to Orthodoxy in the late ninth or early tenth 
centuries by their Bulgarian neighbours. Orthodox religious life in the 
lands of the future Moldova was also dependent to some degree on the 
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metropolitanate of Kiev and subsequently the metropolitanate of Galicia 
at Halych, to which Petru Mu$at turned in his bid to establish an organized 
church structure in Moldova.30 These connections with the Orthodox 
world, however, did not prevent the representatives of the Roman 
Catholic church in the region from contesting the primacy of Byzantine 
Christianity. In a similar fashion, the Byzantine church continued to have 
considerable influence in Hungary well into the thirteenth century, and 
even beyond.31 Nevertheless, it was Byzantine Orthodox Christianity 
which eventually prevailed amongst the Romanian-speaking Moldovans 
and Wallachians. 
The Middle Ages: The Reigns of Alexander the Good and 
Stephen the Great 
It was during the reign of Alexander the Good (reigned 1400-1432) that 
Moldova became fully integrated into the religious and cultural life of 
Byzantine Christianity. This followed the arrival of the patriarchal 
delegation to the principality in 1401 to confirm the creation of the 
Metropolitanate of Moldova and Suceava. This process of incorporation 
into the Byzantine world had already begun in Moldova’s sister princi¬ 
pality of Wallachia with the creation of the Orthodox metropolitanate of 
Ungrovlachia based at Curtea de Arge§ in 1359. 
The language through which the Romanian-speaking Moldovans and 
Wallachians received the Byzantine Orthodox liturgy and religious liter¬ 
ature was Church Slavonic (now usually referred to as ‘Old Church 
Slavonic’). The conversion to Orthodox Christianity of the Slavs by 
Byzantine missionaries and monks had been aided by, and was dependent 
upon, the invention of a Slavonic alphabet by SS Cyril and Methodius and 
their followers. Through this alphabet the Byzantine liturgy, as well as the 
Holy Scriptures, lives of saints and other religious, and even profane, texts 
were translated from Greek into the Slavonic language. By the late ninth 
century the Bulgarians had accepted Old Church Slavonic and the 
Romanian-speakers in the region had probably adopted Old Church 
Slavonic for use in the Byzantine liturgy by the eleventh century, through 
the mediation of Bulgarian Orthodox clergymen and monks.32 It was thus 
the Bulgarian variant of Old Church Slavonic in particular which was most 
frequently used in the principalities over the following centuries for 
copying Slavonic texts or translating from Byzantine-Greek originals. To 
this day, Romanian religious terminology is infused with words of Slavonic 
and Greek origin, as well as terms derived from Latin originals.33 The 
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Bulgarian variant of Old Church Slavonic was also used for original works 
of a more creative nature, such as the ‘Life of St John the New’, written 
by the Bulgarian clergyman, Grigore Jamblac, who led the patriarchal 
delegation which had arrived in Moldova in 1401. 
The emergence of the Moldovan and Wallachian principalities as 
political entities in the fourteenth century had the effect of transforming 
Old Church Slavonic into the written language of the court, as well as that 
of the church, through its adoption by the chancellery. Old Church 
Slavonic dominated both these institutions in the principalities until 
well into the seventeenth century, although the court chancelleries also 
drew up documents in Latin and German where necessary. Old Church 
Slavonic, however, underwent certain modifications throughout the 
Orthodox world under the influences of the local spoken languages. In 
Moldova the script underwent some slight mutation as a result of the 
gradual permeation of Polish and East Slav linguistic influences.34 The 
centrality of Old Church Slavonic in the early centuries of the principal¬ 
ities’ existence is reflected in that fact it was the Old Church Slavonic 
alphabet which was used to give written form to the Romanian language. 
This alphabet was only replaced by the Latin script in the principalities 
in the mid-ninteenth century. 
Institutional religious life in Moldova, based on the Byzantine model, 
also began to flourish during Alexander the Good’s long reign. Alexander 
founded an Orthodox bishopric at Roman, as well as re-establishing the 
bishopric set up by Bogdan I at Radaufi. He built a number of churches 
and his monastic foundations included Moldovi^a and Bistrifa in northern 
Moldova, as well as Capriana and Vazare$ti east of the River Prut. 
These monasteries shared in the Hesychast tradition, with its stress on 
inner silence and meditative contemplation, already established at Petru 
Murat’s foundation at Neamf, which was itself indebted to the Hesychast 
traditions emanating from Wallachia and elsewhere in the Balkans. 
The style of ecclesiastical architecture and painting employed during 
Alexander’s reign was also based on the Byzantine style, together with 
the slight local variations already visible in the Orthodox lands surround¬ 
ing Moldova, such as those of the Serbian ‘Morava’ school. The richly 
decorated religious embroideries and vestments produced during 
Alexander’s reign also owed their designs to Byzantine originals. 
Bistrifa and Neamf monasteries became the main Moldovan schools 
for the copying of Old Church Slavonic religious texts from Bulgarian and 
Serbian, as well as for the translation of Byzantine-Greek originals. An 
important school of calligraphy and manuscript illumination was also 
established at Neamf monastery during Alexander’s reign. One of the 
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many beautiful works produced by the school was a copy of an illuminated 
Slavonic gospel, currently held in the Bodleian Library in Oxford.35 
Orthodox clergymen, monks and scholars of Slavonic and Greek 
origin, travelled extensively through the principalities in the medieval 
period, assisting in the diffusion of Byzantine religion and culture. The 
career of Grigore Jamblac is a case in point. A monk from Trnovo in 
Bulgaria, which was itself a leading cultural centre, Tamblac had already 
visited Serbia, Mount Athos (the home of the Hesychast movement in the 
Orthdox world) and Constantinople before his arrival in Moldova. Here 
he was abbot of Neamf monastery from 1403 until 1415. Famed for his 
sermons in Old Church Slavonic, Tamblac did much to confirm and insti¬ 
tutionalize the presence of the Byzantine Orthodox liturgy and religious 
literature within the Moldovan church in its Slavonic form. He became 
metropolitan of Kiev in 1415 and in this capacity he helped to strengthen 
relations between the world of the Orthodox East Slavs and the 
Moldovans.36 
The Byzantine model was, however, also adopted during Alexander’s 
reign in the day-to-day life of the princely court at Suceava.37 The cere¬ 
monial of the court displayed the influence of the imperial court at 
Constantinople, which was itself based upon the elaborate ritual of the 
Orthodox church. Additionally a system of court officials began to crystal¬ 
lize under Alexander’s direction, with titles derived either directly from 
the Greek spoken at the imperial court, such as logofat meaning chan¬ 
cellor, or in Slavonic translation, such as stolnic meaning high steward, or 
paharnic, cup-bearer. Once again, this system and nomenclature of court 
officials probably arrived in Moldova through the mediation of the 
Bulgarian or Serbian royal courts, where Byzantine influence had long 
been apparent. 
Alexander ruled with the aid of a princely council, or Sfatul Domnesc, 
consisting of advisers drawn from amongst the boyars, that is the landed 
nobles, from whose ranks court officials were drawn. During his reign, 
Alexander was able to maintain royal authority over the boyars, leading 
to a relatively long period of political stability which, as we shall see, 
proved to be a rare event in the principality’s history. 
Alexander’s official title was domn, from the Latin, dominus, which is 
often translated as prince. In medieval written documents, the Moldovan 
and Wallachian princes were often referred to as hospodar, the Slavonic 
translation of domn, or as voievod. Alexander often appropriated for 
himself the description autocrat, a name usually only applied in this period 
to the emperor in Constantinople himself, and reflecting the Byzantine 
belief that the emperor’s sovereignty was absolute and universal, 
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mirroring that of God in heaven. As a Romanian historian has noted, 
‘Alexander inherited from the Byzantine world his conception of power 
and the role of the ruler in the life of the state’.38 
The reality of the small principality’s existence, however, and the 
practical extent of Alexander’s power were more limited than his appro¬ 
priation of Byzantine political and ecclesiastical models suggests. The 
prince’s independence and autonomy were circumscribed by the fact that 
Moldova had been effectively held in fief from the Polish-Lithuanian 
crown since Petru Murat’s oath of allegiance to Wladislas Jagiello in 1387. 
Indeed, so much did the Polish king regard Moldova as a component part 
of his kingdom, that he awarded several estates in Moldova to his relatives 
shortly after Alexander’s accession to the Moldovan throne.39 Alexander 
himself paid homage to the Polish king five times during the course of his 
reign and was on several occasions obliged to help the Polish king against 
his adversaries, the Teutonic knights. While fealty to the Polish monarch, 
who had many Orthodox subjects, saved Moldova from the immediate 
clutches of her powerful Catholic Hungarian neighbour, a treaty drawn 
up between Poland-Lithuania and Hungary in 1412 reflected the potential 
fragility of Moldova’s territorial integrity and the limitations of her ruler’s 
absolutist aspirations.40 
The treaty confirmed Moldova’s status as a vassal of Poland-Lithuania, 
but laid certain military obligations upon Moldova to fight for the 
Hungarians in the event of an Ottoman Turkish attack. Failure to perform 
such services would lead to the partition of the principality: the north and 
east, with the port of Cetatea Alba, falling to Poland, and the south and 
west, with the port of Chilia, to Hungary. Although the partition did not 
take place, its stipulations reflected not only Moldova’s potential vulner¬ 
ability, but also the territorial expansion and economic growth which had 
taken place under Alexander which now prompted Moldova’s neighbours 
to cast covetous eyes upon her. 
When Alexander came to the throne in 1400, Moldova’s borders had 
only extended to the River Dnestr in the north, at Hotin.41 The rest of the 
river was effectively controlled by the Muslim Tatars, including Cetatea 
Alba, although this remained a major Genoese trading port. In 1408 
Alexander successfully pushed the Tatars beyond the Dnestr and secured 
his position on the river at Tighina. From here, Alexander struck down 
towards the Dnestr estuary and seized Cetatea Alba where the Genoese 
traders obligingly accepted his suzerainty. Alexander thus established 
the Dnestr river as Moldova’s eastern border, where it remained until 
Russia annexed the lands between the Prut and Dnestr rivers in 1812. 
Simultaneously, by incorporating Cetatea Alba into Moldova, Alexander 
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asserted his control over the lucrative trade route between this Black Sea 
port and central and northern Europe, especially the Polish city of Lvov. 
Cetatea Alba also yielded signs of God’s approval of Alexander’s victory 
over the Tatars, through the discovery of the relics of Saint John the New, 
martyred by the Tatars in 1330. These were transported to Suceava, the 
seat of the new metropolitanate, to serve as the principality’s protective 
saint. 
This was, however, by no means the last of Alexander’s military and 
economic successes. By 1412 he had also taken control from Wallachia of 
the other great Genoese emporium, Chilia, situated on the Danube 
mouth. By securing these two entrepots, Alexander greatly increased the 
international political and economic significance of Moldova. The princi¬ 
pality now acted as the territorial link, under one sovereignty, between 
the great north European Baltic and Hanseatic trading ports and the 
Black Sea, and through this to the Levant, Constantinople and the 
Mediterranean. 
Alexander’s military conquests and the political stability of his reign 
assisted the growth of trade, but Alexander also sought to increase trade 
in Moldova directly, especially through the granting of privileges to 
merchants and traders. Hence, he extended the rights of traders to hold 
market and fairs within the principality. The Genoese traders at Cetatea 
Alba and Chilia were allowed to retain their administrative autonomy, 
despite the incorporation of these towns into Moldova, and continued 
to practise their Catholic faith. In 1408 Alexander extended generous 
privileges to traders from Lvov in Polish Galicia and to Transylvanian 
merchants. Suceava, which had existed as an urban outpost well before 
the foundation of Moldova, and more recently served as the seat of the 
court and metropolitanate, became one of the principality’s main in-land 
commercial centres. Situated in the north of the principality, Suceava 
served to connect Moldovan traders with the important trading com¬ 
munities of Lvov and with Bistrifa in Transylvania. All three towns had 
significant and influential German merchant populations. 
In order to secure Moldova’s new border on the Dnestr river from the 
Tatars, Alexander extended the fortifications at Hotin and Cetatea Alba. 
He also improved the defences of Chilia on the Danube, which was 
vulnerable to Wallachian and Hungarian assault, and in the interior of the 
country at Neamf and Suceava. The administrative organization of 
Moldova was also achieved during Alexander’s reign through the division 
of the country into twenty-four regions. 
The Moldovan territorial space continued, however, to be contested by 
other Christian denominations. This was shrewdly exploited by Alexander 
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to his own political and economic advantage. In 1401 he recognized the 
establishment of an Armenian Orthodox bishopric based at Suceava. 
The Armenians were an important trading community throughout the 
Balkans, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus and the establishment of 
the bishopric helped to ensure their enduring presence on Moldovan soil. 
In 1414 he established a Catholic bishopric at Baia, in addition to that 
established by Lafcu at Siret. This not only placated the regions’ ‘Catholic 
powers’, Poland-Lithuania and Hungary, but also the significant Catholic 
German trading community, as well as the Poles and Hungarians who 
lived in Baia. Alexander also had two Catholic wives, one of whom was 
Ringala, the cousin of the Polish king. 
Perhaps the most interesting of the Christian denominations repre¬ 
sented in Moldova during the reign of Alexander and his successors was 
Hussitism . The Hussites entered the principality as a result of their perse¬ 
cution in Bohemia and Hungary after 1420. Most of these Hussites were 
artisans and craftsmen, probably of Slovak and Hungarian origin, who 
found employment in Moldovan towns, although some of them may have 
come to Moldova as mercenaries. The Hussites did not seek converts 
amongst the Orthodox population, but were responsible for many conver¬ 
sions from Catholicism to Hussitism, a process which the principality’s 
Orthodox prince cannot have viewed with displeasure. In the 1440s the 
Englishman Peter Payne, a follower of John Wycliffe who had contacts 
with the Hussites in Bohemia, took refuge in Moldova before travelling 
on to Constantinople in 1451 with the intention of establishing a union 
between the Hussites and the Orthodox church. Such discussions as may 
have taken place were inevitably brought to an end by the Ottoman 
conquest of Constantinope in 1453, after which the Hussites continued 
their development as a separate sect. A number of them were received at 
the court of Stephen the Great who, like his grandfather, doubtless 
approved of their conversions amongst the Roman Catholic population.42 
The Hussite presence in Moldova may be recollected in the name of the 
town Hu§i and a village of the same name.43 
Alexander’s reign, therefore, was one of consolidation of royal power 
and institutions, the promotion of trade and extension of Moldova’s 
borders, within which the principality’s religious and cultural life began to 
flourish. It was the period in which Moldova developed lasting finks with 
the Byzantine world of her Slavonic neighbours and with Constantinople 
itself. The Byzantine heritage was to remain central to the fife of Moldova 
for centuries to come. Although Dimitrie Cantemir was almost certainly 
incorrect in his claim that Alexander received his princely crown directly 
from the Byzantine emperor, Cantemir was, nevertheless, correct in his 
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description of Alexander as ‘the first to make foreigners acquainted with 
the name of the Moldovans, who up to then had been too little known’.44 
Despite the successes of Alexander’s reign, however, the princi¬ 
pality’s existence was threatened by a far greater foe than her Catholic 
neighbours. By 1354, the Muslim Ottomans had already extended their 
empire to the European shores of the Dardanelles and in subsequent 
decades their military prowess made them victorious throughout the 
Balkans and Danube Basin. The Battle of Kosovo in 1389 effectively 
brought the independence of the Orthodox Serbian kingdom to an end 
and was followed by the subjugation of the Bulgarian lands to Ottoman 
control. In 1396 the Christian forces of the Wallachian ruler and the King 
of Hungary were defeated at Nicopolis on the Danube. The course of the 
Lower Danube now fell under Turkish control as the Wallachians lost 
the Danube fortress at Silistra together with the Black Sea coast of the 
Dobruja. A Turkish siege of Cetatea Alba was successfully repulsed by 
Alexander the Good in 1420 but subsequent decades witnessed a number 
of further Christian defeats. In particular, the routing of the Hungarians 
at the Battle of Varna in 1444 effectively sealed the fate of South-East 
Europe. On 29 May 1453, the ‘Holy City’ of Constantinople, the political 
and religious capital of the East Roman empire for over a millennium, fell 
to the Ottomans. This was a turning point in the lives of the Orthodox 
Balkan peoples and the beginning of the region’s long domination by a 
power of alien religion. 
Wallachia had already been forced to pay tribute to the Ottomans in 
the early years of the fifteenth century. In 1462 Mehmed II successfully 
invaded the principality. He dethroned its prince, Vlad the Impaler, 
and placed on the throne Vlad’s more obliging brother, Radu the 
Handsome. That Moldova was able avoid such a fate and retain consid¬ 
erable independence from the Turks for several decades longer than 
Wallachia, owed much to the military courage and political and diplo¬ 
matic skill of Stephen the Great (reigned 1457-1504), the grandson of 
Alexander the Good. 
Stephen the Great has the reputation as one of Romania’s national 
heroes, but his path to the throne was anything but auspicious. 
Immediately upon Alexander’s death in 1432, civil war broke out between 
his numerous descendents. Neither of the principalities had a clear system 
of royal succession to the throne, and utilized a mixture of the hereditary 
and elective principles. This meant that all male members of the princely 
family, including illegitimate sons, had the right to claim the throne and 
to place themselves before the boyars who chose the new ruler from 
amongst them. Unsurprisingly, this created intense rivalry between the 
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different contenders and their boyar supporters which frequently lapsed 
into full-scale war. The flawed system of succession ultimately streng¬ 
thened the hands of the Ottoman sultans in their attempts to exert control 
over the rulers of the principalities. 
The civil war on Alexander’s death raged for twenty-five years and the 
period up to Stephen’s accession in 1457 saw no less that sixteen reigns 
divided between eight princes. In order to win the throne, Stephen entered 
into an alliance with his Wallachian cousin, Vlad the Impaler, and was 
forced, as the price of his support, to cede the port of Chilia to the 
Wallachians and their Hungarian suzerains.45 
In exchange for Polish support in his battle to win the throne, Stephen 
was also forced to cede the fortress of Hotin on the Dnestr river. The 
consequence of the loss of Chilia and Hotin was that Moldova lost much 
of the autonomy, built up during Alexander’s reign, to her powerful 
Roman Catholic neighbours. These now controlled the Danube and 
Dnestr rivers, and the trade which traversed them. Moreover, only one 
year before Stephen ascended the Moldovan throne, his predecessor and 
rival, Petru Aron, had been forced to pay tribute to the Ottoman Turks, 
thereby accepting their suzerainty: an ominous sign of the growth of 
Turkish power. 
Once installed on the throne, however, Stephen was determined to free 
himself from dependence upon Hungary, Poland and the Turks by 
entering into alliances with these powers and playing them off, one 
against the other. In so doing, Stephen was able to turn Moldova into a 
regional political and military force of no mean significance. As the 
historian $erban Papacostea notes, ‘ceasing simply to be an object of 
Polish-Hungarian rivalry, Moldova became an active factor in European 
politics’.46 
Stephen’s immediate concern was the return of the fortresses and ports 
of Hotin and Chilia. His two-year siege of Hotin led to a treaty with the 
Poles in 1459 under which Stephen swore fealty to the Polish king, who 
in turn restored Hotin to Moldova. Supported now by the Poles, Stephen 
was successful in his reconquest of Chilia from the Hungarians in 1465. 
Loss of control over the Danube mouth was a significant economic and 
strategic blow to the Hungarians, however, and led their king, Matthias 
Corvinus, to launch an invasion of Moldova. Stephen’s defeat of the 
Hungarians at Baia in 1467 proved to be the last major attempt by the 
Hungarians to bring Moldova under direct Hungarian control and gave 
Stephen freedom of action to deal with the Poles and Turks. 
The latter, in the meantime, had formed an alliance with the Muslim 
Tatars, brooding discontentedly east of the Dnestr river, whence they had 
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been driven by Alexander the Good. Stephen had already successfully 
beaten back a Tatar incursion across the Dnestr at the Battle of Lipnic 
in 1469 and had built two fortresses on the river, at Orhei and Soroca, 
to contain them. Six years later, Stephen’s army was once more victorious 
A 
over a combined Turkish-Tartar army at the Battle of Podul Inalt and 
repulsed Turkish naval attacks on Chilia and Cetatea Alba. These vic¬ 
tories over the seemingly invincible Sultan Mehmed II, ‘the Conqueror’ 
of Constantinople, led the pope to declare Stephen to be the ‘Athlete of 
Christ’, which was a name reserved only for other such notable heroes as 
John Hunyadi and the Albanian Skanderbeg. 
Undaunted, the Turks once again attacked Moldova in 1476 and 
defeated Stephen at the Battle of Valea Alba. Stephen’s position 
remained sufficiently strong, however, for the Turkish forces to withdraw 
from the country without making any territorial gains. A treaty between 
Stephen and Mehmed stabilized relations but forced the Moldovan ruler 
to pay tribute to the sultan, like his predecessor Petru Aron. 
Following Mehmed’s death, his successor, Bayezid II, proved deter¬ 
mined to retake Chilia and Cetatea Alba. In the summer of 1484, the Turks 
captured the fortresses and reinforced Stephen’s status as a tribute-paying 
vassal of the Sublime Porte. A treaty of 1487, however, while confirming 
Turkish possession of the two ports, stipulated that the Ottomans were not 
to expand beyond them. Moldova’s autonomy was recognized, including 
the continuance of Moldovan customs, religion, and law, together with the 
right of the boyars to choose their own prince. These conditions were 
subject, however, to the princes’ regular payment of tribute and the 
requirement to give military aid, if requested, to the sultan. 
The loss of Chilia and Cetatea Alba, the latter now known as 
Akkerman to the Turks, was a huge blow to the Moldovan ruler, and not 
simply on economic grounds. The fortresses were now garrisoned by 
Turkish troops, thereby potentially curtailing Stephen’s military freedom 
of action and enabling the sultan to interefere in the affairs of Moldova 
and lands further afield. As Bayezid II himself commented, Chilia was ‘the 
key and gateway to the whole country of Moldova and all the lands of 
Hungary and of the Danubian countries’, while Cetatea Alb& was ‘the key 
and gateway to all the Polish lands, the Romanian lands and Tatar lands 
and to all the Black Sea . . ,’.47 
In an attempt to recapture these strategically and economically 
important possessions, Stephen was forced to turn once again to the Poles. 
Reluctantly Stephen swore fealty to the Polish king in 1485 in exchange 
for military assistance. The Poles, however, made peace with the Turks 
and thereby earned themselves Stephen’s enmity. With relations between 
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Moldova and Poland-Lithuania at complete breakdown, Stephen sought 
support against the Poles in a number of unlikely quarters. He concluded 
an alliance with the Tatar Khan of the Crimea, and was even prepared 
at times to consort with the Turks against the Poles. He also exerted 
considerable diplomatic pressure in pursuit of close relations with Ivan 
III, prince of Muscovy (reigned 1462-1505), who was seeking to expand 
his territory at the expense of his Catholic Polish-Lithuanian neighbour.48 
Closer contact with Muscovy was secured through family links, since 
Stephen’s first wife, Eudoxia, sister of the Kievan prince, was also Ivan 
Ill’s cousin.49 Stephen’s rapprochement with Muscovy was sealed by the 
marriage of his daughter by Eudoxia to Ivan’s son in 1483. Diplomatic 
activity between the Moldovan and Russian courts was intense in the late 
1480s and early 1490s, and it is possible that a treaty of alliance may have 
been concluded. 
In 1492 Stephen moved against the Poles by invading and occupying 
Pocujia, a region in the south-east of Polish Galicia. Pocujia had been 
promised to Stephen’s ancestor, Petru Mu$at, I in 1387 as surety for a large 
loan which the Moldovan prince had lent to his suzerain, Wladislas 
Jagiello, to help him prosecute his war against Hungary. The loan had 
never been repaid, but the Moldovans had, thus far, not pursued their 
right to Pocujia. Since it was watered by the upper reaches of both the 
Dnestr and Prut rivers, the area was rich in agricultural produce, as well 
as having plentiful mineral resources. In 1497, the Poles struck back with 
a full-scale invasion of Moldova. Once again, however, Stephen’s military 
skill proved superior to that of his adversaries, leading to victory over the 
Poles at the Battle of Dumbrava Ro$ie. Thus, while the Polish-Moldovan 
treaty of 1499 stipulated the return of recently seized Pocujia to Poland, 
it also brought Polish suzerainty over Moldova to an end.50 In the final 
years of his reign, Stephen sought friendship with his Catholic neighbours, 
Poland-Lithuania and Hungary, with a view to expelling the Turks from 
the region. As a result, Stephen tried to influence the ruler of Muscovy to 
end his conflict with Poland-Lithuania and to unite with his fellow 
Christians against the Ottomans. 
The fall of the ‘Holy City’ of Constantinople to the Muslims Ottomans 
only four years before Stephen became prince of Moldova in 1457 was a 
crucial factor in shaping the prince’s mentality and that of his successors. 
After 1453 the princes of Moldova and Wallachia were the sole surviving 
Orthodox monarchs in south-eastern Europe. They increasingly regarded 
themselves, and were regarded by the Orthodox peoples under Ottoman 
rule, as the last bastion of Orthodox Christianity in the region, from where 
a ‘crusade’ against the infidel might be launched, and as the protectors 
24 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
and patrons of the Orthodox church under alien rule. The Moldovan and 
Wallachian princes thus saw themselves as the legitimate inheritors of the 
Byzantine imperial tradition. In keeping with such a view, the ceremonial 
at Stephen’s court was replete with Byzantine ritual. His investiture as 
prince in 1457 included his anointment by the Orthodox metropolitan. 
This mirrored the former emperors’ anointment by the patriarchs of 
Constantinople and served to endow the Moldovan house of Mu$at with 
an almost sacred aura.51 
Stephen’s three marriages to Orthodox princesses were an integral part 
of his vision of Moldova as the defender of the Orthodox world. The 
prince’s marriage to Eudoxia of Kiev and the pursuit of closer family 
connections with Ivan III of Muscovy were intended to seal Moldova’s 
position as the mediator between the world of the Orthodox Christians of 
the Balkans and that of the Orthodox East Slavs. Stephen’s subsequent 
marriage in 1472 to Maria of Mangup, a member of the former Byzantine 
imperial family, was also pursued in order to raise the prestige of Moldova 
in the Orthodox world and to link the house of Mu$at directly with the 
imperial heritage. Through this marriage, Stephen acquired territory in 
the Crimea region of the Black Sea. His third marriage, to the daughter 
of the Wallachian prince Radu the Handsome, was inspired in the hope, 
which was not fulfilled, of uniting the thrones of Moldova and Wallachia 
and thereby launching an anti-Ottoman crusade from the princpalitites. 
Stephen’s role as patron and protector of the Orthodox church was 
apparent in the blossoming of Moldova’s religious life during his long 
reign. The prince was assisted in this by the many Orthodox Christians, 
especially Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians, who fled from Constantinople 
after its fall, and from other areas of the Byzantine empire which the 
Turks had conquered.52 Stephen was also responsible for founding, or 
restoring, some forty churches and monasteries in Moldova. These 
included additions to the religious foundations of his predecessors, for 
example at Neamf and Bistrifa monasteries. Amongst Stephen’s own 
foundations were the monastery of Putna, which quickly emerged as one 
of Moldova’s foremost centres of monasticism and scholarship, as well as 
Voronef, Dobrovaf and Tazlau. Amongst the prince’s new churches was 
one dedicated to the Apostles Peter and Paul in Hu$i in the 1490s, which 
was transformed into the seat of the new bishopric of Hu$i in the following 
century. Wealthy boyars at the princely court were also generous towards 
the church. Of particular cultural importance was Arbore monastery, 
founded by Stephen’s chief magistrate. 
The style of ecclesiastical architecture and painting employed during 
this period combined the Byzantine style inherited from the era of 
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Alexander the Good, with local traditions such as Gothic elements intro¬ 
duced by Transylvanian and Polish artists and artisans attracted to 
Moldova by the prince. Stephen and his boyars further supported the 
growing monastic establishment through financial donations and gifts of 
land, which included whole villages, as well as forests, vineyards, mills, 
beehives and fishponds. As a result, the monasteries soon ranked amongst 
the principality’s foremost landowners. 
The workshops attached to Moldova’s monasteries were prolific in the 
creation of precious religious artefacts, such as icons, embroidery, 
vestments and ritual objects. Many of the silversmiths and goldsmiths as 
well as the artists of the elaborately decorated frescoes and murals which 
adorned Moldovan church walls were trained in the Moldovan monas¬ 
teries, while others came from remoter areas of the former ‘Byzantine 
commonwealth’. Richly decorated liturgical books were produced at the 
new scriptorium at Putna monastery and at Neamf, where the school of 
calligraphy and manuscript illumination founded by Alexander the Good 
continued to flourish. 
Many of Moldova’s artistic treasures, however, were destined for 
Orthodox religious houses and institutions beyond the principality. The 
prince, together with wealthy boyars and metropolitans, began to give 
support to the Orthodox church throughout the Ottoman empire. Their 
munificence consisted of financial donations, often used for the restoration 
or construction of ecclesiastical buildings, and in gifts or precious liturgi¬ 
cal or religious objects. From the mid-fifteenth century, and for several 
centuries thereafter, the principalities supported the church throughout 
the Balkans, as well as the patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, 
Antioch, and Jerusalem. Support for the patriarchy of Jerusalem included 
donations to the ‘Holy Places’ associated with the fife and death of Christ. 
The relationship between the principalities and the monasteries of Mount 
Athos, the great centre of Orthodox spirituality, was especially warm. 
Stephen’s gifts to the ‘holy mountain’ of Athos began in 1466 with a dona¬ 
tion of money to Zographou monastery and, in subsequent decades, his 
gifts included an illuminated Slavonic edition of the Gospels, precious 
embroideries and a gold icon of St George. He was also responsible for 
the building of a tower at Vatopediou monastery, as well as a baptistery 
at St Paul’s monastery, both on Mount Athos.53 
Stephen’s growing reputation for generosity within the Orthodox 
Christian world, and his considerable military successes, would not have 
been possible without the internal consolidation of his royal authority. His 
anointment by the Moldovan metropolitan during his investiture as prince 
in 1457 was not only a means of legitimizing his accession to the throne 
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after twenty-five years of civil war, but also of establishing himself as the 
inheritor of the Byzantine concepts of rulership. Although often at odds 
with political and military reality, Stephen, in the best traditions of 
Byzantine autocracy, believed that the ruler’s authority was derived 
directly from God, as part of His divine plan, as well as through royal 
descent. His reassertion of royal power over the boyars was in keeping 
with these principles. 
Mindful of how the power of the landed boyars had enabled them to 
contest the royal succession and drag the country into civil war, Stephen 
sought to diminish their strength through the restitution of royal lands 
which the boyars had expropriated during the wars, and by preventing any 
further expansion of boyar estates. He reasserted royal domination over 
the Sfatul Domnesc, the princely council, and over the army. He expanded 
the latter to an impressive force of some forty to sixty thousand men, while 
reducing the authority of the boyars over the contingents which they sent 
to war.54 
The concept of divine order, and the legitimacy of Stephen’s rulership 
through royal descent, were given expression in the first chronicle of 
Moldovan history, which was produced at Stephen’s court during his 
lifetime. Up until this period, literary works in Old Church Slavonic had 
been almost entirely copies of Slavonic texts or translations from 
Byzantine-Greek. Few creative works were produced, with the notable 
exception of Grigore Tamblac’s ‘Life of St John the New’. The chronicle 
written during Stephen’s reign provided the framework for the oldest 
surviving Moldovan chronicle in Old Church Slavonic, the sixteenth- 
century ‘Anonymous Chronicle of Moldova’, which covers the history 
of the principality from its foundation by Drago$ to 1507, three years 
after Stephen’s death. This chronicle subsequently provided the source for 
the seventeenth-century Moldovan chroniclers, Grigore Ureche and 
Miron and Nicolae Costin, who produced the first historical chronicles 
in the Romanian language. The political importance of the sixteenth- 
century ‘Anonymous Chronicle of Moldova’ lies in its stress both on 
divine order and on dynastic continuity in legitimizing Stephen’s rule, 
and integrates the major events in Stephen’s reign into Moldova’s history 
from the principality’s foundation by Drago$.55 This sense of dynastic 
continuity and the unfolding of Moldovan history around its rulers was 
given expression by Stephen’s removal of the wooden church erected by 
Drago§ at Volovaf to his own monastic foundation at Putna, where it 
became the Mu$at family necropolis. 
Stephen’s reign was both Moldova’s ‘Golden Age’, in which the 
political and cultural achievements of Alexander’s reign were brought to 
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fruition, as well as its swansong. Moldova under Stephen the Great 
appeared poised to establish its independence from foreign suzerainty and 
to achieve the status of a regional power of military, political and cultural 
significance. Yet even at the height of Stephen’s power the signs of 
impending Ottoman domination were already evident. The reigns of his 
successors bore witness to the principality’s diminishing freedom of 
action in the political and economic sphere as Turkish influence in the 
region grew. 
The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Moldova under 
Ottoman Suzerainty 
Ottoman gains on the Black Sea shore in the late fifteenth century had 
already transformed the Black Sea into a ‘Turkish lake’. The fate of 
Christendom took a further turn for the worse when, at the Battle of 
Mohacs in 1526, the Hungarian king was defeated by the Ottomans. 
Fifteen years later, central Hungary was transformed into a Turkish 
pashalik, a province under direct Turkish control headed by a pasha. 
Transylvania was also forced to accept vassal status similar to that of 
Moldova and Wallachia. 
Nevertheless, the principalities retained considerable autonomy within 
the Ottoman Empire. Under agreements (or ahdnames, later misleadingly 
known as ‘capitulations’)56 between the sultans and the principalities, the 
princes became vassals of the sultan, who retained control of their foreign 
policy, and they paid him an annual tribute, together with various other 
contributions in money and kind. In exchange, the sultan was obliged not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the principalities and agreed not to 
settle Muslims, build mosques or garrison Ottoman troops on Wallachian 
or Moldovan soil. In reality, however, the Ottomans were soon 
encroaching on the autonomy of the principalities. 
A number of ports and fortresses belonging to both Moldova and 
Wallachia on the Danube and Dnestr rivers were occupied by the Turks. 
As early as 1419 the ports of Giurgiu and Tumu on the Danube had each 
been transformed into a raia\ a territory occupied and administered by the 
Turks, usually around a fortress. Following their loss under Stephen the 
Great, Chilia and Cetatea Alba also became raia-s (for such the plural, 
which has no counterpart in English, will in future be rendered). In 1538, 
during the reign of Stephen’s illegitimate son, Petru Rare?, Sultan 
Suleiman the Magnificent seized Tighina on the Dnestr, which became the 
core of the Bender raia.51 Over the following century, the same fate befell 
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the Danube ports of Braila, Ismail and Reni. In 1714 the massive fortress 
of Hotin on the Upper Dnestr became a raia, occupied by a Turkish 
garrison, to prevent it falling permanently into the hands of the Poles. The 
Turks and their followers increasingly acquired land in and around each 
raia and established a number of mosques. When Prince Vasile Lupu 
entered Chilia and Ismail during the 1630s, he discovered to his horror 
that neither port had a single church, although both had mosques. 
The purpose of the raia-s was to secure the northern border of the 
Ottoman empire against Christian attacks, and to ensure the continued 
loyalty of the sultans’ Moldovan and Wallachian vassals. The raia-s also 
acted as collection points for tribute and agricultural produce from the 
principalities destined for delivery to Constantinople. The fortresses 
and land incorporated into each raia were not returned to the principal¬ 
ities until the early nineteenth century, despite the many attempts by the 
princes of Moldova to recapture them with the help of their Christian 
neighbours. 
The raia-s of Bender (Rom. Tighina) and Akkerman (Rom. Cetatea 
Alba) on the Dnestr river served as a channel of communication between 
the Turks and their Muslim Tatars allies who lived beyond the Dnestr.58 
The Ottomans had already settled Tatar families in the Dobruja on the 
Black Sea in the early sixteenth century and had offered them land in the 
area around the raia-s of Chilia and Akkerman. From the mid-sixteench 
century, Tatars began to settle in the triangle of land running roughly from 
the south of Bender on the Dnestr in south-east Moldova, across to Chilia 
on the Danube mouth. This area was known as Budjak to the Tatars 
and Turks (Bugeac, or Bugiac, in Romanian) meaning ‘corner’ or ‘nook’ 
in Tatar. By the early seventeenth century some 15,000 Tatars had been 
settled in the Bugeac and the name began to be used in official documen¬ 
tation. At the same time, as a reward for the Tatars’ frequent military help 
against rebellious Moldovans, Poles and Cossacks, the Ottomans created 
the massive Tatar-controlled pashalik of Silistria which included the 
Danube ports of Tumu, Giurgiu, Braila, and Chilia, as well as Akkerman 
and Bender on the Dnestr, together with the Bugeac and the Dobruja. A 
substantial area of the principality was thus dominated by the Muslim 
Tatars and proved a permanent source of conflict as Moldovan rulers and 
boyars frequently sought to expel them, often with the assistance of neigh¬ 
bouring powers. 
The Ottomans did not only encroach upon the territorial integrity of 
the principalities. In the sixteenth century, the sultan also became respon¬ 
sible for confirming the appointment of each new ruler and increasingly 
interfered in the process of their election by the boyars. No ruler in either 
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Moldova or Wallachia could remain long on the throne without the 
approval of the sultan. Meanwhile, the boyars tried to elect weak 
princes through whom they could exert control. Stephen the Great’s 
attempt to ensure that the Moldovan throne remained the preserve of the 
house of Mu§at proved abortive. Never again was the principality to have 
a prince who ruled as long as either Alexander the Good or Stephen 
the Great. 
The last representative of the Mu$at line to rule in Moldova was $tefan 
Razvan whose reign barely lasted five months in 1595. Even before this, 
the Mu§at hold on the throne had become insecure as it increasingly 
became ‘a plaything between the boyars, the Turks and foreign adven¬ 
turers’.59 The latter included men of Albanian, Armenian, and Greek 
origin, eager to become one of only two Orthodox Christian ruler within 
the sphere of the Ottoman Empire. Aspiring candidates and their boyar 
supporters were not above colluding with neighbouring Christian powers, 
or even the Turks, or the otherwise much-loathed Tatars, to secure the 
throne. Increasingly ‘the thrones of the principalities were obtained 
through money, treachery, cunning and murder’.60 
In addition to bearing the costs of the annual tribute, from the mid¬ 
sixteenth century the princes also had to pay a heavy ‘fee’ to the sultan as 
the price of their appointment. Both these payments rose quickly. The 
tribute paid by Stephen the Great in 1487, for example, had been some 
4,000 gold pieces. This had risen to 65,000 gold pieces by the 1560s and 
stood at a staggering 260,000 gold pieces by the seventeenth century, in 
addition to the appointment fee.61 The prince also had other obligations 
to the sultan such as providing financial assistance for Ottoman military 
campaigns as well as military service itself. He was forced to provide 
labourers for certain tasks, such as the repair of the Danube and Dnestr 
fortresses, as well as frequent and sumptuous ‘gifts’ for the sultan and his 
family and for Ottoman officials. 
With such lucrative rewards on offer, it is hardly surprising that the 
sultans encouraged a rapid turnover of rulers. Between Petru Rare?’ 
second reign from 1541-1546 and the exceptionally long reign, by 
Moldovan standards, of Vasile Lupu from 1634 to 1653, there were some 
forty-five reigns in Moldova. Few princes survived as long as a decade, 
while many reigned for only months, or even weeks. Not a few were 
appointed, unseated and reappointed several times according to 
prevailing political and military winds. 
Despite the high costs, and personal risk, that attached to it, however, 
the throne remained much sought after. For a start, there was the consid¬ 
erable prestige of the prince’s unique relationship with the Orthodox 
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church, a point to which we shall return. Moreover, ‘if the prince was 
capable and had secured the favour of the sultan and his advisers, he could 
conduct himself as an absolute ruler at home’, since there were few 
constitutional restraints upon him.62Although the prince ruled with his 
council, increasingly known as the ‘divan’ in the Ottoman period, this 
could easily be packed with his family or loyal retainers. In any case the 
divan had no legal means of restraining the prince, leaving only the option 
of rebellion, recourse to which the boyars frequently took. 
The new incumbent on the throne could, moreover, easily recoup his 
financial losses, and hopefully make a handsome profit, through the sale 
of state offices, the holders of which then sold on subordinate offices, and 
a crippling system of ‘tax-farming’, which again profited the prince and 
many of the boyars. As evidence for the proliferation of taxes, it has been 
estimated that by the seventeenth century a single piece of land in 
Moldova could be subject to as many as seventy different imposts.63 The 
prince also profited through being awarded monopolies on certain agricul¬ 
tural goods by the sultan. 
Unfortunately, however, the Turks reserved for themselves a mono¬ 
poly over a large share of Moldova’s plentiful agricultural produce, which 
consisted of grain, butter, honey, wax, salt, wine, sheep, cattle and horses. 
Much of this, but especially sheep, cattle and grain, could only be exported 
to Constantinople where it fed the city’s rapidly expanding population. It 
was the prince’s duty to purchase, collect and ship these products for the 
Turks at the lowest possible prices. The raia-s on the Danube and Dnestr 
rivers were important for the enforcement of these procedures. To ensure 
the princes’ loyalty to the sultans and the complete fulfilment of his oblig¬ 
ation to provision Constantinople, as well as his other financial and 
military obligations, a Janissary guard of 500 men was assigned to the 
princely court. 
While many rulers, boyars, officials and merchants profited financially 
from the effects of Ottoman suzerainty, other sectors of society were 
drained of their wealth. The taxation system ultimately fell upon the 
peasantry since both the higher boyars and the church benefited from 
many exemptions. The ingenious device of charging tax on communities 
rather than individuals was designed to prevent peasants from fleeing in 
the face of their obligations. Other sectors of society clearly did not always 
benefit from the economic effects of Ottoman suzerainty either. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Ia$i was the seat both of the princely court 
and the metropolitanate from the 1560s, the number of houses in the 
capital fell from 12,000 to 4,000 over the course of the seventeenth 
century.64 There was little incentive, however, for a prince to reform the 
Introduction 31 
system. Any prince who tried to ease the financial position of his subjects 
was able to raise less money in taxation to pay for the costs of the throne. 
Any rival candidate would thus be in a position to offer the sultan more 
money and have the prince ejected from the throne. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, given the Turkish breaches of Moldovan 
autonomy, the princes were not above breaking their side of the agree¬ 
ments with the Ottomans. In particular, the princes regularly entered into 
relations with foreign powers, a privilege reserved in theory for the sultan. 
Petru Rare?’ first reign, which began in 1527, was brought to an end by 
Suleiman the Magnificent’s invasion of Moldova in 1538 which had 
resulted from the prince’s machinations with the Habsburg king (later 
Emperor) Ferdinand. Rare? was dethroned and Suleiman seized Tighina, 
which was renamed Bender, and transformed into a raia. Petru Rare? was 
reinstated as prince in 1541, together with a Janissary guard for his 
‘protection’. 
Although they could only be sustained on the throne with Turkish 
approval, many of Petru Rare?’ successors were brought to power with 
the aid of the Polish-Lithuanian kings. The sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries saw a continuation of Polish-Lithuanian political influence in 
Moldova, despite the independence from this power achieved under 
Stephen the Great. Alexandra Lapu?neanu, for example, reigned from 
1552 to 1561 and again from 1564 to 1568 and was on both occasions 
brought to power with the military help of the Poles. This did not prevent 
him, however, from being chronically subservient to the Turks. He paid 
the sultan his tribute regularly and made no attempt to try to regain 
Moldova’s lost fortresses, as the boyars urged him to do. He even burned 
Moldova’s surviving fortresses, saving only Hotin, so that they could not 
pose a threat to the Ottomans. Furthermore, at the request of the Porte, 
Lapu?neanu moved the princely court and seat of the Moldovan metro¬ 
politanate from Suceava to Ia?i so that both institutions would be removed 
from Polish influence and nearer to the Turkish-controlled raia-s.65 
Some rulers even continued to swear fealty to the Polish-Lithuanian 
monarchs, as well as to the sultan, in an attempt to ‘balance’ one 
power against the other and thus retain freedom of action. The last ruler 
of the royal house of Mu?at, $tefan Razvan, was replaced by Ieremia, a 
representative of the powerful Movila boyar family, with Polish help in 
1595. Movila subsequently recognized the Polish-Lithuanian king as his 
overlord. 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Moldovans also 
developed contacts with the Zaporozhian Cossacks who lived in the 
region of the Dnieper river in the Ukrainian borderlands of Poland- 
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Lithuania. Alexandru Cornea who ruled Moldova from 1540 to 1541 
sought to retake Bender and Akkerman with Cossack assistance in the 
first joint ‘anti-Ottoman’ venture of the Moldovans and Cossacks. In the 
1560s the Cossacks even laid claim to the Moldovan throne since the 
hetman was distantly related to the Mu§at royal line.66 A prince of 
Armenian origin, John the Brave, (or alternatively ‘the Terrible’, owing 
to his attempt to force the boyars and the church to pay tax ), who ruled 
from 1572 to 1574, refused to pay tribute to the sultan. Aided by the 
Cossacks, he attacked the Turkish raia-s of Braila in Wallachia, and 
Bender and Akkerman on the River Dnestr, and invaded the Bugeac, with 
a view to expelling both the Turks and Tatars. The prince and his Cossack 
allies, however, were defeated by the Ottomans at the Battle of Cahul in 
June 1574. John was taken prisoner by the Ottomans and subsequently 
executed: a not uncommon fate for recalcitrant princes. Such close 
relations, however, did not prevent the Cossacks from sometimes entering 
the principality as enemies and plundering its towns. Even Vasile Lupu, 
Moldova’s defender of the Orthodox faith in the mid-seventeenth century, 
suffered humiliation at the hands of the Cossacks. His refusal to allow the 
marriage of his daughter to the son of the Cossack hetman, Bogdan 
Khmelnitsky, led the Cossacks to sack Ia$i in 1650. Thus chastened, Lupu 
was forced to submit to Khmelnitsky’s request. 
Michael the Brave’s brief union of Wallachia, Moldova and 
Transylvania was also achieved with some Cossack support, since it was 
they who assisted him in his invasion of Transylvania in 1599. 67 Michael 
had become prince of Wallachia in 1593 where he consolidated his power 
sufficiently to enable him to defeat Ottoman forces on the River Danube 
in 1595 at the Battles of Calugareni and Giurgiu. Four years later he 
invaded Transylvania and was elected prince. In the spring of the 
following year, he entered Moldova and unseated the Polish-backed 
Ieremia MovilS. Thus, for a few months the three principalities were 
governed by a single ruler. A rebellion by the Transylvanian nobles 
and a Polish invasion of Moldova and Wallachia, however, brought this 
brief unity to an end. Movila was reinstated by the Poles as ruler of 
Moldova in 1600 and Michael the Brave was murdered by a malcontent. 
Though his reign over the three Romanian-speaking principalities was 
meteorically short, Michael the Brave is, nevertheless, regarded by many 
Romanian historians as one of the forerunners of the movement for 
Romanian national unity. 
Despite the short duration of most princely reigns, and the violent end 
which awaited many princes, the thrones of Moldova and Wallachia 
retained high prestige. As the only Orthodox rulers under Ottoman 
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suzerainty, and indeed the only Orthodox rulers in Europe other than the 
prince of Muscovy, the Moldovan and Wallachian princes were regarded 
as the legitimate followers of the former Byzantine emperors whose duty 
it had been to protect and sustain the Orthodox church. It is possible that 
already by the late sixteenth century the princes were being invested in 
Constantinople by the patriarch, prior to their investiture in their princely 
capitals by their respective metropolitans. Such ceremonies were symbolic 
of the intimate bond between ruler and church, and emphasized the 
nature of the ruler’s office as ‘God-given’.68 
The sixteenth-century princes continued to act as generous benefactors 
to the Orthodox church both in the principality and beyond. Petru Rare? 
(reigned 1527-1538 and 1541-1546), despite the considerable loss of 
Moldovan autonomy to the Turks during his reigns, was responsible for 
completing a number of monasteries established by his predecessors, such 
as Moldovija, where he also built the church, and Capriana, east of the 
River Prut. Both of these houses had been originally founded by 
Alexander the Good. Petru Rare? himself established monasteries at 
Probota and Ra?ca. Alexandru Lapu?neanu, despite his supine attitude 
towards the Turks, was also a generous benefactor of the church. He 
founded the monastery of Slatina and built a number of churches, 
including that at Bistrifa monastery, as well as a church in Lvov in Polish 
Galicia. Wealthy boyars also played their part in supporting the Orthodox 
church. The monastery of Humor was founded by one of Petru Rare?’ 
courtiers while Sucevi|a monastery was built through the generosity of the 
powerful Movila family in the late sixteenth century. 
A characteristic of a number of Moldovan parish and monastic 
churches was the practice of painting the whole surface of the exterior 
walls. Notable examples are at Stephen the Great’s church in Suceava 
painted in the 1520s, the churches at the monasteries of Moldovija, 
Voronef, Arbore and Humor painted in the 1530s and 1540s, and the 
church at Sucevi^a monastery which was decorated in the later sixteenth 
century. The paintings include depictions of a typically religious 
nature, such as angels, saints, martyrs, apostles and prophets, as well as 
biblical scenes of the Last Judgement. More unusually, there are also 
scenes of a more profane nature such as an artist’s impression of the 
siege of Constantinople by the Persians in the early seventh century, a 
depiction of a group of classical philosophers, and portraits of a con¬ 
temporary sixteenth-century metropolitan and a renowned hermit. 
The highly unusual nature of these exterior painting, together with other 
local influences, have led some historians to argue for the existence of a 
distinct ‘Moldovan style’ of ecclesiastical art and architecture between the 
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fourteenth and seventeenth centuries.69 We should, however, note Dimitri 
Obolensky’s comment that local variations in ecclesiastical art and archi¬ 
tecture were less significant than ‘the common pattern of values, beliefs 
and intellectual and aesthetic experiences which in the course of the 
Middle Ages, the Bulgarians, Russians, Serbians and Rumanians acquired 
from Byzantium’.70 
Moldovan, and Wallachian, rulers from the sixteenth century onwards 
were in no danger of neglecting their duty, as heirs to the Byzantine 
emperors, towards the Orthodox ‘commonwealth’ beyond the borders 
of the principality. Direct contact between the principalities and the 
patriarch of Constantinople was made in the early sixteenth century. 
Many patriarchs visited the principalities personally, including Patriarch 
Pachomios in 1513, asking for succour for the Orthodox church in 
Ottoman ‘captivity’. The Moldovan prince Petru $chiopul (reigned 
1574-1577, 1578-1579 and 1582-1591) gave the patriarch a house in 
Constantinople and, for some years in the sixteenth century, the patriarch 
resided in a Wallachian monastery in Constantinople. The century also 
saw considerable support from the principalities for the patriarchates 
of Jerusalem and Antioch, based in Damascus, particularly by Alexandru 
Lapu$neanu and Petru $chiopul. The latter even sent monks from 
Ia§i to build a church in Jerusalem, which prompted the patriarch to 
pay a visit to $chiopul’s court in Moldova. The patriarch of Antioch 
also visited both the principalities during the last of Petru $chiopul’s 
three reigns. 
The princes were also generous in their support for the Orthodox 
church throughout the Balkans, giving both money and precious gifts. The 
monasteries on Mount Athos, in particular, were almost entirely 
dependent upon the principalities for funding during the sixteenth 
century, and Petru Rare§ and Alexandru Lapu^neanu and his wife were 
notable donors. The Moldovan rulers also supported the monasteries on 
Mount Sinai, in Serbia and Macedonia, as well as in the lands of present 
day Greece and Bulgaria.71 
One sixteenth-century prince, however, proved to be a notable 
exception to these stalwarts of Orthodoxy. Prince loan Iacob Heraclid, 
otherwise known as Despot Voda, who reigned from 1561 to 1563, was a 
most unlikely cultural synthesis: a Greek Protestant. Following the 
prince’s investiture the Moldovan boyars, doubtless pleased with their 
selection of a prince they believed would be pliable, indulged in two days 
of drunken revelry. The prince soon revealed his true colours, however, 
and attempted to introduce protestantism into the principality with the 
aid of the many contacts he had amongst protestants in Germany, 
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Denmark and Poland. He appointed a Polish Protestant as bishop and 
opened a protestant school at Cotnari. He even attempted to sequester 
the land and wealth of the monasteries and was duly murdered by the now 
suitably sober Orthodox boyars.72 
During the seventeenth centuary protestantism, this time in its 
Calvinist guise, was to reappear, as we shall see below, but the seventeenth 
century as a whole represented the high point of Moldova’s relations with 
the rest of the Orthodox religious world. There was a flood of new 
monastic foundations paid for by rulers and their wives, as well as by 
wealthy metropolitans and boyars. Many princes had direct contact with 
the various patriarchs, either through correspondence or personal visits 
by the patriarchs to Moldova. There were also increasing contacts with 
the Georgian Orthodox church and with the Russian Orthodox world. 
The vigour of the Orthodox church in seventeenth-century Moldova, 
and its centrality to the Orthodox religious world as a whole, is especially 
associated with the reign of Vasile Lupu, who reigned continuously for 
nineteen years from 1634 to 1653. Lupu, whose original name was Lupu 
Coci, had been an official at the Moldovan court, and was of Albanian 
and Moldovan descent, but Greek-educated. He changed his name to 
Vasile, the Romanian form of Basil, on becoming prince in honour of the 
ninth-century Byzantine emperor Basil I. This expressed his desire to 
reign over Moldova with a ‘Byzantine-style’ absolutism and to promote 
and protect the Orthodox church at home and abroad in the manner of 
the former emperors of Constantinople. Lupu succeeded in centralizing 
power and in controlling the political life of Moldova either through his 
representatives, usually his relatives, or directly. He revitalized the use of 
Byzantine ritual in the daily life of the Moldovan court, which included 
the donning of elaborate Byzantine ceremonial costume. Thus, Lupu was 
seen to have, quite literally, inherited the mantle of the former emperors.73 
Lupu was responsible for erecting over twenty religious establishments 
in Moldova and one in Wallachia, the Stelea church in Targovi$te built in 
the 1640s. The architecture of these buildings reflected the local Byzantine 
style, inherited from previous centuries, with newer cultural influences 
from Poland, Transylvania, Russia and the Orient.74 His foundations 
included churches throughout Moldova, including two in Suceava, 
restoration of the Golia monastery in Ia$i, and the creation of two new 
monasteries, one at Hlincea, near Ia$i and the Trei Ierarhi monastery, also 
in Ia$i, now well established as the Moldovan princely and religious 
capital. Trei Ierarhi, in addition to the Byzantine style, shows the influ¬ 
ences of both the Middle East and Russia. While the external walls are 
covered in stone-carved patterns of Armenian, Georgian, Turkish, Arabic 
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and Persian design, the paintings on the inside of the church were exe¬ 
cuted by artists from Moscow. 
Lupu donated money and land, which sometimes included within it 
whole villages, for the use of monasteries in Moldova. His munificence 
towards the rest of the Orthodox ‘commonwealth’ soon became 
legendary, a testament not only to Lupu’s generosity but also to how much 
wealth a shrewd Moldovan ruler could accumulate. Monks, clergymen, 
artists and craftsmen from all over the Orthodox Christian world were 
made welcome by Lupu at his court in Ia$i and received gifts of money or 
precious religious treasures. In addition, he granted commercial privileges 
to Serb and Croatian monasteries, as well as founding the monastery of 
St Lavra at Morea in the Peloponnese. Such was Lupu’s close involvement 
in the politics of the patriarchy in Constantinople that he even paid off 
the patriarch’s debts in 1638. It was, therefore, no simple flattery when the 
patriarch described the prince as ‘the living successor to the emperors who 
formerly reigned in Byzantium’.75 
Lupu did not forget the larger Orthodox community and was generous 
in his support of Orthodox populations in Poland-Lithuania, now under 
increasing pressure from the forces of the Catholic Counter-Reformation 
and the Uniate movement. He supported the Lvov Dormition Brother¬ 
hood, originally established to promote Orthodoxy in the fifteenth century 
by merchants in Lvov, a city which had long-standing trading finks with 
Moldova. Lupu himself founded the church of St Paraschiva in Lvov in 
1644, as well as giving donations to the Orthodox church in Kiev. 
The practice of ‘dedicating’ monasteries within the principalities to 
sister-houses or Orthodox institutions elsewhere in the Ottoman empire, 
which began as early as the fourteenth century, increased considerably 
during the seventeenth century. Practically, this meant that a Moldovan 
monastery would be placed under the jurisdiction of the house or insti¬ 
tution to which it was dedicated, together with all its land, property 
and revenues.76 The Gofia monastery in Ia$i, for instance, was dedicated 
to Mount Athos in the early years of the seventeenth century during the 
rule of the Movila family. One of Vasile Lupu’s other predecessors, 
Radu Mihnea, dedicated the Galata monatery in Ia$i to the Church of the 
Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in 1618 and the Aron Voda monastery, also 
in Ia$i, to the Antioch patriarchy in 1625. Lupu himself dedicated Stephen 
the Great’s monastic foundation of Dobrovaf to Zographou monastery 
on Mount Athos. Subsequent princes were no less generous. The wife of 
Gheorghe Stephen, Lupu’s successor, dedicated Alexander the Good’s 
important foundation at Bistrifa to the patriarchy of Jerusalem. Dosoftei, 
metropolitan of Moldova from 1671 to 1686, dedicated Petru Rare$’ 
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monastery of Probota to the patriarchy of Jerusalem in the 1670s and the 
great Capriana monastery, east of the River Prut, was dedicated to 
Zographou monastery on Mount Athos by Antioch Cantemir in the 1690s. 
Increasingly, these so-called dedicated monasteries were also run by 
monks or clergymen, usually Greeks, who came to Moldova from the insti¬ 
tution to which the Moldovan house had been dedicated. By the time the 
monasteries were secularized in the 1860s, the dedicated monasteries and 
their ‘foreign monks’ were found to be in possession of one-fifth of the 
total land surface of both the principalities.77 
The expansion of the monasteries in the seventeenth century meant 
that the monastic population was considerable, although the building and 
restoration of churches and monasteries was partly due to the great 
destruction and plundering of religious houses which took place during 
the frequent wars and other upheavals. The monasteries were important 
not only for their central role as religious institutions and workshops 
which produced religious artefacts and books and as centres of schol¬ 
arship, but also as landowners, producing agricultural produce, providers 
of education, and as institutions which cared for the sick. The centrality 
of religion in the life of the Moldovans in the seventeenth century was 
also reflected in the growing number of hermitages (many of which were 
also ‘dedicated’) and the proliferation of obscure local saints, such as 
Chiriac of Bisericiani who spent sixty years living in a cave.78 The monastic 
population continued to be at the heart of Moldova’s religious, economic 
and social life until well into the nineteenth century, and even beyond. 
Vasile Lupu was also responsible for helping to maintain the doctrinal 
purity of the Orthodox faith by curbing Calvinist influences emanat¬ 
ing from neighbouring Transylvania. The Reformed church was not 
only attempting to convert individuals within the Romanian-speaking 
Orthodox community in Transylvania, but was even instigating reforms 
with the aim of incorporating the whole of the Orthodox church in 
Transylvania into its own structure.79 The spread of Calvinist doctrines 
had even started to permeate into the very core of the Orthodox church 
in Constantinople. Kyrillos Lukaris, patriarch from 1620 to 1638, for 
example, was known to favour reforms of the church which were inspired 
by Calvinism.80 
In keeping with his role as defender of Orthodoxy, Lupu rose to the 
challenge posed by the spread of Calvinism and convened a synod at Ia§i 
in 1642. In attendance were Varlaam, metropolitan of Moldova from 1632 
to 1653, together with representatives of the Patriarch of Constantinople 
and of Petru Movila, the metropolitan of Kiev. Lupu himself ‘presided 
over the work of the synod like the former Byzantine emperors’.81 
38 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
The synod eventually accepted Petru Movila’s Confessio fidei orthodoxae 
(‘Confessions of the Orthodox faith’) as the Orthodox church’s official 
refutation of Calvinist influences. This was subsequently endorsed by 
the patriarch of Constantinople and by the patriarchs of Jerusalem, 
Alexandria and Antioch: a testament to the importance of the Moldovan 
court to the Orthodox world as a whole in this period. 
Lupu’s close relationship with Petru Movila, a member of the Movila 
family which had reigned in Moldova in the early seventeenth century, 
was of considerable importance in other developments which took place 
during the prince’s reign. The academy opened by Lupu in Ia§i in 1640 
was modelled on the Kiev academy already established by Movila. The 
Ia§i academy taught Greek, Slavonic, Latin, and Romanian, as well as 
theology, philosophy and rhetoric to up to four hundred students. Lupu 
also opened a number of elementary schools attached to Moldovan 
churches and monasteries. Printing was also introduced to the principality 
through the mediation of Movila. Hitherto, printed religious works had 
been imported into Moldova from Poland-Lithuania or Transylvania. In 
1642, however, with Movila’s assistance, Metropolitan Varlaam acquired 
a press from Kiev which was placed in the Trei Ierarhi monastery in Ia§i. 
The following year, Varlaam’s Carte romaneasca de invafdturd dumenecele 
preste an $i la praznice impdrdte$ti $i la svinfi mari (‘The Romanian Book 
of Teachings for Sunday and other Major Feasts and Religious Holidays’), 
or the Cazania lui Varlaam, achieved fame as the first religious book in 
the Romanian language printed in Moldova. The script used by the 
printing presses of the period continued, however, to consist of Old 
Church Slavonic characters. 
Like many Moldovan boyars fleeing the political upheaval which 
surrounded almost every change of ruler, Petru Movila had himself taken 
refuge in Poland-Lithuania after the murder of his father Simeon, who had 
been prince of Moldova from 1606 to 1607. Much of Petru Movila’s educa¬ 
tion took place in Poland, including a period at the school run by the Lvov 
Dormition Brotherhood. Pupils at the school were taught, amongst other 
subjects, Greek, Slavonic, Italian and Latin. Through the medium of the 
latter, in particular, Moldovan boyars educated in Polish exile were 
exposed to the influence of Western Catholicism and to Renaissance and 
humanist ideas. Such currents are apparent in the chronicles, written in the 
Romanian language, of Grigore Ureche (1590-1647), Miron Costin (1633— 
1691) and his son, Nicolae Costin (1660-1712), who all undertook much of 
their education in Poland.82 
Nevertheless, it was the relationship with the Orthodox Ruthene 
population of Poland-Lithuania which was most significant for the 
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Moldovans. Migrations of Ruthenes into the Moldovan lands, and of 
Moldovans into the largely Ruthene-inhabited lands of Poland-Lithuania 
to the north and east of the principality, had taken place throughout the 
preceding centuries, and continued during the seventeenth century.83 
Moldova’s trading and religious links with the city of Lvov, in particular, 
were long-established. Moldovan traders in the city had their own market 
and church, as well as the right to be tried by a Moldovan judge in the 
event of misdemeanours.84 Both Alexandru Lapu§neanu and Petru 
$chiopul had been generous benefactors of the Orthodox church in Lvov 
in the sixteenth century and the Movila family and Vasile Lupu supported 
the Lvov Dormition Brotherhood and its school. In addition to Petru 
Movila, a number of Moldova’s future churchmen were educated at the 
Lvov school, including metropolitan Dosoftei whose Greek family had 
taken refuge in Lvov. Close contact was later established between the 
school at Lvov, and the Kiev and Ia$i academies subsequently set up by 
Movila and Lupu. 
The ever increasing number of monastic foundations in Moldova, 
which acted as educational institutions and centres of scholarship, 
maintained strong links with Orthodox sister-institutions in Poland- 
Lithuania, as well as those under Ottoman rule. One such was the 
monastery of Secu, founded by the boyar Nistor Ureche, who was no 
stranger himself to years of exile in the lands of Poland-Lithuania. Grigore 
Ureche, son of the founder and future chronicler, as well as the future 
metropolitans Varlaam and Petru Movila, all received part of their 
education at Secu, where they were taught both Greek and Latin.85 
Petru Movila’s years as metropolitan of Kiev from 1633 to 1647 served 
to reinvigorate the Orthodox church in Poland-Lithuania, as well as the 
church in Moldova. The church ‘union’ of 1596 in Poland-Lithuania, 
through which a section of the Orthodox church accepted the primacy of 
the pope in Rome while retaining the Orthodox liturgy, had severely 
undermined the position of the Orthodox church in the kingdom. It was 
Petru Movila who helped to restore the position of the Orthodox church 
in Poland-Lithuania. As metropolitan, he sought to ‘immunize’ the 
Orthodox church against both Catholicism and Calvinism by employing 
some of their methods. Hence, he improved the organization of the 
church, encouraged lay participation in the church’s work and gathered 
scholars around him to produce and print updated editions of the Bible 
and ‘Lives of Saints’. Movila was subsequently influential in the spread of 
these activities to Moldova, through his cooperation with Metropolitan 
Varlaam. In 1632 Movila opened the academy at Kiev which provided the 
model, as well as many of the teachers, for Lupu’s academy in Ia$i. 
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Movila’s invigoration of the Orthodox church in Poland-Lithuania also 
resulted in an increase in the output of religious literature produced by 
the Ruthenes. One of the most important Ruthene Orthodox religious 
writers of the seventeenth century was Ioannichie Galeatovschi, a teacher 
and rector at the Kiev academy, who had close links with the church in 
Moldova. His greatest work was translated into Romanian as Cheia 
Infelesului (‘The Key to Understanding’) in the 1670s and was highly influ¬ 
ential in the development of religious literature in the Romanian language 
subsequently produced in the principalities. 
It has been argued, however, that the reciprocal religious and cultural 
relations between the Orthodox Ruthenes and Moldovans under Movila 
and Lupu were ‘a late blossoming’.86 By the late sixteenth century, Old 
Church Slavonic was already in decline as the lingua franca integrating 
the principalitites into the religious and cultural world of their East and 
South Slavs neighbours. In part, this was the result of the ever-growing 
differentiation amongst the Slavonic languages which meant that Old 
Church Slavonic was becoming increasingly antiquated and out of touch 
with the spoken Slavonic languages. Much like Latin in the Western 
church, Old Church Slavonic was becoming the preserve of the educated 
few. In the principalities this was even more marked, since the majority 
peasant population were Romanian-speaking. Moreover, by the seven¬ 
teenth century, the boyars, upper clergy, and princes were increasingly 
fading under the influence of Greek and Romanian. 
Writing in the early eighteenth century, Dimitrie Cantemir celebrated 
the diversity of the many national groups who lived in Moldova, which 
included, in addition to the Moldovans themselves, Bulgarians, Serbs, 
Albanians, Greeks, Germans, Poles, Cossacks, Jews and Gypsies.87 The 
Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine empire and the fall of Constantinople 
in 1453 had unleashed a flood of Orthodox refugees of various cultural 
backgrounds, who fled to the relative freedom of the principalitites and 
to other Orthodox lands beyond Muslim control, such as the Orthodox 
areas of Poland-Lithuania and Muscovy. It was the Greeks, however, who 
were to become especially influential in the principalities as a result of 
their previously dominant position within the former Byzantine empire, 
their control over the Orthodox church in Constantinople and the import¬ 
ance of Greek as one of the ‘sacred’ languages of the church, as well as 
of the ancient world. 
The diaspora Greeks were already influential in the sixteenth century 
and many were elected to the Moldovan throne. In addition, their 
presence in Orthodox cities in Poland-Lithuania such as Lvov also proved 
to be important to the development of Greek culture in Moldova. Boyars 
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seeking refuge in Lvov during the succession crises, came into contact with 
these Greek families from whom many of them learned Greek.88 The 
boyars also came into contact with Greek-Byzantine culture at many of 
the schools in Poland, such as that run by the Lvov Dormition 
Brotherhood. In the seventeenth century, the academies at Kiev, Ia$i and 
the academy in Bucharest, established later in the century, all taught 
Greek. Since these academies were beyond the direct control of the 
Turkish authorities, they attracted many Greek students from within 
the Ottoman Empire, thus reinforcing the Greek presence in the princi¬ 
palities and the importance of Greek as the lingua franca and language 
of culture. 
It is common to date the beginning of the Greek ‘Phanariot’ period 
(a term which will be explained further below) to the reign of Nicolae 
Mavrocordat in the principalies in the early eighteenth century. It should, 
however, be appreciated that the presence of the Greeks, including 
‘Phanariot’ Greeks, was a major factor in the life of the principalities well 
before the ‘official’ Phanariot era. The Basarab ruling family in Wallachia 
had thus been thoroughly hellenized by the time of its extinction in the 
seventeenth century. In Moldova, members of the Cantacuzino and Ghica 
‘Phanariot’ families gained the throne during the course of the seven¬ 
teenth century. The higher echelons of the church, especially in Wallachia, 
had also been occupied by Greeks or Greek-speakers by the end of the 
century. Neither the church nor the boyars entirely resented this 
‘hellenization’ since for the former, Greek money and influence were 
important in the fight against the Catholic Counter-Reformation and 
Uniate movement emanating from Poland-Lithuania or the Habsburg 
lands, and against Calvinism. Meanwhile, those boyars who were heavily 
intermarried with the Greeks, found it extremely useful that their relatives 
‘could intrigue for them at the sultan’s court’.89 
Nevertheless, in the seventeenth century there were a number of 
revolts by the ‘native’ boyars against the influential Greeks. Matei 
Basarab, Vasile Lupu’s almost exact contemporary as prince of Wallachia 
(1632-1654) was brought to power by just such a revolt, as was, ironically, 
Lupu himself. Lupu’s reign proved, however, a great disappointment to 
those hoping to see Greek influence in Moldova wane. His generosity to 
the church at home and abroad, and the increasing number of Greek 
monks and clergymen in charge of the dedicated monasteries in Moldova, 
aroused resentment amongst sections of the boyar nobility. In addition, 
the number of Greek teachers in the principality rose as Greek became 
one of the main languages taught at the schools established by Lupu. 
The prince was generous in his provision for these teachers, granting a 
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number of estates for the upkeep of teachers at the school attached to the 
Trei Ierarhi monastery in Ia$i. It was largely as a result of Lupu’s 
generosity to the Greek clergy and the establishment of Greek culture in 
the principality during his reign, that his rival, Gheorghe $tefan, was able 
to seize the throne in 1653. Lupu was by now regarded ‘as a Greek and a 
supporter of the Greeks’, while the Moldovan boyars regarded Gheorghe 
$tefan as being ‘from our own people’.90 
Paradoxically, however, it was under the auspices of a largely hellen- 
ized church and Greek-influenced, court that Romanian began to emerge, 
over the course of the seventeenth century, as the language of the 
Orthodox liturgy, of the court chancellery and administration, as well as 
a literary language in its own right.91 The printing of the Cazania lui 
Varlaam in Ia$i in 1643, to which we have already referred, was the start 
of the Moldovan church’s transformation into a Romanian-speaking 
church. Over the subsequent decades, religious and liturgical works were 
increasingly translated into Romanian. In part, this was an acknow¬ 
ledgement that Old Church Slavonic was a language incomprehensible to 
Moldova’s peasant masses and indeed to most of the lower clergy, whose 
ignorance of Slavonic was such that many were unable to conduct religious 
services. It was also a reaction to the Protestant and Calvinist threat to 
the Orthodox church within the neighbouring principality of Transylvania, 
where service books in Romanian were already being printed in the 
sixteenth century. Lupu’s synod of Ia$i in 1642 had been called to counter 
plans for the integration of the Orthodox church in Transylvania into the 
Reformed church, to which end a Calvinist catechism in Romanian 
had been printed, followed by the first Romanian version of the New 
Testament in 1648. The Orthodox church in Moldova was therefore on 
the offensive, anxious to ensure the continued loyalty of its Romanian¬ 
speaking flock. Metropolitan Varlaam himself wrote a riposte to the 
Romanian-language Calvinist catechism and in 1644, at the Ia§i press, 
he printed his explanation of the seven church sacraments in Romanian 
as §apte Taine ale Bisericii. 
Dosoftei, metropolitan between 1671 and 1686, was a most influential 
figure in the Moldovan church’s transformation, despite his Greek 
background. He was responsible for the translation into Romanian of 
numerous works of history, religion and literature. Most important, 
however, were his translations of liturgical works from Old Church 
Slavonic, such as the Dumnezeiasca Liturghie (‘The Divine Liturgy’) of 
1679, which was dedicated to ‘the whole of the Romanian people every¬ 
where who speak this Orthodox language’.92 His Romanian version of a 
Slavonic edition of the psalms, Psaltire a lui David, was printed in the 
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1670s and was the first large-scale verse work produced in the Romanian 
language. The Psaltirea de inteles (‘The Psalter of Understanding’), a 
psalter with parallel Old Church Slavonic and Romanian texts, was 
printed in 1680. In the following years, Dosoftei produced a four-volume 
Viafa $i petrecerea sfinfilor (‘Lives and Deeds of the Saints’) from Greek 
and Old Church Slavonic sources, which included the deeds of the various 
Moldovan local saints. It was largely due to the works of clergymen like 
Varlaam and Dosoftei that ‘by the second quarter of the eighteenth 
century a service book in Slavonic in the Romanian lands became a rarity, 
and the Slavonic tradition can be said to have expired’.93 
During the course of the late seventeenth century, Romanian also 
began to emerge as the language of the chancellery and administration. It 
is indicative of the growing importance of the language that when Vasile 
Lupu decided to systematize the Moldovan legal system, he did so in 
Romanian. This was published as Carte romaneascd de invdfdturd de la 
pravilele impdrate^ti de la alte guidefe (‘The Romanian Book of 
Teachings from the Imperial Statutes and Other Judicial Pronounce¬ 
ments’) printed in Ia§i in 1645. Changes within the chancellery were driven 
by the fact that Romanian was increasingly favoured by the boyars for use 
in private documents. Consequently, by the turn of the century, few 
official documents were being produced in Slavonic. 
Romanian also emerged as a literary language in its own right during 
the course of the seventeenth century. The chronicles of Moldovan history 
produced by Grigore Ureche and Miron and Nicolae Costin were all 
written in Romanian. Metropolitan Dosoftei’s 1681 Poem cronologic 
despre domnii Moldovei (‘Chronological Poem regarding the Princes of 
Moldova’), covering the period from Drago§’ foundation of the principal¬ 
ity to the reign of Gheorghe Duca in the 1660s, was the first printed 
historical work in Romanian, and also put forward the theory that the 
Moldovans were of both Dacian and Roman descent. The Moldovans’ 
Latin origins was also the theme of Miron Costin’s De neamul moldove- 
nilor (‘On the Origins of the Moldovans’) written during the latter part of 
the century. Such arguments were to be expounded some decades later by 
Dimitrie Cantemir in his chronicle of Romanian origins, Hronicul vechimii 
a Romano-Moldo-Vlahilor, produced c. 1720, in which he claimed that 
both the Wallachian and Moldovan peoples were of Roman origin, and 
argued for their continuous presence on the territory of the former Roman 
province of Dacia following the departure of the Roman legions. 
Interestingly as well, in his Descriptio Moldaviae, Cantemir claimed that 
prior to the fifteenth century, the Moldovans had used the Latin script 
in written Romanian. Old Church Slavonic, he alleged, had only been 
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introduced into the principality following the Council of Florence, which 
had brought about a very short-lived union of the Catholic and Orthodox 
churches. Metropolitan Teoctist, a Bulgarian, had, so Cantemir explained, 
introduced the Old Church Slavonic script in order to separate the 
Moldovans from the Latin church and maintain them in the Orthodox 
sphere. Teoctist was therefore, according to Cantemir, the ‘initiator of 
these barbarities which still dominate in Moldova’.94 
Despite a growing acceptance of the theory of the common Roman, 
or Daco-Roman, origins of the Moldovans and Wallachians amongst 
certain intellectual circles in the late seventeenth century, the belief in 
this particular account of these peoples’ ethno-genesis was by no means 
widespread and its political implications lay well in the future. The early 
indications of an anti-Slavonic sentiment expressed by Cantemir was to 
become ideologically important only in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (not least in Ceau§escu’s Romania). As Cantemir’s own life- 
history was to show, relations with Moldova’s East Slav Orthodox neigh¬ 
bours remained central to the life of the principality well beyond the 
seventeenth century, despite the decline in the use of Old Church 
Slavonic. 
The decades after Vasile Lupu’s fall from power in 1653 saw a number 
of attempts at developing political and military relations with the expand¬ 
ing Russian empire. Lupu’s successor, Gheorghe $tefan, attempted to form 
an alliance with Russia to bring about the return of the Moldovan 
fortresses occupied by the Ottomans since the fifteenth century. In 1655 
the patriarch of Constantinople sent a mission to Moscow on §tefan’s 
behalf, requesting that Moldova be placed under Russian protection and 
in 1658 a treaty was drawn up between the two countries. This came to 
nothing, however, since §tefan, wisely perhaps, refused to go to war against 
his Polish-Lithuania neighbour as the price of the Russian alliance.95 
During the mid-seventeenth century, however, Poland-Lithuanian lost 
parts of her territory to both Russia and the Ottomans. The acquisition 
by Russia of Poland-Lithuania’s Ukrainian borderlands east of the River 
Dnieper in 1667, including the city of Kiev, brought Moldova into closer 
geographical proximity to Russia with all its potential for a new, and 
closer, political relationship. The Ottomans had also acquired land in the 
region from the Poles in the 1670s, while a treaty between the Turks and 
Russians in 1681 allowed the Ottomans to take control of lands between 
the Dnestr and Dneiper rivers, below the city of Kiev. The Turks now 
installed the supposedly loyal Greek prince of Moldova, Gheorghe Duca, 
(reigned 1665-1666, 1668-1672 and 1678-1683) as hetman, in charge of 
the Turkish Ukrainian lands. 96 Duca was declared ‘ruler of the Ukraine 
Introduction 45 
and Moldova’, a position he occupied until 1683. He now encouraged 
Moldovans to move into the Turkish Ukraine, east of Moldova’s Dnestr 
border, by promises of tax freedom and local autonomy. Those who came 
joined landowners of Moldovan origin already present east of the Dnestr, 
such as the Movila family who had owned estates in the region since the 
1580s. As Duca’s domain now reached the River Dnieper, and thereby 
bordered onto newly-enlarged Russia, he attempted, through the media¬ 
tion of Metropolitan Dosoftei, to secure Russian support against both 
the Turks and Poles. The attempt failed and Duca’s status as vassal of the 
Turks forced him to give them military support against the Christians at 
the siege of Vienna in 1683. 
The Turks’ failure to capture Vienna, in part due to the intervention 
of the Polish king, John Sobieski, was a turning point in the history of 
the Ottoman empire, marking the beginning of the empire’s gradual 
contraction and decline. The Christian victory at Vienna led to a resur¬ 
gence of Habsburg power in Central and Eastern Europe, while Poland, 
led by Sobieski, recaptured the Ukrainian lands lost to the Ottomans. 
Having done so, Sobieski’s army entered Moldova, with the intention of 
annexing the principality.97 As a result of the 1699 Peace of Carlowitz 
between the Turks and the Christian powers, however, the Poles were 
forced to leave Moldova. The peace additionally confirmed the Habsburg 
monarchy’s reacquisition of most of the Hungarian lands lost after the 
Battle of Mohacs, as well as the principality of Transylvania, thus trans¬ 
forming the Habsburg monarchy into Moldova’s immediate neighbour to 
the west. It was his expectation of Habsburg hegemony in the area 
following the siege of Vienna which prompted Constantin Cantemir, 
Moldovan prince from 1685 to 1693, to sign a secret treaty with the 
Habsburgs in 1690 to assist them against the Turks, although the treaty 
was never enforced. 
Dimitrie Cantemir, Russia and Phanariot Rule 
It was, however, to the rising power of Russia that Constantin Cantemir’s 
son by his Greek wife, Dimitrie Cantemir, turned to help free Moldova 
from the Turks. Dimitrie had been installed as prince in 1710 by the Turks 
in the belief, mistaken as it turned out, that he would be a loyal vassal, 
since he had undertaken part of his education in Constantinople. There, 
he had become conversant not only with the major European languages, 
but also with Turkish and other oriental languages and had written the 
first treatise on Turkish music (in Turkish), as well as what some 
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Romanian scholars consider to be the first novel in the Romanian 
language, Istoria ieroglifica (‘The Hieroglyphic History’). 
Inspired by Peter the Great’s military successes, which included the 
conquest of Turkish Azov and his defeat of the seemingly invincible 
Swedish king Charles XII at the Battle of Poltava in the Polish Ukrainian 
lands in 1709, Cantemir entered into negotiations with Peter. This culmi¬ 
nated in the April 1711 Treaty of Lutsk in which Cantemir accepted a 
Russian protectorate over Moldova on condition that the Moldovan 
throne remained the hereditary preserve of the Cantemir dynasty, that the 
powers of the Moldovan state remained in the hands of its prince, and that 
the lands and fortresses lost to the Ottomans be restored. In return, 
Cantemir promised to assist Russia in its war against the Turks with an 
army of 10,000 men.98 In his proclamation to the Moldovan boyars in July 
1711, Cantemir justified his request for Russian protection against his 
Ottoman suzerain by recourse to the so-called ‘theory of the capitula¬ 
tions’. According to this, although vassals of the sultan, the rulers of the 
principalities had entered into agreements, or ‘capitulations’, with the 
Ottomans freely and the sultan had agreed to protect the independence 
of Moldova and Wallachia in exchange for tribute. The Turks had violated 
these agreements, according to Cantemir, by their seizure of land and 
fortresses in both principalities and by interfering in the selection of rulers. 
The ‘theory of the capitulations’ was not new when Cantemir expounded 
it in 1711, but was used frequently in the subsequent century and a half 
by boyars who sought to justify to the European Great Powers the 
removal of Ottoman suzerainty. 
Unfortunately, Cantemir’s passionate rhetoric was not matched by 
prowess on the battlefield and at the Battle of Stanile$ti, near the River 
Prut, the combined Russian and Moldovan forces were crushed by the 
Turks. Many Moldovan boyar families fled with Cantemir into exile in 
Russia, where he received a title of nobility and estates in Russian 
Ukraine. He became a counsellor to Peter the Great whom he exhorted 
to continue Russia’s imperial expansion against the Ottomans. He 
continued his historical and scholary studies in many languages, which 
included his Descriptio Moldaviae, written at the request of the Berlin 
Academy, as well as a history of the Ottoman empire, thus becoming in 
effect Russia’s first orientalist. His Russian-educated son, Antioch 
Cantemir, achieved fame as the originator of satire in Russian literature. 
Cantemir’s flight from Moldova, however, left the principality entirely 
at the mercy of the Ottomans. The fortress of Hotin, Moldova’s largest 
fortification, was turned into a raia with a Turkish garrison, its position on 
the Dnestr making it a crucial stronghold against any future Russian 
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attack on the principality. The Hotin raia was larger than any of the other 
raia-s established in Moldova, comprising some hundred villages and 
three market towns, in addition to the town of Hotin itself. The raid's 
western border reached as far as the River Prut. The estates of the 
boyars who had fled to Russia with Cantemir were divided amongst 
the Turks’ loyal supporters." Since the prince of Wallachia, Constantin 
Brancoveanu, had also reached an agreement with Peter the Great similar 
to that of Cantemir, the treachery of the princes of both principalities now 
frightened the sultan and induced him to place the thrones in the hands 
of loyal Greek Phanariot families based in Constantinople. Thus, the most 
important result of Cantemir’s Russian escapade was the imposition of 
Phanariot rule in Moldova and Wallachia by the sultan. 
The installation of the Phanariot regime, however, was not simply 
due to Cantemir and Brancoveanu’s betrayal of their overlord, but should 
be seen within the wider context of international relations. Changes in 
the balance of power in the late seventeenth century, and the expan¬ 
sion of the Habsburg empire following its reconquest of Hungary and 
Transylvania, put Wallachia and Moldova on the ‘front line’ of the 
Turkish confrontation with the Catholic Habsburgs. In the east, Moldova 
faced an increasingly powerful and expanding Russian empire. It was thus 
necessary for both the principalities to be in loyal hands in the ailing 
Ottoman empire’s conflict with the Christian powers. 
We should now turn to the origin of the term ‘Phanariot’. The Greek 
‘Phanariots’ had taken their name from the ‘Phanar’, or ‘lighthouse’ 
district of Constantinople, whence a number of Greek families had fled 
following the Ottoman conquest in order to be in close proximity to 
the Orthodox patriarchal buildings.100 By the late seventeenth century, the 
Phanariots dominated the Orthodox church hierarchy in Constantinople, 
as well as acting as the patriarchy’s bankers and financiers. They had also 
risen swiftly within the Ottoman administration as a result of their 
expertise gained at the former Byzantine court. In particular, due to their 
proficiency in foreign languages, they regularly began to fill the post 
of ‘grand dragoman’, or chief translator, to the sultan; in effect a type of 
foreign minister. Alexandru Mavrocordat was the first Phanariot to 
achieve international standing as grand dragoman and held this post from 
1673 until 1709. In his additional capacity as the sultan’s private secretary, 
Mavrocordat had negotiated the Peace of Carlowitz with the Christian 
powers in 1699. The Phanariot families also acted as bankers, merchants 
and doctors to members of the Ottoman court. 
To consolidate their position, the Phanariot Greeks sought to acquire 
land, but since there were restrictions on the purchase of land by non- 
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Muslims, they began to cast their eyes upon the principalities. Besides 
having autonomy within the Ottoman empire, the principalities were 
attractive to the Greeks because they were governed by the sole surviving 
Orthodox monarchs in South-East Europe and modelled their courts on 
the pre-1453 Byzantine court. The Phanariot families consequently began 
to purchase estates in Moldova and Wallachia and to marry into the native 
boyar, and even into the royal, families. The Phanariot Cantacuzino, 
Rosetti and Ghica families were amongst the first to integrate themselves 
into Moldovan and Wailachian society. In the eighteenth century, 
however, the Porte certainly favoured those Phanariots whose families 
were still largely based in Constantinople, rather than in the principalities, 
since members of their close families could act as ‘hostages’ to ensure the 
princes’ loyalty to the sultan. 
The Mavrocordats were one such Constantinople-based family and the 
first ‘official’ Phanariot prince to rule in the principalities was Nicolae 
Mavrocordat, son of the sultan’s trusted grand dragoman, Alexandra. 
Nicolae had already ruled briefly in Moldova before Dimitrie Cantemir, 
and was appointed once again as prince of Moldova from 1711 to 1715 
and in Wallachia from 1715 to 1716 and again between 1719 and 1730. 
Since the practice of alternating rule in each principality was followed by 
all Mavrocordat’s successors, much of what follows below applies to both 
Moldova and Wallachia. In the first half of the eighteenth century the 
thrones of the principalities were dominated in particular by three 
Phanariot families, the Mavrocordats, Ghicas, and Racovifas. Subse¬ 
quently, and until the removal of the Phanariots from power in 1821 after 
the Greek revolt against the Ottomans, the Ipsilanti, Callimachi and 
Moruzi families dominated. Each ruler had normally acted as grand 
dragoman at the Porte before his appointment as prince, through which 
he had, supposedly, proved his loyalty to the Porte. 
The Phanariot era has generally been regarded by Romanian histori¬ 
ans as a period of stagnation and decline in the principalities at a time 
when Western Europe was, allegedly, reaping the benefits of the 
Enlightenment. The Phanariots, moreover, stand accused of ‘orientalizing’ 
Wallachia and Moldova and of cutting off its peoples from European 
civilization, and in particular from their Latin ‘brethren’ in the West. 
Nicolae lorga was the first eminent historian to argue that, on the contrary, 
the period was one of constructive reform owing to the work of a number 
of ‘enlightened’ Phanariot princes. Volume Seven of lorga’s Histoire des 
roumains published in 1940, which deals with the Phanariot period, is 
entitled ‘The Reformers’ and examines in particular the reforms of 
Nicolae and Constantin Mavrocordat.101 
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Iorga, moreover, pointed out that the ‘Greek’ Phanariot princes were 
by no means of purely Greek origin. The Cantacuzinos were probably of 
Byzantine descent and the Ipsilantis were certainly ethnic Greeks. The 
Rosettis, however, were of Levantine Italian origin, while the Ghicas were 
of Albanian extraction. Both the Racovifa and the Callimachi families 
were of Moldovan origin. Moreover, many Phanariot families, such as 
the Cantacuzinos, Rosettis and Ghicas had, as we have already seen; 
integrated themselves into the boyar class in both principalities, 
and some had even been elected ruler, in the seventeenth century.102 
As Cyril Mango has written, ‘in short, the leading Phanariot families 
were a hodgepodge of enterprising Greeks, Romanians, Albanians and 
Levantine Italians’.103 
A number of Phanariot rulers were both highly cultivated and keen to 
reform the chaotic government and administration of the principalities, 
and they were inspired by Enlightenment ideas. Alexandru Mavrocordat, 
the ‘founder’ of the Mavrocordat ‘dynasty’, as well as being grand 
dragoman to the sultan, was a scholar and medical doctor, who had 
studied in Rome, Padua and Bologna. The princely academies in Ia§i and 
Bucharest utilized Alexandras many scholarly works on grammar, 
rhetoric, philosophy and theology. His son, Nicolae Mavrocordat, was also 
a scholar who bequeathed to his son, Constantin, a library so rich and vast 
that it was coveted by both Louis XV and by George II of England, who 
attempted, unsuccessfully, to induce Constantin to part with it on his 
father’s death. Although he promoted the Greeks in his entourage, 
Nicolae was an able administrator who, miraculously, even succeeded in 
lowering the tribute payable to the Porte. He was concerned to improve 
education in the Moldovan principality and was responsible for strength¬ 
ening the academy at Ia$i, established in 1707 following the closure of the 
academy set up by Vasile Lupu. Nicolae Mavrocordat’s writings included 
a tract on the dangers of nicotine, a very early example of the genre, and 
entirely suitable for the son of a doctor. 
Nicolae’s son, Constantin Mavrocordat, is perhaps especially deserving 
of the title ‘Enlightened Despot’. He ruled in Moldova from 1733 to 1735, 
1741 to 1743, 1748 to 1749 and in 1769, and alternately in Wallachia.104 
Constantin Mavrocordat was responsible for the abolition of a number of 
indirect taxes, such as those on cattle or fields under cultivation, both of 
which were damaging to agricultural productivity. He introduced instead 
a general tax, payable annually in instalments. Known as a ‘francophile’ 
and acquainted with the works of the French ‘philosophies’, in 1746 in 
Wallachia and 1749 in Moldova, Mavrocordat declared the right of 
peasants to redeem themselves, on payment of remuneration to their 
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lords. For those who were unable to do so, labour services due to their 
landlords were reduced to twelve days in Wallachia and twenty-four 
in Moldova. 
Mavrocordat also ensured that senior administrative and judicial 
officials were paid a regular salary in order to prevent them raising money 
through the sale of lower offices and the imposition of arbitrary fines and 
taxes, the traditional means whereby such officials had enriched 
themselves. Constantin improved the standards of schools attached to 
Moldova’s many monasteries and churches, ensuring that the Romanian 
language was taught in all such institutions. In particular, he was 
concerned that priests should be able to conduct religious services in 
Romanian, which he also hoped to elevate as the administrative language 
in the principalities at all levels. He was responsible in 1741 for the 
publication of the first collection of documents illustrating the course of 
Moldovan and Wallachian history. 
A member of the Phanariot Ghica family, already long-established in 
Moldova, Grigore Alexandru Ghica, who ruled from 1764 to 1767 and 
again from 1774 to 1777, was responsible for further improvements at the 
academy in Ia§i. He also established lyceums at a number of provincial 
towns as well as setting up twenty-three elementary schools. 
Several Phanariot rulers attempted to rationalize Moldova’s chaotic 
legal system with its mixture of Byzantine-Roman law and Moldovan 
customary law. Scarlat Callimachi, who ruled in Moldova in 1806,1807 to 
1810 and again from 1812 to 1819, was responsible for the publication of 
Moldova’s first civil law code. The ‘Callimachi code’ was based on the 
Austrian civil code and remained in force until 1864 in Moldova, and 
longer still in Russian-ruled Bessarabia.105 
The Phanariot era also saw the translation and printing of many works 
of the European Enlightenment. Since Greek was one of the main 
languages of instruction at the princely academies and the monastic 
schools, and spoken by a substantial number of the boyars, it had become 
the language of high culture in the principalities. In addition, it was the 
second language, after Romanian, used in the chancellery and judiciary in 
the eighteenth century, as well as being the lingua franca of merchants 
and traders in the principalities. 106 
The first Greek press in the Ottoman lands had been established at 
Cetafuia monastery near Ia$i in 1682. Both the monastery and the press 
owed their existence to the generosity of the Greek prince, Gheorghe 
Duca.107 In the relative autonomy of the principalities, away from 
the restrictive atmosphere of Constantinople, important works of the 
Enlightenment, including studies by John Locke and Montesquieu, were 
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translated and circulated in Greek.108 Many more of the fruits of the 
Enlightenment were translated into Romanian, such as Catherine the 
Great’s philosophical and legal treatise, Nakaz (‘Instructions’), and the 
works of Voltaire which appeared in the 1770s. Indeed, from the middle 
of the century French works were regularly translated into Romanian 
under the auspices of the Phanariot princes. 
Nevertheless, despite the many positive examples of Phanariot rule, 
and the role of the princes in the circulation of the literature of the 
Enlightenment, the era as a whole certainly deserves something of the evil 
reputation which has attached to it. In his defence of the Phanariots, 
Nicolae Iorga criticized the Greek doctor, Zallony, for his ‘Essay on the 
Fanariots’, originally published in France in 1824.109 Zallony’s aim had 
been to alert Europe to the abuses of the Phanariot system in the princi¬ 
palities, fearing that the Phanariots would take control of a future 
independent Greek state over which they would have a similarly cor¬ 
rupting influence. It is hardly suprising, therefore, that Zallony’s work 
portrays the Phanariot system in a grim, and frequently absurd, light. 
Many of Zallony’s observations and criticisms, however, are borne out by 
observations made by Western travellers to the principalities, as well as 
by subsequent historians. 
The eighteenth century saw an intensification of all the defects of 
Ottoman suzerainty in the principalities which had been exposed in 
previous centuries. The very institution of the Phanariot regime had come 
about as a result of the Porte’s need for more direct control over the affairs 
of the principalities, threatened now by the growing power and influence 
of the Habsburg monarchy and Russia. From the 1730s, the ruler was 
appointed directly by the sultan, without even the pretence of consultation 
with the boyars.110 The foreign policy of the principalities was now entirely 
in the hands of the sultan, in practice and no longer only in theory, and 
miscreants who dabbled with foreign powers were frequently executed. 
The Moldovan and Wallachian armies were reduced to little more than a 
princely guard. During the course of the eighteenth century, the number 
of Turks permitted to live within the principalities grew, especially in the 
areas around the raia-s where they acquired land and were useful in 
enforcing requisitioning. The Turkish monopoly on agricultural produce 
also increased, especially after the middle years of the century when the 
Ottomans lost their ‘bread baskets’ in Egypt and the Crimea.111 This made 
Moldovan and Wallachian grain even more essential for feeding 
Constantinople, where famine was not uncommon, as well as the inhabi¬ 
tants of the raia-s on the Danube and Dnestr rivers. Requisitioning took 
place regardless of local needs. 
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Meanwhile, the financial obligations placed on each new prince 
increased. As well as the annual tribute, and the ‘fee’ for appointment, 
the Phanariots were obliged to make an additional payment after three 
years to renew their appointment. New incumbents were also responsible 
for paying off any debts left by their predecessors. In addition, the 
Ottomans proved inventive in finding additional means of raising money, 
which they then ‘obliged’ their faithful vassals to pay. Steven Runciman 
provides a fine example of one such financial obligation. ‘The prince was 
appointed at Constantinople and consecrated there by the patriarch. He 
had to arrive at his new capital within thirty days, or else pay a fine of 
some sixteen gold pounds to the Aga of the Janissaries for every day over 
the thirty till he arrived. Tactful princes were never over-punctual.’112 
Indeed, the huge costs of the throne led to the financial ruin of both 
the Mavrocordat and Racovifa families over the course of the eighteenth 
century. 
As in previous centuries, therefore, it was very much in the Porte’s 
interests to ensure a rapid turnover of rulers. Between 1711, when Nicolae 
Mavrocordat became prince, and 1821 when Phanariot rule in the princi¬ 
palities ended, there were some thirty-six changes of ruler in Moldova and 
the average reign was little over two years. It should be noted, however, 
that this situation was little different to that which prevailed in earlier 
periods of Ottoman suzerainty. As William Wilkinson, the British consul 
in Bucharest, explained, the sultan regarded the principalities ‘as farms 
which were to be let out to the highest bidders; the farmer-princes 
were therefore deposed and recalled, whenever the offers and promises 
of others of their countrymen appeared more adventageous’.113 Under 
such circumstances, even such well-meaning Phanariots as Constantin 
Mavrocordat had little freedom of action. He was forced to rescind many 
of his reforms due to financial pressure, and at one stage was temporarily 
exiled for failure to pay a ‘supplementary charge’, his throne being in the 
meantime occupied by a more cooperative prince. The system made any 
long-term attempts at reforms self-defeating. As Wilkinson explained, the 
princes ‘live under the incessant apprehension of sudden recall and 
disgrace, [which] induces them to bestow their whole attention on such 
resources only as are most immediately within their reach, and to neglect 
any plan that merely offers a remote prospect of gain’.114 
Such problems were often compounded by the many wars between the 
Ottomans, Habsburg monarchy and Russia fought during the century 
on the soil of the principalities, which created attendant conditions of 
lawlessness. Alexandru Ipsilanti, for example, had introduced significant 
reforms into the legal system in Wallachia, including the production of a 
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printed law code in 1780 and the establishment of tribunals in Bucharest 
with the right of appeal against decisions of the princely divan. His 
attempts to bring about similar reforms in Moldova during his two year 
reign from 1786 to 1788, however, were cut short by the the Janissaries, 
who had been sent to guard the Moldovan border against the Russians 
but chose instead to plunder the prince’s capital of Ia$i. 
Despite these disadvantages, the thrones of the principalities remained 
attractive to the Phanariots for a number of reasons. In particular, there 
was the considerable prestige which surrounded the princes’ status as the 
only Orthodox rulers under Ottoman suzerainty. This was symbolized by 
the grand investiture and anointment of the new princes by the patriarch 
in Constantinople. The Phanariot families’ desire to acquire the thrones 
was intimately entwined with their hopes that the Ottomans could be 
expelled from Europe, for which the principalities might provide the 
base.115 The Phanariots’ pretensions to imperial grandeur were reflected 
in the court ceremonial which seems to have reached proportions unseen 
in previous centuries. The Greek doctor, Zallony, criticized by Iorga for 
his wholesale condemnation of Phanariot rule in the principalities, vividly 
described the prince’s court and the fawning deference shown towards 
him by the boyars. The latter regularly carried the prince around his 
palace ‘whilst two or three other lords hold the train of his robe. Under 
this aspect of a paralytic, he passes through his apartments’. At the dining 
table, even the prince’s bread was cut up for him into small pieces by 
fussing servants, while his wine was offered up in a crystal glass. 
Meanwhile, Bohemian musicians serenaded the pampered prince. The 
ringing of bells was thereafter deemed necessary, according to Zallony, to 
announce to the enthralled world that the prince was about to take his 
siesta, and to inform the world of his awakening.116 That such excesses 
were a normal part of courtly life is confirmed by Thomas Thornton, an 
English merchant in Constantinople, who described the princely courts in 
the principalities as being ‘a ridiculous combination of all that is grotesque 
in ceremony with all that is vulgar in manners .. .’.117 
A further advantage for the incumbents of the thrones was that for as 
long as the prince could maintain the sultan’s trust, which was admittedly 
rarely a lengthy period, the prince had almost limitless authority in his 
domestic affairs. The collective powers of the boyars on the princely divan 
were insignificant because the prince controlled all appointments. These 
were regularly filled by the prince’s Greek relatives, described by 
Thornton as the ‘flock of harpies’ from Constantinople and a source of 
great resentment amongst the native boyars.118 If these boyars wished to 
gain the new prince’s good opinions and occupy a position on the divan, 
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they had to win him over by showering him with ‘magnificent presents; 
for presents have a magic power over the great men of the East’. 
According to Zallony, once the prince was installed, however, he 
exercised ‘a despotic sovereignty’ and his ‘most earnest care’ was ‘to invest 
his nearest relatives with the first dignities .. .’.119 
The profits that could be made by the prince and his relatives were 
usually more than sufficient to off-set the huge costs of appointment. 
Traditional means of raising funds such as tax-farming and the sale of 
offices continued apace. The post of chief minister to the prince was very 
expensive but much sought after since the minister could then sell on 
further offices to local boyars. Since few of these officials were paid proper 
salaries, the costs were ultimately paid by the peasantry, who bore the 
brunt of taxation and the other financial extortions whereby officials made 
their money. Princes and tax-farmers were, like the Turks, adept at 
inventing new taxes and fines. 
William Wilkinson was greatly struck by the indolence and rapacity of 
both the ‘native’ and Greek boyars.120 ‘Money’, he declared, ‘is their only 
stimulus; and the means they generally employ to obtain it are not the 
efforts of industry ...’, but rather those of tax-farming or sale of offices.121 
The prince’s Greek relatives, meanwhile, came to the principalities ‘for 
the express purpose of amassing a fortune, and immediately give 
themselves up to the seductions of luxury’.122 
The prince could also make his fortune by exploiting his role in requi¬ 
sitioning the agricultural produce bound for Constantinople, under the 
terms of the Turkish monopoly. William Wilkinson commented on the 
principalities’ great wealth of agricultural commodities. Especially 
abundant were wheat, wax, honey, butter, cheese, hides and timber, all of 
which, however, were subject to the Ottoman monopoly. Nevertheless, 
the prince and his followers could make a profit out of this since the 
products bound for Turkey, ‘are bought by the local governor for about 
one-fourth of the prices current in the market, and one-sixth of their value 
in Turkey’. 123 
Some Phanariot rulers even exploited to their own advantage the 
periods of dearth caused by the devastations of war and Ottoman requisi¬ 
tioning. Alexandru Moruzi, who ruled three times in Moldova between 
1792 and 1807, extorted loans from the local monasteries during a time of 
famine. With this money he bought grain from the Bulgarian lands which 
he then sold to the starving Moldovan peasants at hugely inflated prices.124 
There is, therefore, some truth in Zallony’s comment that ‘the system 
of the hospodar ... is plunder’. Zallony went on to observe that when the 
new prince proceeded to his capital, ‘the sound of bells ... throws the 
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people into consternation. Is it possible that they could rejoice at the sight 
of their new sovereign, who, like a vulture, is about to cast himself on a 
new prey?’ 125 It is perhaps to the period of Phanariot rule that the 
Romanian proverb owes its origin, ‘a change of rulers is the joy of fools’. 
According to Thomas Thornton, the consequences of this government 
of despotic Greeks and degenerate boyars was to lead the general 
population into a state of apathy. Since they could not reap the fruits of 
their labour, the people ‘exert no ingenuity, and apply themselves to no 
new branches of industry’.126 William Wilkinson expressed similar views. 
He was fully aware of the great unexploited mineral resources of the 
principalities, but observed that the inhabitants eschewed work which 
would only serve to ‘fill the prince’s coffers’. Indeed, far from providing 
information which contradicts Zallony’s condemnation of Phanariot rule, 
Wilkinson believed that ‘there does not perhaps exist a people labouring 
under a greater degree of oppression from the effect of despotic power, 
and more heavily burdened with impositions, and taxes, than the 
peasantry of Wallachia and Moldavia .. ,’.127 
A further financial benefit accruing to the Phanariot incumbents of the 
Moldovan and Wallachian thrones was the ease with which they could 
exploit their intimate connection with the patriarchy of Constantinople. 
While simony may have been practised in the principalities in previous 
centuries, it now became so widespread as to be institutionalized. All high 
ecclesiastical offices in Constantinople and the principalities were sold for 
large sums and patriarchs were appointed and dismissed at will for 
financial gain. 
Despite the increasing levels of corruption, the Orthodox church 
remained at the heart of Moldovan cultural life.128 New monasteries were 
established in the eighteenth century, especially in the lands between the 
Prut and Dnestr rivers where over a dozen were built, including Harbovaf 
in the 1730s and Tabara in the 1780s. The monastic expansion was in part 
due to the high levels of destruction, and plundering, which took place 
during the century’s many wars, and which set in train in their wake a 
process of restoration and rebuilding. Suitably enough a number of 
hospitals were founded in the monasteries over the course of the century. 
Paradoxically, despite the Phanriots’ relationship with the Orthodox 
church in Constantinople, most of the monasteries erected during their 
period of rule were undertaken through the generosity of wealthy boyars 
and churchmen rather than the princes themselves. Indeed, links with the 
Orthodox ‘commonwealth’ as a whole were less strong in the Phanariot 
era than during the seventeenth century. Support for the monastic houses 
on Mount Athos declined and the patriarchs visited the principalities less 
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often, although a notable exception was Patriarch Silvestros of Antioch 
who passed through Moldova en route to Moscow and installed an Arabic- 
language press in Ia$i. The Phanariot rulers seemed to have been more 
interested in supporting Greek schools in the lands of present-day Greece, 
and the patriarchal school in Constantinople. Although the hierarchy of 
the Orthodox church in Wallachia was heavily Greek-dominated, this was 
not, however, the case in Moldova where the church authorities largely 
succeeded in blocking the elevation of Greeks to high office.129 The 
Moldovan church, therefore, retained a more ‘native’, Romanian¬ 
speaking character throughout the Phanariot era. 
Despite the centrality of the church in the life of the principalities, 
William Wilkinson was shocked to discover the prevalence of supersti¬ 
tions redolent of paganism amongst the peasantry. ‘They firmly believe in 
all sorts of witchcraft’, he wrote, ‘in apparitions of the dead, in ghosts, and 
in all kinds of miracles .. .’.13° This may have been a reflection on the poor 
quality of the lower clergy, who were themselves drawn overwhelmingly 
from the peasant population of a land which had not undergone industrial 
or agricultural ‘development’ by the early nineteenth century. 
Moldova retained its overwhelmingly rural character throughout the 
Phanariot era, and beyond. 131 Westerners travelling through the princi¬ 
pality during the ‘high noon’ of the Phanariot period in the early 
nineteenth century extolled the beauties and fertility of the Moldovan 
landscape but were also struck by its archaic state. The Scottish army 
doctor, Adam Neale, for example, commented on the vast expanses of 
undrained marshes and lakes, as well as the grassy steppes, dotted with 
large flocks of sheep, herds of horned cattle and magnificent horses. 
‘Moldavia’, he wrote, ‘remains in its primitive state ... [with] ... villages 
of the most primeval character, surrounded by wattle fences.’132 Such 
impressions of untamed nature were doubtless reinforced by a night in the 
forest where Neale’s sleep was inconvenienced by the eerie howling of 
distant wolves and the rushing waters of ice-cold streams and rivers in the 
rocky crevasses.133 
A German visitor, Freiherr von Campenhausen, was able to appreciate 
Moldova’s natural charms, unencumbered by the economic imperatives 
of many of the British travellers.134 Von Campenhausen was enchanted 
by the natural abundance of the Moldovan lands between the Prut and 
Dnestr rivers which teemed with rich animal and birdlife, and flourishing 
plants. He described the lands around Ismail and Chilia on the Danube 
river as ‘the homeland of the magpie’, which lived amongst the high and 
leafy trees, the wide variety of fruit-trees and lush vineyards. He also 
admired the beauty of the town gardens in Akkerman where fruit-trees, 
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roses, lilies, balsam and other sweet-smelling flowers grew together in 
unorganized abandon or, as he put it, ‘in Turkish style’.135 Von 
Campenhausen was charmed by the local Turkish ‘flower-language’ (‘eine 
Blumensprache’) in which ‘every flower, every tree, every weed, has a 
meaning ..The cypress tree, for example, expressed sadness, and the 
oak, peace. Lavender symbolized work and industriousness, while 
rosemary spoke of faithfulness, and the rose of beauty.136 
That an abundance of flowers had long been a feature of the Moldovan 
principality is suggested by the memoirs of the Hungarian, Kelemen 
Mikes, who travelled from Bucharest to Ia§i in the middle of the 1730s. 
‘Our journey was a delight,’ wrote Kelemen, ‘and a bride could have 
delighted in accompanying us; for all the way from Bucharest to Ia§i she 
would have trodden on nothing but many, many different sorts of flowers 
— everywhere the meadows were filled with flowers, so that our horses 
stepped on nothing but carnations and tulips.’137 Two centuries later, the 
Soviet authorities were to exploit Moldova’s rich variety of flowers and 
herbs for industrial purposes. Moldova became the Soviet Union’s main 
producer of essential oils, especially those of rose, lavender, sage and mint, 
used in the perfume, pharmaceutical and confectionary industries.138 
Many visitors to the principality in the early nineteenth century, 
commented on the similarity between the Moldovan peasants’ dress and 
that of their putative Dacian ancestors depicted on Trajan’s column in 
Rome. William Wilkinson, for instance, observed that ‘the dress of the 
male peasants bears some resemblance to that of the Dacians, as repre¬ 
sented in the figures on Trajan’s pillar in Rome’.139 According to Adam 
Neale, ‘the dress and warlike aspect of the Moldavians is strikingly 
picturesque, and remains nearly the same as when ... the Roman artists 
chiselled the basso reliev’ for the pillar of Trajan’.140 This is an interesting 
reflection, perhaps, of the dissemination of the ‘Daco-Roman’ theory 
amongst certain European intellectuals. For Adam Neale, the somewhat 
barbaric appearance of the Moldovan peasants was reinforced by the fact 
that they lived ‘like Tartars as much on horseback as on foot’.141 Indeed, 
the many fine horses bred on the Moldovan steppes provided a plentiful 
supply for the Austrian and Prussian cavalries at this time.142 
Moldova’s urban inhabitants, particularly those who surrounded the 
court, clearly had a more pronounced ‘oriental’ air, reflecting a society, 
infused with Ottoman, and the remnants of Byzantine social codes, in 
which rank, status and occupation were reflected in dress. Freiherr von 
Campenhausen rather fancifully described the garb worn by the people of 
Ia$i as having a part-Turkish, part-Chinese and part-Jewish appearance. 
The coffee-houses in the city were also in the Turkish style, with their low 
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divans, and were full throughout the day with the city’s exotically dressed, 
if indolent, inhabitants.143 Zallony described the elaborate dress of the 
prince himself, which also reflected Turkish fashion. Not being a Muslim, 
however, the prince did not wear a turban, but wore instead ‘a cylindrical 
bonnet of yellow cloth, surrounded by black sable’. The prince’s pre¬ 
eminent position was also symbolized by the practice of ‘ornamenting the 
interior of his slippers with red cloth’; perhaps a remnant of the Byzantine 
emperors’ sole right to wear the imperial ‘purple’ (actually a dark red). 
Further down the social scale, the boyars were distinguished from lesser 
mortals by the calpac, or bonnet, which consisted of black lamb skin in a 
balloon shape adorned with a red tassle. The relative rank of the boyars 
was reflected in the size of their bonnets. Inevitably, the boyars were keen 
to outdo each other in the size of their headgear, the unfortunate conse¬ 
quence of which was to lead them to wear bonnets so ludicrously large as 
‘to prevent a boyar from admitting a friend into his carriage’.144 
Freiherr von Campenhausen, while admiring Moldova’s natural 
beauties, was shocked to find that the streets of large settlements like Xa$i 
or Bender were narrow, dark and dirty. Moreover, the Moldovan towns 
were still subject to regular outbreaks of diseases, and even plague, now 
unheard of in the cities of Central and Western Europe.145 
The ‘Byzantine’ absolutist pretensions of the Phanariot princes and the 
widespread abuses of the system of government in the principalities in the 
eighteenth century provoked the Moldovan and Wallachian boyars to 
demand limitations on the authority of the prince, and a return to the 
system of election of native princes. There was a great dislike especially 
of the Greek boyars who surrounded the prince and the influence they 
wielded. The ‘graecophobia’ already visible in the seventeenth century, 
became more widespread, especially amongst the ‘native’ boyars who 
were excluded from the spoils of Phanariot rule. Byzantine culture and 
traditions, for centuries regarded as the very bedrock of civilization itself, 
were now perceived as both oppressive and alien by many of the boyars. 
This was compounded by the growth of Greek nationalism in the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century, which associated Greek identity 
with a specific territory rather than with a supra-national heritage 
(although of course the ‘Megali Idea’ sought to reconcile the two). Thus, 
by the 1820s a sense of loyalty towards the ‘Byzantine commonwealth’, 
which had previously tied together Orthodox believers of diverse ethnic¬ 
ities, was held by few in the principalities.146 
A number of attempts were made during the course of the century to 
oust the Phanariot rulers from the Moldovan throne.147 These included an 
attempt in 1753 to dethrone Constantin Racovfla, infamous for his 
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oppressive taxes and the abuses of the Greek boyars who surrounded him. 
Later in the century, Grigore Ghica III faced an anti-Phanariot movement 
during his second reign from 1774 to 1777 and in 1775 an angry mob, 
headed by the Moldovan metropolitan, stormed the court. Ghica’s 
successor, Constantin Moruzi, faced a similar challenge in 1778 and in 
1796 a secret anti-Phanariot society was established in Moldova. None of 
these revolts were ultimately successful in replacing the Phanariot regime. 
This was achieved instead by the Greek revolt, which broke out on 
Moldovan soil in 1821, which finally convinced the Ottomans that the 
Phanariot Greeks were no longer reliable as rulers of the principalities. 
As well as fomenting plots against the Phanariot rulers, the boyars in 
the principalities had another weapon in their armoury in the form of 
petitions sent to the European Great Powers. In these petitions the princi¬ 
palities’ problems were enumerated, together with proposals for reform 
and requests that the ‘powers’ should intervene on behalf of the princi¬ 
palities at the Porte. In particular, the boyars sought to return to the 
system of government by native princes. Many petitions requested that 
limitations be placed on the principalities’ economic obligations to the 
Porte; others listed possible administrative reforms, and changes to the 
make-up of the princely divan (or council), and some even drew attention 
to the plight of the peasantry under Phanariot rule. It should be noted, 
however, that the goal of the petitioners was not radical social reform, but 
an alteration in the scheme and manner of government. Moreover, calls 
for ‘national unity’ or full political independence were rare.148 The earliest 
proposal for Moldovan and Wallachian unification was the memorandum 
put together by Mihai Cantacuzino in 1772 which was sent to the 
Habsburg, Prussian and Russian rulers. 
Nevertheless, the notion of the common Roman or ‘Latin’ origins of 
the Romanian-speakers in the principalities and Transylvania gained 
currency during the course of the eighteenth century, especially as a result 
of the historical and philological studies produced by the so-called 
‘Transylvanian School’ of Uniate clergymen. This emphasis on the 
‘Latinity’ of Romanian-speakers coincided with the growing admiration 
for the French language and culture amongst the boyar class, both native 
and Greek. Through allowing the translation of French books into 
Romanian, the Phanariot princes were themselves in part responsible for 
the growing fashion for all things French. Moreover, during the eighteenth 
century, the Phanariot rulers themselves were obliged to be conversant in 
French, the lingua franca of diplomacy and cultivated society throughout 
much of Europe. A number of Phanariot princes, such as Constantin 
Mavrocordat, were known francophiles. The princes regularly employed 
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French secretaries at their courts and French tutors for their children, 
while the academies at Bucharest and Ia§i attended by the boyars also 
taught the French language.149 As a result of these developments, by the 
early 1830s, the French language and French culture had replaced Greek 
as the principal vehicle of foreign influence in both the principalities. 
In addition, around the turn of the century, many boyar families began 
to send their sons to be educated in France, where they fell further under 
the spell of French culture and were increasingly disposed to view 
themselves as part of the ‘Latin’ family of Europeans: a perception which 
only served to differentiate them yet further from their Greek and 
Slavonic co-religionists. The ideological developments surrounding the 
French Revolution and the Napoleonic period were to provide these 
Moldovan and Wallachian boyars with liberal and national ideas which 
were to bear fruit in the movement for national unity. The prevalence of 
such ideas during the Phanariot era, however, should not be exaggerated. 
Thomas Thornton’s meeting with representives of some of the more 
ancient boyar families in the early nineteenth century is instructive in this 
regard. These proudly informed Thornton that they were ‘the descendants 
of the Slavi, and are of a distinct race from the people, who have sprung 
from the alliance of the Romans with the original Dacians .. ,’.150 The 
Moldovans in particular, amongst whom the Greek influence was less 
strong than in Wallachia, retained strong connections with the world of 
the Orthodox East Slavs throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 
The Growth of Russian Influence in the Moldovan 
Principality 
The importance of Russia, in particular, in the life of the principalities was 
reflected in the growing number of petitions sent to the Russian court, 
requesting the reform of the Phanariot system of government. Although 
the growth of French interest in the Danubian region during the era of 
Napoleonic expansion led the boyars to increase the number of petitions 
sent to France, Russia remained the main recipient of petitions from the 
principalities from the 1760s right through until the 1830s.151 
At this point it would be appropriate to review the history of Moldova’s 
relations with Russia* up to the eighteenth century. Political relations 
between Moldova and the principality of Muscovy, and subsequently 
Russia, seem to have been slender in the centuries before Dimitrie 
Cantemir’s alliance with Peter the Great. Stephen the Great had close 
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diplomatic relations, as well as contact through marriage, with Ivan III, 
but this did not lead to any lasting links between the two countries. In the 
sixteenth century, Bogdan, son of Alexandru Lapu$neanu, sought refuge 
in Moscow, and Michael the Brave had diplomatic contacts with the tsar, 
but to what end remains unclear.152 
Moldova, in any event, was geographically separated from the Russian 
lands by Poland-Lithuania, and amongst the Orthodox East Slavs, it was 
with their Ruthene and Cossack neighbours that the Moldovans had the 
closest relations. It was not until Russia began to emerge as a significant 
power in the seventeenth century that the Moldovans began to seek the 
tsar’s aid against the Ottomans. The earliest examples of this by Gheorghe 
$tefan in the 1650s and Gheorghe Duca in the 1670s proved a failure, 
but were clearly serious. The patriarch of Constantinople himself inter¬ 
vened with the tsar on §tefan’s behalf, while metropolitan Dosoftei acted 
as mediator between Moscow and Duca. Nevertheless, there is much truth 
in the assertion that ‘up until the reign of Peter the Great ... relations 
between the principalities and Russia, that is to say Moscow, amounted 
to next to nothing’.153 
Neither do religious-cultural links between Moldova and Russia 
appear to have been especially strong before the seventeenth century. 
While the peregrinations of numerous Orthodox clergymen and monks of 
Greek, Serb, or Bulgarian origin in the Russian lands are recorded from 
the late fifteenth century onwards, there are next to no such records of 
visitors from the principalities before the seventeenth century. This may 
well have been a by-product of the lack of political relations but, more 
plausibly, it was due to the fact that the Orthodox church in the princi¬ 
palities was richly endowed by both the princes and the boyars and had 
no need of the tsar’s benevolence.154 
Indeed, until well into the seventeenth century it was the Moldovan 
church, even more so than that of Wallachia, which acted as the protector 
of the ‘Byzantine commonwealth’ under Ottoman rule. In this capacity, 
Moldova acted as a bridge or mediator between the world of the Balkan 
South Slavs and Greeks and the world of the East Slavs. A number of 
cultural streams reached the Russian lands through Moldova, including 
possibly the Hesychast monastic tradition, through Neamf monstery in 
particular. Many Old Church Slavonic religious texts also reached Russia 
through the mediation of the scriptorium at Putna. In the seventeenth 
century, Greek cultural influence spread to Russia through the products 
of the Greek press established at CetSfuia monastery near Ia$i. 
It was only with the establishment of the Moscow patriarchy in the late 
sixteenth century that the Russian tsars began to regard themselves as the 
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protector of Orthodoxy, with Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’. Even in the 
mid-seventeenth century, however, it was still the Moldovan church, 
especially during the reign of Vasile Lupu, which was at the heart of 
the Orthodox world and at the forefront of the struggle against Calvinism, 
and through Moldova’s close association with the metropolitanate of Kiev 
under Petru Movila, also Orthodoxy’s main bastion against Uniate and 
Catholic influence. 
Nevertheless, the seventeenth century saw the first significant religious 
contacts between Moldova and Russia. Russian icons had long been 
prized in the principality. In the 1620s, the archimandrite Varlaam, the 
future metropolitan of Moldova, was sent on a mission to Moscow to 
procure icons for the religious houses in Ia§i. Lupu had extensive corres¬ 
pondence with Tsar Michael Fedorovic on the question of icons, as 
well as in the matter of the the training of the artists employed to paint 
the church of the Trei Hierarhi in Ia§i. The Moldovan prince sent a 
number of his representatives to Moscow and honoured the tsar with the 
gift of an Arab horse. But the influence was largely one way at this 
time: from the principalities to Russia. Even some Russian historians 
agree that until the seventeenth century, it was the Byzantine influence, 
mediated through the principalities, which enriched the Orthodox 
heritage in the Russian lands.155 
It was only in the eighteenth century, therefore, that both the political 
and religious connection with Russia became significant in Moldova. The 
century saw Russia’s domination of the icon ‘market’, especially after 1770 
when Russian factory-made icons began to circulate widely in the princi¬ 
palities.156 There was also a renewal of monastic spiritual fife in Moldova 
which brought together members of both the Russian and Moldovan 
Orthodox churches. The monk Paisie was originally from a monastery in 
Poltava in Ukraine and established an order at Dragomima monastery in 
Moldova in the 1760s dedicated to community living, obedience, poverty 
and humility, as well as prayer, work and care for the sick. Paisie subse¬ 
quently moved to Secu monastery and eventually Neamf monastery where 
he was responsible for a late-flowering of both scholarly and spiritual 
renewal. Paisie’s reputation attracted to Neamf novices from throughout 
the Orthodox world, including many Russians and Ruthenes, as well as 
Moldovans. His pupils were responsible for the translation of many 
Russian books into Romanian, including the ‘Life of the Saints’ by Saint 
Dimitri of Rostov in 1810. At around the same time, a Russian priest based 
at Ia$i printed the first Romanian-Russian dictionary.157 
It was the military and territorial expansion of the Russian empire in 
the eighteenth century, however, which was to have the most profound 
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effect upon the fate of Moldova. In the one hundred and one years 
between the institution of the Phanariot regime in Moldova in 1711 and 
the Russian annexation of the Moldovan lands between the Prut and 
Dnestr rivers in 1812, the clash of the three empires — the Ottoman, 
Russian and Habsburg — resulted in six major wars totalling twenty-three 
years of warfare, largely fought on the territory of the principalities. 
During the 1735 to 1739 war, the Habsburg monarchy fought alongside 
the Russians against the Ottomans and, for the final year of the war, 
Moldova was occupied by Russian troops. A number of leading Moldovan 
boyar families petitioned the tsar, requesting the annexation of the 
principality by Russia. Suitably enough, it was Dimitrie Cantemir’s two 
nephews who drew up a draft treaty under which Moldova would be 
placed under Russian sovereignty, but with the boyars maintaining their 
traditional privileges, such as the right to elect the prince. Unfortunately 
for the pro-Russian elements, the war proved to be a victory for the 
Turks and the Russians were obliged to withdraw from Moldova. The 
Turkish victory was to prove, however, merely a stay of execution for the 
Ottoman empire, and the second half of the century was to see consid¬ 
erable gains by both the Habsburg monarchy and the Russian empire at 
the Turks’ expense. 
During the 1768-1774 Russo-Turkish war, the Russian army occupied 
both principalities from 1769 onwards and received considerable military 
aid from their supporters in both Wallachia and Moldova.158 The boyars 
in Moldova once again requested annexation by Russia, regarding this 
prospect as preferable to remaining under Ottoman suzerainty. The war 
proved to be a massive victory for the Russians and the terms of the Treaty 
of Kuchuk-Kainardji greatly increased Russian influence both in the 
principalities and throughout the Ottoman lands. The treaty guaranteed 
the free exercise of Orthodoxy in the Ottoman empire and granted the 
Russians the right to intercede with the Porte on behalf of all Orthodox 
Christians. In addition, Russian ministers in Constantinople were per¬ 
mitted to ‘remonstrate’ in favour of the principalities at the sultan’s court. 
Provision was also made for foreign consulates to be opened in Ottoman 
cities. The treaty was also an economic success for the Russians in that it 
officially made the Black Sea and the Straits open to all Russian 
commercial vessels, as well as giving Russian merchants complete freedom 
of movement throughout the principalities and along the course of the 
Lower Danube. 
Baron Thugut, the Habsburg minister of war, clearly recognizing the 
importance of the treaty in promoting Russian hegemony in the Ottoman 
lands, commented wryly that ‘the whole erection of the stipulations of the 
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Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji is a model of skill on the part of the Russian 
diplomatists, and a rare example of imbecility on the part 
of the Turkish negotiators. By the skilful combination of the articles 
which that treaty contains, the Ottoman Empire becomes from henceforth 
a kind of Russian province’.159 As a later commentator observed, the 
treaty ‘strangely entangled things spiritual with things temporal... [and] 
presented ... an inexhaustible store of negotiations for times of peace, 
and standing pretext for declaring war’.160 The inevitable Ottoman 
attempts to evade the stipulations of the treaty did indeed allow the 
Russians, prompted by their Moldovan and Wallachian petitioners, to 
seek to intervene further in the affairs of the principalities. 
The close of the 1768-1774 war also saw the first dismemberment 
of Moldovan territory by one of the Christian powers, and set a prece¬ 
dent for Russia’s own annexation of Moldovan lands a few decades 
later. Under the terms of a convention of May 1775, the Turks awarded 
the north-western corner of Moldova to the Habsburg monarchy as a 
‘reward’ for the monarchy’s neutrality during the war. This territory, of 
some 10,000 km2, became known in the Habsburg monarchy as 
‘Bukovina’, a neologism referring to the many beech trees which grew in 
northern Moldova. It remained part of the monarchy until it was incorpo¬ 
rated into Romania after the First World War. The loss of ‘Bukovina’ was 
not only a major breach of the territorial integrity of the principality, but 
also a significant blow to its religious and cultural life, since the monar¬ 
chy’s gains included the historic capital of Suceava and a number of 
Moldova’s foremost monastic foundations, including Putna, which housed 
the tomb of Stephen the Great.161 
The Russians also made further territorial gains at Ottoman expense in 
the years after the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji. In 1783 they wrested 
control of the Crimea fropi the Ottomans thus securing their domination 
over the Black Sea. In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the Russians 
also opened consulates in Bucharest and Ia$i in the early 1780s. These con¬ 
sulates were to prove immensely important in the cultivation of links with 
pro-Russian boyars and Phanariot rulers. The growing Russian influence 
in the principalities made it even more essential for the Phanariot princes 
to strengthen their contacts with the court at St Petersburg. This was a risky 
activity, since discovery by the Porte usually led to a summary beheading. 
The Orthodox Greeks throughout the Ottoman empire, however, had 
long-standing relations with their Russian co-religionists. Many of the 
Phanariots, and other Greek families in the principalities, had finks 
through marriage with the Russian nobility, while others had operated as 
traders for the Russians within the Ottoman empire or had served as 
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officers in the Russian navy and army. Contacts with the court at St 
Petersburg, therefore, were not solely the preserve of the Moldovan and 
Wallachian boyars during the Phanariot period. One such pro-Russian 
prince was Alexandru Mavrocordat II who ruled in Moldova from 1785 to 
1786. Mavrocordat was dethroned owing to the machinations of the 
Habsburgs, who managed to convince the Porte that he was too closely 
finked to the Russians. As it turned out, the Habsburg diplomats were 
correct, since Mavrocordat was the head of a Greco-Russian plot to 
provoke the Greeks and Moldovans in the principality to rise up against 
the Turks in favour of Russia. The deposed prince fled to Russia with many 
of his boyar supporters. 
The war of 1787 to 1792 again saw military support for the Russians 
from within the principalities and, following the end of hostilities, a 
number of pro-Russian families withdrew with the Russian army across 
the River Dnestr. Under the terms of the 1792 Treaty of Ia$i, the Russians 
gained all the lands between the rivers Bug and Dnestr, thus making the 
Russian empire Moldova’s immediate neighbour. As a result, Russian 
influence in the principalities went from strength to strength. Under the 
Russo-Turkish convention of 1802, rulers were to serve for a seven- 
year term, and could not be appointed, or dismissed, without Russian 
approval. All offices in the principalities were to be awarded to ‘native’ 
boyars where possible, and Russia had the right to intervene at the Porte 
if these stipulations were violated. The new Russian ambassador at the 
Porte from 1803, A. Y. Itafinsky, used this convention to expand Russian 
influence still further.162 In particular Itafinsky cultivated the pro-Russian 
Phanariot, Constantin Ipsilanti, for whom the Russians secured the throne 
of Wallachia, and the grand dragoman at the Porte, Dimitrie Moruzi, 
brother of the Moldovan prince, Alexandru Moruzi. The need for the 
Russians to increase their influence at the Porte and in the principalities 
was occasioned by growing French interest in the fate of the principalities 
and the lands of the Ottoman empire in the period of post-revolutionary 
expansion.163 
Dimitrie Moruzi, the grand dragoman at the Porte, made contact with 
the Russian court at St Petersburg in the years preceding the outbreak of 
war between Russia and the Ottomans in 1806. He assured the tsar of his 
family’s good will towards Russia and began to pass on vital information 
to the Russian court regarding the Porte’s foreign policy. A similaly 
pro-Russian course was also pursued by Constantin Ipsilanti, the 
Wallachian ruler, who also communicated details of Ottoman diplomacy 
to the Russians. French diplomatic pressure at the Porte, however, led to 
Ipsilanti’s fall from power in 1806 and his flight to Russia. Once there. 
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Ipsilanti requested that the thrones of both principalities should be united 
under him and promised to supply the Russian army if it invaded the 
principalities. Unfortunately for Ipsilanti’s ambitions, however, Tsar 
Alexander I had already decided to occupy the principalities, so that 
Ipsilanti’s services were unnecessary. 
Russia’s invasion of the principalities in 1806 was once again met by 
considerable support for the Russians within both principalities. In 
Moldova, a large number of boyars were employed by the Russians 
in both administrative and military capacities during the six years of 
occupation.164 Nevertheless, the Russian occupation put pressure on 
Russia’s supporters in the principalities, as the negative economic effects 
of the Russian presence became apparent. Russian requisitioning of food 
supplies in the principalities, together with financial exactions, led to 
famine in some areas, while the presence of the Russian soldiers gave rise 
to frequent outbreaks of syphilis and other diseases. By the late summer 
of 1811 there were severe riots in Bucharest amongst boyars, traders and 
peasants, all of whom had been adversely affected by the Russian 
occupation.165 Nevertheless, it was clear to the politically active boyars 
that Russia alone offered the Moldovans and Wallachians the best chance 
of freeing themselves from the Ottomans. Dimitrie Moruzi continued 
throughout these exchanges to pass secret information on to the court at 
St Petersburg, despite the suspicions of his Ottoman superiors. 
The Russians themselves regarded the occupation of the principalities 
in 1806 as a prelude to their annexation. Catherine II and Joseph II’s 
‘Greek Project’ of 1782 had already envisaged a partition of the Ottoman 
empire with the principalities, to be renamed ‘Dacia’, under Russian 
control. The emperor, however, had drawn back from the project. With 
Russia’s acquisition of a common border with Moldova as a result of the 
1792 Treaty of Ia$i, however, Russian plans to annex the principalities 
became feasible. Under the terms of the Treaty of Erfurt of 1808 
Napoleon and Alexander I agreed to Russia’s seizure of the principalities. 
With this in mind, in 1810 the Russians demanded that the Ottomans 
should cede to them both Moldova and Wallachia. The Ottoman 
negotiators intimated that although the return of Wallachia to Ottoman 
control would be obligatory at the end of the war, they might be prepared 
to make concessions over the fate of Moldova. The Russians stepped up 
their contact with the grand dragoman, Dimitrie Moruzi, in the hope that, 
despite the Ottoman response, he would be able to engineer the annex¬ 
ation of both principalities. The breakdown of relations between Tsar 
Alexander I and Napoleon, however, forced the Russians to reduce their 
demands on the Ottomans. Early in 1811 the Russians suggested that they 
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should only take possession of the Moldovan lands up to the Siret river, 
but the Ottomans, sensing Russia’s weakness, rejected even this proposal. 
In October, Alexander’s fears of a French attack on Russia forced him to 
sign an armistice with the Turks and to lower his demands still further. 
Dimitrie Moruzi, in his capacity as grand dragoman, now hastened the 
conclusion of a treaty between Russia and the Porte. He feared that in the 
event of a delay, the French would attack Russia and the tsar’s bargaining 
position would be so weak that his demands on the Ottomans would 
dwindle to insignificance. Moruzi’s diplomatic machinations thus ensured 
that Russia made a significant territorial gain in the principalities, even if 
this was not as much as Alexander had originally hoped. Under the Treaty 
of Bucharest of May 1812, the Russians gained all the lands between the 
Prut and Dnestr rivers and subsequently named this territory ‘Bessarabia’, 
the etymology of which will be discussed below. Moruzi did not survive 
this Russian victory for long, however. He was rewarded for his treachery 
towards the sultan with execution. 
Under the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, Russia received over 
45,000 km2 of Moldovan territory between the Prut and Dnestr rivers. The 
lands ceded to Russia were thus larger in extent than the lands remaining 
to the truncated Moldovan principality, and included all the Turkish 
raia-s: Hotin, Bender, Akkerman, Chilia, Ismail and Reni, as well as the 
Bugeac. Russia’s new province contained within it some 17 market towns, 
685 villages and a population of 482, 630.166 The Moldovan boyars did not 
let this truncation of the Moldovan principality go without protest, and 
sent a number of petitions to the European powers, including one to the 
Austrian chancellor, Prince Mettemich, in Vienna. In particular, the 
boyars pointed out that the fertile soils between the Prut and Dnestr rivers 
were of huge economic importance to both Moldova and Wallachia, since 
they had in the past provided the greatest proportion of the agricultural 
produce which the principalities were obliged to sent to Constantinople.167 
Although the Russia government had been unable to secure both the 
principalities during the 1806 to 1812 war, the Treaty of Bucharest assured 
Russia of a pre-eminent position of influence within the principalities, 
through the confirmation of the Treaties of Kuchuk Kainardji and Ia$i, as 
well as the 1802 convention. Moreover, through her annexation of 
Bessarabia, Russia gained one of the most important navigable branches 
of the Lower Danube, the Chilia channel, with the right of free navigation 
for Russian commercial shipping as far as the mouth of the River Prut. 
Subsequent treaties gave Russia control of the other main channels on the 
Danube delta, giving her effective control over Danube navigation: a 
factor of grave concern to the other European Great Powers. 
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Russia and the Principalities after 1812 and the Growth of 
French Influence 
Before turning to the effects of Russian administration in Bessarabia in 
the period up to the First World War (which we will explore below in 
depth), it is instructive to examine Russia’s motives in expanding her 
influence in the principalities as well as the nature of her relationship with 
the truncated Moldovan principality and Wallachia in the nineteenth 
century. This will also serve to cast light on Romania’s troubled 
relationship with the Soviet Union in the twentieth century. 
Russia’s interests in the principalities from the eighteenth century 
onwards, had both strategic and ideological motivations. Geographically, 
the principalities lay on a potential ‘Russian road’ of territorial expansion 
into the Balkans and to Constantinople itself. The principalities, with their 
rich agricultural produce, could either be annexed entirely or serve to 
provision the Russian army en route to the Balkans and beyond.168 
Encroachments on to Ottoman territory by way of the principalities 
increased during the eighteenth century as the vulnerability of the 
Ottoman empire was exposed. 
The Russians also had important strategic interests in the Black Sea 
and the Straits. The Ottomans had effectively controlled the Black Sea 
since their capture of the Crimea in the fifteenth century. They had subse¬ 
quently closed the Black Sea to foreign shipping, with the periodic 
exception of Venetian vessels. The Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji of 1774 
was thus a major breakthrough for the Russians, since it guaranteed free 
access to the Black Sea to Russian commercial ships. Russia’s position on 
the Black Sea was also strengthened by her acquisition of the Crimea in 
1783. Russia regarded effective domination of the Black Sea and Straits 
as essential to secure the southern shores of the Russian empire from 
potential attack and to ensure the export of Ukrainian grain which was a 
vital component of the Russian economy. Domination of the Black Sea 
and Straits would also allow Russia the preponderant influence over the 
ailing Ottoman empire and the possibility of competing with the other 
European powers as far afield as the Mediterranean or the Near East. 
Hence, events within the Ottoman territories bordering on the Black Sea 
and Straits, in other words, the principalities and Bulgarian lands, were of 
paramount importance to the Russians.169 
Russian interest in the principalities and the Balkans also had 
ideological motivations, however. The Russian tsars and foreign policy¬ 
makers, espoused a genuine concern for the Orthodox Christian peoples 
under Moslem domination. As the only Orthodox Christian rulers in 
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Europe free from Ottoman suzerainty, the tsars took a paternalistic 
attitude towards their co-religionists under Ottoman domination. They 
envisaged a new ‘Byzantine empire’ under Russian control with a mission 
to expel the Muslim Ottomans from Europe and re-christianize 
Constantinople. In the nineteenth century, Tsar Nicholas I (reigned 
1825-1855), in particular, was greatly inspired by this ideology. 
The Russians, moreover, regarded themselves as having a ‘civilizing 
mission’ over what they clearly regarded as the more ‘backward’ peoples 
of the Balkans and sought to establish a more efficient and representative 
administration there. Although Nicholas I and subsequent tsars were 
inspired by autocratic and conservative political principles, Russia in the 
early nineteenth century, nevertheless, represented a considerable degree 
of ‘progress’ for the peoples languishing under Ottoman rule. A case in 
point is provided by the so-called ‘Organic Statutes’ which were intro¬ 
duced in the principalities by the Russian governor, Kiselev, in 1834 in 
an attempt to introduce a degree of constitutionalism and accountability 
into the running of the principalities. The Statutes, which can be com¬ 
pared with similar reforms introduced into Russian Finland after 1809, 
provided for a separation of powers in each principality into an executive, 
headed by a prince, elected for life by an assembly in each principality, 
with a veto over legislation. The legislature was to consist of an assembly 
in each principality with law-making powers and control over the budget. 
Although the Statutes were soon regarded as too conservative and in¬ 
adequate by Moldovan and Wallachian boyars inspired by Western 
liberalism, they were, neverthess, progressive for their time. 
Moreover, the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, the result of yet another 
Russian military victory over the Turks, was of considerable benefit to the 
principalities. The treaty not only confirmed earlier treaties whereby 
Russia had established an effective protectorate over the principalities, 
but the sultan in addition recognized the administrative autonomy of both 
Moldova and Wallachia. The Turks also returned to Wallachia the 
fortresses of Turnu, Giurgiu and Braila on the Danube and the lands 
around them that had been seized by the Turks centuries before and 
administered as raia-s. Crucially as well, the treaty annulled the Turkish 
monopoly on agricultural produce, allowing the principalities to trade 
freely on the open market. Unfortunately, however, this brought the 
principalities’ own grain exports into direct competition with those from 
the Russian Ukrainian lands. In retaliation, the Russians manipulated 
their domination of the Chilia channel and allowed the mouth of the 
Danube river to silt up which had adverse effects on the trade at the 
Wallachian river ports of Galafi and BrailS. 
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In addition, the deleterious economic effects of the Russian occupation 
of 1829 to 1834 did little to endear the Russians to the Moldovans and 
Wallachians, since its effects were similar to those experienced during the 
occupation from 1806 to 1812. A further Russian occupation took place 
from 1848 to 1851. Thomas Thornton, who had visited the principalities 
in the early years of the century, returned again a few decades later. He 
lay the blame for the poverty of the principalities at the door of the 
Russians arguing that the commerce of the principalities had been ruined 
by the requisitioning of agricultural produce by the Russian army, as well 
as the frequent unauthorized pillaging which took place.170 Although 
Thornton’s analysis of the economic problems of the principalities was 
doubtless somewhat simplistic, the heavy-handed and autocratic Russian 
administration prompted many of the politically active boyars to question 
whether replacing Ottoman hegemony with that of Russia really repre¬ 
sented an improvement for the principalities. 
Russia continued to be supported by many of the conservative land¬ 
owning boyars, especially in Moldova, until late into the nineteenth 
century. There was a high degree of marriage between the boyars and the 
Russian aristocracy. Gorchakov, the Russian foreign minister during the 
1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war, for instance, was connected by marriage to 
both the Moldovan Sturdza family and the Cantacuzinos. In addition, 
some of the higher Orthodox clergy with connections to the Russian 
Orthodox church also tended to remain pro-Russian.171 By the 1830s and 
1840s, however, such groups were no longer as politically significant as the 
younger generation of boyars educated at Western universities, particu¬ 
larly in Paris. 
These young boyars looked to the liberal West rather than to autocratic 
Russia, as their model for the reorganization of the principalities. They 
aspired to a secular state based on liberal and constitutional principles 
which would enshrine the ‘rights of man’ espoused by the French revolu¬ 
tionaries. To these young minds, it was France which now appeared as the 
beacon of ‘progress’ and civilization, while Russia seemed increasingly 
‘oppressive and reactionary’.172 
In addition, this generation of boyars had absorbed the ideology of 
nationalism, both from French sources, and through contact with Herder’s 
nationalist and linguistic ideology circulating in the German universities. 
These Moldovans and Wallachians now regarded the ethnic nation as the 
primary focus of individual and communal loyalty and hoped to unite all 
the Romanian-speakers of the principalities, and even Transylvania, into 
a common ‘Romanian’ national state. This, they hoped, would be 
governed by a foreign prince and thus enable them to throw off the 
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burdensome Russian protectorate. This stress on the nation and secular 
liberal values was to sever any residual bonds of loyalty felt towards the 
Russians based on common Orthodoxy. The educated generation of the 
1830s and 1840s regarded the fate of the principalities as being bound up 
with that of Western Europe and were emotionally drawn to their Latin 
‘brethren’ in France. 
Thus, the 1848 revolutions in Wallachia and Moldova had a decidedly 
pro-French and anti-Russian flavour. The revolutionaries, urged on by 
emigre groups in Paris, aspired to thrown off the Russian protectorate and 
introduce liberal reforms. Hatred of Russia was enflamed by its military 
suppression of the revolution and the ensuing occupation of the princi¬ 
palities until 1851. Nevertheless, as a testament to the complexities, and 
frequent contradictions, of Russia’s relations with the Romanian-speaking 
peoples, Russia’s suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1849, in the 
short term at least, ‘protected the Rumanians [of Transylvania] against 
Hungarian domination and won the approval of a large section of the 
Romanian leadership’.173 The Russian protectorate over the principalities 
was, in any case, soon brought to an end by Russia’s military defeat in the 
Crimean War. 
According to the terms of the 1856 Peace of Paris which ended the 
Crimean war, Russia was replaced by a protectorate of the seven Euro¬ 
pean Great Powers, which included the Ottoman empire, over the 
principalities and Serbia. Russia’s humilitation was increased by the 
stipulation which forced her to return to the Moldovan principality 
the southern areas of Bessarabia, (i.e. the districts of Ismail, Cahul 
and Bolgrad). The purpose of this, however, was not to reward the 
Moldovans but to ensure that the Danube delta passed back under 
effective Turkish suzerainty, thereby preventing Russia from controlling 
Danube navigation.174 
Russia’s humiliation and her obvious desire to overturn the Peace of 
Paris and retake southern Bessarabia introduced considerable friction into 
Russia’s relations with the principalities. Increasingly, the Russians 
focused their attention upon the Balkan Slavs, in particular the Serbs and 
Bulgarians, as their potential allies against the Ottomans, rather than the 
inhabitants of the principalities. This did not, however, prevent Russian 
involvement in the unification of the principalities in the 1860s and 1870s 
and the creation of the Romanian state. 
The Romanian national movement, which had gathered force since the 
failed revolution of 1848, was backed by France, which saw in it a means 
of extending French influence in the region. Romanian emigres in Paris 
were an important component of this movement, and favoured the 
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complete removal of Russian influence from the principalities and the 
installation of a foreign prince on the throne.175 None of this was pleasing 
to the Russians and they could not hide their dislike of the French- 
educated A. I. Cuza, elected as ruler in both Wallachia and Moldova in 
1859. The legislative and administrative union of the principalities 
followed in 1862 and a number of Cuza’s subsequent policies, such as the 
secularization of the monasteries in the principalities, angered the 
Russians. Cuza’s support for the 1863 Polish revolt prompted the Russians 
to consider Cuza’s expulsion from the throne. Fortunately for the 
Russians, Cuza was overthrown by a coup from within the principalities 
in 1864. Two years later Karl of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen (a cadet 
branch of the Prussian royal family) was elected to the throne of the newly 
created Romanian state as prince, although Romania remained under the 
protection of the Great Powers. The Russians only grudgingly accepted 
the prince’s election. 
Ideally the Russians would have preferred the principalities to remain 
separate entities under local rulers through whom Russia could continue to 
exert influence. Thus, by the 1860s Russian thinking was at odds with the 
vast majority of politically active Romanians who desired complete inde¬ 
pendence for their new country and, when international conditions proved 
favourable, the incorporation of the Romanian-speakers of Transylvania 
into the state. It is worth noting, however, the existence of a significant 
minority of Moldovans who concurred with the Russian position. 
A movement to maintain Moldova’s separate status had existed since 
the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and consisted primarily of large- 
landowning boyars who had supported the Russian protectorate before 
the war.176 These Moldovan boyars feared that in a unified ‘Romania’, 
the francophile liberals would dominate and introduce a number of 
reforms, including the distribution of the largest landed estates amongst 
the peasantry. They also anticipated the loss of their direct control 
over the government which would result from the removal of the capital 
from Ia$i to Bucharest, and lead, inevitably, to the decline of the ancient 
Moldovan capital. The fall of A. I. Cuza in February 1864, gave renewed 
hope to these separatists. This culminated in a demonstration in Ia§i in 
April led by pro-Russian boyars in which violence flared and a number of 
people were killed. Although Russian officials gave only their unofficial 
support to the demonstration, the Russian foreign minister, Gorchakov, 
with his family links to the Moldovan boyars, was known to be in favour 
of Moldova’s separation from Wallachia. 
Relations between the new Romanian state and Russia continued to 
worsen. Although the two countries fought together during the 1877-1878 
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Russo-Turkish war, friction arose over the question of the Russian army’s 
right of passage through Romania and use of Romanian supplies. This 
issue was enflamed by Romanian memories of previous Russian occupa¬ 
tions, and by Alexander I’s attempt to annex both the principalities during 
the 1806-1812 war. This fear of Russian motives in her dealings with 
Romania and the implications of the Russian army’s entry on to Romania 
soil, even as an ally, was to dog Romanian-Russian relations well into the 
twentieth century. 
The Romanian declaration of independence in May 1877, confirmed 
by the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, met with Russian disapproval. The treaty 
included one significant gain for the Russians, however, since it confirmed 
that southern Bessarabia, restored to Moldova after the Crimean War, 
should once again revert to Russia. This left all the former Bessarabian 
lands between the Prut and Dnestr rivers under Russian control, where 
they were to remain until the end of the First World War. 
Romanian fears of Russian military hegemony in the Black Sea area, 
and Russia’s potential threat to Romania’s newly-won independence, 
seemed reinforced by the emergence of the new Bulgarian state to 
Romania’s south, which was under heavy Russian influence. The threat of 
overwhelming Russian influence in the area was magnified by France’s 
eclipse as a Great Power, and her effective disappearance from ‘the 
Eastern Question’, following her defeat by Prussia in 1870 and the 
creation of the German empire. These factors led Romania, which had 
become a kingdom in 1881, to join the Triple Alliance of the Habsburg 
monarchy, Germany and Italy in 1883, as their ally in any future war 
against Russia. 
In the early nineteenth century, the Moldovans and Wallachians had 
regarded Russia as a representative of order and progress; a marked 
contrast to the apparent corruption and maladminstration of the 
Ottomans. By the late nineteenth century, ‘Rumania, united under French 
patronage by Paris educated liberals, preferred to regard itself as an 
outpost of French civilization on the Danube’.177This attitude was given 
concrete expression in the decision to replace the Old Church Slavonic 
script with the Latin alphabet in 1862 and the infusion of the Romanian 
language with vocabulary of French origin. 
While it may be true that ‘... Russia had very little to offer the Balkan 
states once they were liberated from Ottoman control’, Russia’s military 
contribution to Romanian independence should not be dismissed.178 It was 
Russia’s many wars against the Turks in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and their protection of the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans 
which enabled the Romanians, as well as the Greeks, Serbs and 
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Bulgarians, to secure greater autonomy, and eventually independence, 
from the Turks. Moreover, Russia’s motives in her relations with the 
principalities were not always self-serving, since many of the Russians felt 
a genuine desire to help fellow-Christians under Ottoman domination and 
to introduce more responsible and efficient government into the princi¬ 
palities and other Balkan lands. 
Moreover, it is a paradox that in regarding themselves as an ‘outpost of 
French civilization on the Danube’, and attempting to emulate France and 
other Western countries, the Romanians were to find themselves very 
much on the ‘periphery’ of European events, forever conscious of their 
political, economic and cultural shortcomings in relation to the more pow¬ 
erful Western nations. In reality the Romanians shared few close historic 
bonds, political traditions or similarities in social and economic structure 
with the Western countries. The introduction of French cultural influences 
into the principalities was to be responsible for important discontinuities 
in Romanian history. In turning decisively away from their Orthodox East 
Slav neighbours, with whom they had lived in political and religious sym¬ 
biosis for over a thousand years, the Romanians, particularly those of 
Moldova, ceased to be at the geographic and cultural heartland of the 
Orthodox world and made themselves ‘a Latin island in a sea of Slavs’. 
Bessarabia Under Russian Rule, 1812-1918 
Let us now turn to the history of the lands between the Prut and Dnestr 
rivers between their annexation by Russia under the 1812 Treaty of 
Bucharest and their incorporation into the Romanian state in 1918. The 
territory ceded to the Russians under the terms of the treaty was called 
Bessarabia by its new rulers. This term, which has been adopted in most 
textbooks, was, however, at the time not strictly accurate. ‘Bessarabia’ 
(Romanian Basarabia) originally only referred loosely to the lands 
between the Danube and Dnestr rivers on the Black Sea coast which 
had been conquered from the Tatars and incorporated within the princi¬ 
pality of Wallachia during the reign of Mircea the Old (1386-1418). 
These lands were subsequently absorbed into the principality of Moldova 
in the fifteenth century.179 By the late sixteenth century, the application 
of the name ‘Bessarabia’ had been extended to describe not only the 
lands running between the Danube and Dnestr rivers, but also the Bugeac 
region inhabited by the Tatars. Dimitrie Cantemir thus frequently refers 
to Bessarabia in his Descriptio Moldaviae written in the early eighteenth 
century. Cantemir specifically recorded that Bessarabia consisted of 
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four regions: the Bugeac, together with Akkerman on the Dnestr 
and Chilia and Ismail on the Danube. Cantemir believed the name 
‘Bessarabia’ was derived from a tribe, the ‘Besi,’ who had dwelt in the 
region in remote antiquity.180 More plausibly, however, the term is 
derived from the name of the founder of the Wallachian principality, 
Basarab I, who also gave his name to the ruling Wallachian dynasty, the 
house of Basarab, to which Mircea the Old belonged. The association of 
‘Bessarabia’ with Wallachia is borne out by the fact that medieval and 
early modern maps of the Wallachian principality are frequently labelled 
‘Bessarabia’ and by the frequent description of Wallachia as the terra 
Basarabiae. The name ‘Basarab’ itself is of Turkic, probably Cuman, 
origin.181 
It will be remembered that many pro-Russian Moldovans and 
Wallachians had supported the Russians during the occupation of the 
principalities between 1806 and 1812. In Moldova, many boyars had been 
employed at this time in both the Russian administration and army. 
Following Russia’s formal annexation of Bessarabia under the Treaty of 
Bucharest in May 1812, many pro-Russian families from the principalities 
crossed to the east of the River Prut with the Russians. There they 
received grants of land from the Russian authorities, together with the 
right to take part in the government of the new province. Amongst these 
pro-Russians were representatives of some of the most important families 
in the principalities, such as the Sturdzas, an old Moldvan boyar family, 
as well as the Ghica and Cantacuzino ‘Phanariot’ families, and represen¬ 
tatives of many lesser boyar families. By 1821, a quarter of all boyars in 
Bessarabia had close Russian connections. They had either been partisans 
of pro-Russian princes in the principalities during the previous decades, 
seen service in the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish wars, or lived 
in Russia after 1792.182 It was from amongst these pro-Russian boyars that 
the administrators of post-1812 Bessarabia were drawn. 
The first civil governor of Bessarabia was the octogenarian Scarlat 
Sturdza who had served the Russian empress, Catherine II, during the 
1787 to 1792 war. Sturdza had subsequently received a grant of land in 
the Russian territories east of the Dnestr river and thereafter became a 
general in the Russian army. Sturdza’s deputy was a member of the 
Krupenski boyar family who were to wield great influence in Bessarabia 
and who remained steadfastly loyal to the Russians. Sturdza, as it turned 
out, died only one year after taking up his position. He was the sole 
‘native’ governor in the 106 years of Russian rule in Bessarabia. The 
Russian military governor, General Garting, now took overall charge 
of civil, judicial and military affairs until 1816. 
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For the sixteen years from 1812 to 1828, Bessarabia enjoyed a period 
of autonomy.183 Immediately following the annexation, the province’s 
inhabitants were exempt from any taxation for three years by the 
Russians, as well as from military service. The Russians approved the 
continued use of the traditional Moldovan laws, customs and adminis¬ 
trative system within the province, which essentially left the native boyars 
in a dominant position. Provision was made for the use of both Romanian 
and Russian as the languages of administration and justice. The Russian 
governor, Garting, sincerely wished to reform the administration of 
Bessarabia, recognizing that the traditional forms of government in the 
principalities during the Phanariot era had been both chaotic and 
frequently oppressive of large sections of the population. Mindful of 
Russia’s wider foreign-policy aims, Garting believed that without reform 
the ‘Russian promise of being able to govern on behalf of Balkan 
Orthodox Christians would never again be believed’.184 Garting’s attempts 
at reform, however, were to come to nothing, since the boyars reverted 
to their usual ploy of petitioning the tsar in support of their ‘traditional 
rights’. 
Continued use of Moldovan laws and customs and the use of the 
Romanian language were confirmed in the 1818 statute which accorded 
Bessarabia the highest degree of autonomy anywhere in the empire. The 
boyars dominated Bessarabia’s supreme council which effectively allowed 
them to remain entrenched within the province’s legal, administrative and 
financial systems. In addition, the statute confirmed the privileges of the 
region’s various corporate groups. Indeed, the boyars’ privileges were 
extended by the elevation of all boyars to the rank of noble, which meant 
that they were exempt from paying any taxation. The highest nobles alone, 
however, could pass on their title to their successors, and enter into the 
ranks of the Russian imperial nobility. The rights and privileges of the 
church were also confirmed, including the right to tithes and exemptions 
from taxes on their lands. The church thereby retained its position as one 
of the province’s most important landowners. 
The rights of various distinct communities further down the social scale 
were also confirmed by the 1818 statute. These were the relics of groups 
which had previously been granted special status and privileges, although 
some of their rights clearly had a customary origin. The so-called mazali 
claimed historic descent from the lower nobility and were as such eligible 
to hold a limited number of state posts, which would otherwise be the sole 
preserve of the nobles. In addition, they could buy and sell land and paid 
less tax than the peasantry. The mazali also had their own form of self- 
government under a captain appointed by the community. The ruptasi, on 
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the other hand, claimed descent from the clergy or foreign colonists. 
Although subject to taxation and labour services, these were less onerous 
than those imposed on the peasantry. The rdze$i, however, were free 
peasants who were organized into village communities with joint 
ownership over their land. Traditionally, the rdze§i had performed 
military duties for the prince in return for their land. All these groups were 
confirmed in their rights under the statute.185 
The personal freedom of Bessarabia’s peasant majority (the fdrani) was 
also assured under the 1818 statue. It will be remembered that the 
peasants owed their freedom to Constantin Mavrocordat’s abolition of 
serfdom in the principalities in the 1740s. The Russian annexation of 
Bessarabia, however, had led to rumours that serfdom would be 
reimposed, and led to large numbers of peasants fleeing the province. The 
Russians, however, extended freedom from serfdom to all new colonists 
to Bessarabia, (a point to which we shall return). Despite their legal 
freedom, however, the Bessarabian peasants were discouraged from 
moving. They often had to perform labour services for their landlords 
under the contracts of indenture which they took out. Moreover, it was 
the peasants who continued to bear the brunt of the tax-farming system 
and who were also obliged to pay for the costs of upkeep of the local law 
courts, the postal system, roads and bridges, as well as paying a tax on all 
saleable articles and on their agricultural produce. In other words, 
Bessarabia retained much of the social and economic system inherited 
from the Phanariot era, with similar consequences. It was not unusual for 
the peasants to refuse to grow crops, knowing all too well that they would 
see little, if any, of the profits, or to flee the province entirely. 
With little change in Bessarabia’s social and economic conditions in the 
first sixteen years after the Russian annexation, it is perhaps not surprising 
that the province retained an ‘oriental’ appearance. When Tsar Alexander 
I visited Bessarabia in 1818, he was apparently ‘astonished to find the 
Christian nobles dressed in elaborate Turkish gowns rather than jackets 
and breeches’.186 The Russian vice-governor, F. F. Vigel, who served in 
the province from 1819 to 1826 was likewise surprised to see bearded and 
begowned boyars reminiscent of those who had so angered Peter the 
Great in Russia itself a century earlier. Doubtless such sights reinforced 
Vigel’s sense of modern Russia’s ‘civilizing mission’ in the region.187 
One might wonder, therefore, why the Russians allowed this state of 
affairs to prevail until 1828. This was in large measure due to Russia’s 
weakness and lack of manpower in the wake of Napoleon’s invasion of 
Russia, which forced the Russians to rely on the local boyars who were 
already entrenched in the administration in Bessarabia. The continuation 
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of autonomy in the province also owed something to Tsar Alexander I’s 
policy of extending special status to certain outlying areas of the empire. 
Also crucial to Bessarabia’s autonomy, however, was the presence 
amongst those who crossed the River Prut into Bessarabia with the 
Russians in 1812 of the churchman Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni, who was of 
Moldovan origin, but deeply russophile. 
Bodoni provides us with a fine late example of the itinerant Orthodox 
clergyman, albeit that the Orthodox Christian world in Eastern Europe 
was by now oriented at least as much towards the Russian church as 
towards Constantinople. Part of Bodoni’s education had taken place in 
Kiev, as well as in Moldova itself. In 1799 he visited Constantinople and 
in subsequent years he taught philosophy at the seminary in Poltava in 
Russian Ukraine. In 1789, during the Russian occupation of the princi¬ 
palities, the Russians installed Bodoni as bishop of Akkerman, which lay 
at the heart of one of the Turkish raia-s. At the end of the war in 1792, 
when the Turks were reinstalled in Akkerman, Bodoni retired to Russia 
and was appointed metropolitan of Cherson and the Crimea. In 1799 he 
became metropolitan of Kiev. When Russia occupied the principalities 
once more in 1806, Bodoni became head of the church in both principal¬ 
ities. The formal annexation of Bessarabia in 1812, however, cut the lands 
east of the Prut off from the metropolitanate of Moldova in which they 
had been incorporated since the medieval period. In 1813 Alexander I 
created the eparchy of Chisinau and Hotin, which covered the area of the 
Russian empire extending from Bessarabia’s western border on the Prut 
to the River Bug. Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni was the natural choice as 
metropolitan, a position he held until his death in 1821. It was Bodoni who 
effectively acted as the ‘mouthpiece’ for the Moldovan boyars after 1812, 
especially after Governor Sturdza’s death in 1813. His high standing with 
the Russians helped ensure that the statute of 1818 gave Bessarabia a high 
degree of autonomy, as well as ensuring that Romanian achieved the 
status of an official language. 
Russia’s colonization policy in the nineteenth century, however, was to 
have profound implications for the ethnic composition of Bessarabia, 
which was in 1812 still overwhelmingly Romanian-speaking. According to 
a Russian census of 1817, the Bessarabian population was 482,630 of which 
86% were Moldovan (that is to say, Romanian-speaking). With regard to 
the term ‘Moldovan’ used here, we should note that Russian ethnogra¬ 
phers in the nineteenth century recognized the cultural and linguistic 
affinities between the Romanian-speaking populations on both sides of the 
River Prut. As Charles King has pointed out, while ‘imperial censuses used 
the term ‘Moldovan’ to describe Bessarabia’s majority population ... this 
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term was the self-designation of the population, not an invention of the 
Russians’.188 In addition, the Bessarabian population included some 30,000 
Ruthenes (6.5% of the total population), who were long-established in the 
province, as well as 19,130 Jews amounting to 4.2% of the population.189 
In addition, there were small populations of Greeks, Armenians, 
Germans, Gypsies and Bulgarians, together with a few thousand so-called 
‘Lipovans’, the descendents of the ‘Old Believers’ who had left Russia 
during the reign of Peter the Great. 
At the time of Bessarabia’s formal annexation by Russia, the province 
was one of the most sparsely populated areas of the Russian empire. This 
was partly due to the flight, to Wallachia and elsewhere, of possibly as 
many as one-third of the population of the lands between the Prut and 
Dnestr rivers during the Russian occupation. General Kiselev, who later 
became governor of the principalities, apparently declared with reference 
to the occupation of 1806 to 1812, that, ‘the inhabitants fled out of 
Bessarabia, preferring the Turkish regime, hard though it was, to our 
own’.190 While this flight was doubtless in part motivated by the economic 
burden of supplying the Russian army, some of the peasantry fled in the 
fear, false as it turned out, that the Russians would re-impose serfdom. 
The spread of disease, including several outbreaks of the plague at the 
end of the war and in the following decade, also led to a reduction of the 
population of Bessarabia and the principalities. 
The Bessarabian population was also reduced by the expulsion, during 
the 1806-1812 war, of the Tatars, together with most of the Turks, living 
in the Bugeac and the Turkish raia-s of Bender, Chilia and Akkerman. 
The Russians feared that these groups would hardly be well-disposed 
towards them and would ‘stab them in the back’ as the army advanced 
into the Balkans. Through the occupation of Moldova, all areas inhabited 
by the Tatars were now under Russian control and the Bugeac Tatars were 
moved to the Crimea where the Russian government was now settling its 
Tatar population. Through their colonization policies, the Russians sought 
in particular to repopulate the Bugeac and the raia-s of Bessarabia. 
Russian motives for this colonization policy were closely linked to 
Russia’s foreign-policy aims in the Balkans. First, a well-populated and 
prosperous Bessarabia could act as a ‘show-case’ to advertize the benefits 
of Russian administration to the Ottoman Empire’s Orthodox subjects 
over whom Russia claimed to act as a protector. Secondly, it was necessary 
for Russia to build up the agricultural and economic resources of the 
province which was now Russia’s frontier zone with the Ottoman empire 
and the territorial base from which future military campaigns against the 
Turks would be launched. Furthermore, as a Moldovan historian has 
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recently argued, it may well be that the Russian government specifically 
sought to change the balance of nationalities in the province, especially in 
southern Bessarabia, against the indigenous Moldovan population, and 
replace it with groups that could be expected to be more loyal to Russia. 
The prohibition on Moldovans migrating from other areas of Bessarabia 
to the south, is in this respect suggestive.191 In particular, the Russian 
government may have wished to place southern Bessarabia in more loyal 
hands since it bordered the Black Sea and the River Danube, both of 
which were essential to Russia’s broader economic- and foreign-policy 
aims in the region. 
The movement of peoples into southern Bessarabia began even before 
the end of the war. By 1812 there were already some 11.000 new settlers 
in the area. Although some were Romanian-speakers from the Dobruja, 
most were Russians, who entered the province in an administrative or 
military capacity and who were given land, as well as Ukrainians who 
entered Bessarabia from Russian Ukraine.192 In the aftermath of the war, 
the Russian government encouraged more colonists to settle in 
Bessarabia, and especially in the depopulated southern areas, by offering 
generous land grants and financial aid. Peasant migration from other parts 
of the Russian empire was encouraged through the prohibition on 
serfdom in Bessarabia. In 1824, Russian state peasants were enticed into 
moving into the province by promises of land and tax exemptions. The 
prohibition on serfdom also made the area attractive to escaped Russian 
serfs, religious schismatics and even fugitives from the law who sought to 
take advantage of the relative freedom which existed in Bessarabia. 
Russian and Ukrainian migration into Bessarabia was encouraged 
throughout the nineteenth century. By 1858 the Ukrainians, with whom 
the long-standing Ruthene population was now numbered, represented 
some 13.1% of the population with 120,000 people, and 19.6% of the 
population by 1897 with 379,698 people. The Russians numbered 20,000 
inhabitants by 1858, 2.1% of the population, and 155,774, 8% of the total 
population, by 1897.193 
Southern Bessarabia also became the home to many Bulgarian settlers. 
Some, as we have seen, had already settled in the Bugeac during the 
1806-1812 war, where they replaced the Tatars and Turks expelled by 
the Russians. Bulgarians had been entering the principalities since the 
mid-eighteenth century, however, under the protection of the Russian 
army during periods of occupation. More waves of Bulgarian migration 
into southern Bessarabia followed after 1817, as well as those of another 
ethnic group, the Gagauz, a Turkic people of Orthodox Christian faith, 
and continued up until the 1870s.194 Bulgarian migration into Russian- 
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controlled Bessarabia was especially motivated by their regard for Russia 
as ‘the defender of Orthodoxy’ in the Balkans.195 The privileges granted 
to the Bulgarian settlers included freedom from serfdom and exemption 
for ten years from taxation and from military service. 
A numerically small but economically important group of migrants to 
Bessarabia were the Germans. The principality of Moldova had lost a 
significant part of its long-standing German population, which had been 
integral to the foundation of the principality in the medieval period, 
through the loss of Bukovina to the Habsburg monarchy in 1775. New 
German colonists were encouraged to move to southern Bessarabia, 
especially from 1814 to 1824. Most of these settlers came from Prussian 
Poland, Mecklenburg, Pommerania and West Prussia, with groups of 
settlers also coming from the southern German lands, notably 
Wurttemberg.196 In addition to the incentive of leaving territories ravaged 
by the Napoleonic wars and ensuing famines, the Germans were tempted 
into Bessarabia by offers of land, religious freedom, exemption from 
taxation for a full fifty years, as well as loans and the use of peasant labour 
to build their homes. 94% of the Bessarabian German community were 
Lutheran, with 80% of the population engaged in agriculture, through 
which the community was virtually self-sufficient. A few hundred French 
and Swiss colonists also arrived in the 1820s at the same time as the 
Germans, giving rise to such unlikely village names as Paris, Brienne 
and Frerechampenoise in southern Bessarabia. Although the German 
population was barely 10,000 strong even as late as 1827, numbers had 
risen to over 60,000 by 1897, or 3.1% of the overall Bessarabian popula¬ 
tion.197 A French traveller in Bessarabia in 1919, Professor de Martonne, 
recorded his impressions of the German villages built mainly between 
1816 and 1828 in the south of the province. Many of these, such as the 
village of Leipzig, were named in honour of German victories against 
the French in the Napoleonic War. De Martonne was impressed by the 
orderliness of the German villages, with their fine buildings, and by the 
well-cultivated lands surrounding them. In the German villages, he wrote, 
‘you gain ... a vivid impression of prosperity and even wealth, as well 
as of order and method. In the whole extent of the German colonies, 
I have not seen a patch of ground lying waste’. De Martonne described 
the Germans as ‘an aristocracy of hard-headed landowners’, and particu¬ 
larly praised their excellence in the breeding of fine horses and cattle.198 
By the interwar period, the German population had also developed a 
small but efficient industrial sector which included eight factories for 
making agricultural machinery, seven cloth factories, 37 brickworks 
and 91 dairies. 
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Unlike the Germans present in Moldova in previous centuries, how¬ 
ever, Bessarabia’s German colonists were not primarily engaged in trade 
and industry. This was left overwhelmingly to the Jews. These were to be 
found throughout Bessarabia in the nineteenth century, but were 
overwhelmingly urbanized. This pattern of settlement was intensified by 
the Russian regulation of 1882 which prohibited Jews from settling outside 
towns and cities. Most of the province’s small commercial and industrial 
sector was in Jewish hands. The Jews already living in Bessarabia in 1812 
had migrated from Polish and German territories in the Middle Ages and 
were Yiddish speaking.199 In the decades after 1812, Jewish migrants came 
mainly from Russian territories in Poland, Ukraine and the Crimea, 
tempted in particular by the fact that they were, initially at least, exempt 
in Bessarabia from the discriminatory legislation which applied elsewhere 
in the Russian empire. The Jewish population of the province thus rose 
from just under 20,000 in 1817 to 78,750 in 1858 (8.6% of the total 
population) and 228,168 (11.8% of the population) in 1897. Chisinau, 
which supplanted Tighina as Bessarabia’s capital in 1818, had witnessed 
Jewish immigration since the eighteenth century and hence by 1897 some 
50 per cent of the city’s population was Jewish, and Russian-speaking, and 
almost all the capital’s factories were in Jewish hands. The city did not 
avoid the growing anti-semitic violence of late tsarist Russia and witnessed 
vicious pogroms in 1903 and 1905.200 
Russia’s colonization policy transformed Bessarabia into a highly 
ethnically-diverse province. According to the Russian census of 1897, the 
Bessarabian population was just under two million, of which only 47.6% 
identified themselves as Moldovan, Ukrainians made up 19.6% of the 
population, with the Jews at 11.8% and the Russians at 8%. Smaller ethnic 
groups making up the rest of the population, including the Germans at 
3.1% of the overall population, Bulgarians at 5.3%, Turks, including the 
Gagauz, at 2.9% and Gypsies at 0.4% of the total population. While 
still the largest single ethnic group in Bessarabia, the statistics of 1897 
represented a significant fall in the Moldovan population of the province, 
which had stood at some 66.4% of the total population even as recently 
as 1858. Moreover, the Moldovans, together with the Ukrainians, 
made up the bulk of the province’s rural population. Only some 14% of 
Bessarabia’s urban population was made up of Romanian-speaking 
Moldovans even as late as 1897.201 
Moreover, while the Moldovans formed the majority of the population 
in the central area of Bessarabia, national ‘minorities’ outnumbered them 
in the north and south. Hence in the Hotin region on the Upper Dnestr, 
some 53.3% of the population were Ukrainian and only 23.8% Moldovan. 
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South Bessarabia showed even greater disparities of population between 
the indigenous Moldovans and more recent colonists, especially in and 
around the former Turkish raia-s. Chilia, for example, which had been 
some 92% Moldovan in 1806, was only 12.7% Moldovan by 1844. Ismail, 
which was 85% Moldovan in 1809, had a Moldovan population of only 
6.2% in 1884.202 In Cetatea Alba (Akkerman), the Moldovan population 
was only some 16.4% of the population by the end of the century, with 
Ukrainains and Russians making up over 35 % of the population.203 
The Moldovan population of Bessarabia was affected not only by 
Russia’s policy of colonization in the nineteenth century, but also by the 
policy of centralization and russification which followed Bessarabia’s loss 
of autonomy in 1828. The withdrawal of autonomy was brought about 
by a number of factors, including the death of the reliably pro-Russian 
metropolitan, Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni, in 1821. In addition, the Greek 
revolt and Tudor Vladimirescu’s anti-Phanariot rebellion which broke 
out in the principalities in 1821 made Russia’s position in the region 
unstable and prompted the Russians to reduce Bessarabia’s autonomy in 
favour of more direct control.204 To make matters worse, a new war broke 
out between Russia and the Ottoman empire in 1828 and Russia once 
again occupied Wallachia and what remained of the principality of 
Moldova. The logistics of war required Bessarabia to be both efficiently 
run and economically productive if it was to sustain Russia’s war-effort.205 
Such a condition appeared unlikely, however, if the province continued 
to be run by the local nobility. The Russian governor of Bessarabia, 
Vorontsov, who took up his post in 1823, was apparently appalled at the 
state of the province. He discovered Bessarabia’s roads and bridges to 
be largely in ruins, its policing compromised by corruption, and the 
iniquitous tax-farming system to be impoverishing the peasantry. These 
woeful conditions, coupled with the death of Alexander I in 1825 and the 
accession of the more autocratically-minded Nicholas I, inclined the 
government towards a policy of increasing the powers of the Russian 
central government over Bessarabia. 
Under the statute of 1828, therefore, the power of the local nobility 
within the Bessarabian council and over the local law courts were greatly 
reduced. The Russian governor-general was given substantial powers over 
the council, as well as the courts, and over the province’s financial and 
administrative affairs. Nevertheless, some concessions to local conditions 
were still made. Russian did not become the sole language of adminis¬ 
tration until 1833 and the privileges of the various social groups outlined 
in the 1818 statute of autonomy were maintained. Bessarabia remained 
free from serfdom and military service was not imposed until 1874. Local 
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laws prevailed, unless their insufficiency made the use of Russian law 
necessary. Nevertheless, Russia ruled directly in Bessarabia after 1828 as 
she had not done previously. In particular, in the three southernmost 
districts of Bessarabia, where the Moldovan population (that is to say, 
the Romanian-speakers) were not in a majority, all business was to be 
conducted in Russian and Russian law prevailed. Bessarabia’s effective 
incorporation into the Russian empire from 1828 meant the province was 
able to benefit from the liberal reforms of Alexander II in the 1860s, such 
as the institution of equality before the law, agrarian reforms and the 
introduction, at least on paper, of primary and secondary education. From 
1828, however, Bessarabia, like other parts of the Russian empire, was 
also subject to the tsarist governments’ russification policies. The effect of 
these policies on Bessarabia’s intimately connected religious, educational 
and cultural life is immensely important to the whole question of 
Moldovan ‘identity’. 
During the metropolitanate of Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni from 1812 to 
1821, the Romanian language had flourished in Bessarabia. In 1813 
Bodoni opened a press and a seminary in Chisinau, where both Romanian 
and Russian were taught. Through the press, Bodoni was responsible 
for the translation and publication of a number of religious works from 
Russian into Romanian. These included a catechism and a Russian gram¬ 
mar with Romanian parallel text for use at the seminary. In addition, 
Bodoni was responsible for the publication, in St Petersburg, of a New 
Testament in Romanian (1817) and the complete Bible (1819), the latter 
under the auspices of the British and Foreign Bible Society.206 By the time 
of his death in 1821, Bodoni’s press had published some 19,320 copies of 
books.207 
Bodoni’s successor as head of the church in Bessarabia was Dimitrie 
Sulima who, despite being of Ukrainian origin, knew the Romanian 
language and continued Bodoni’s work of translations from Russian texts 
into Romanian. These included his Instrucfia Bisericilor (‘Instructions 
of the Church’) in 1827. He also published a Romanian-Russian primer 
in 1822 and was responsible for setting up a number of elementary schools. 
In 1823 a school was opened in Chisinau to prepare boys for the seminary 
previously established by Bodoni. A church-run school for the daughters 
of priests and teachers was subsequently opened in the capital in 1859.208 
Despite the extensive use of Romanian under Gavril Banulescu- 
Bodoni and Dimitrie Sulima, however, the loss of autonomy in 1828 served 
to limit the use of the language in Bessarabia. From 1833 Romanian was 
no longer an administrative language or language of instruction in schools. 
In 1854 Russian became Bessarabia’s sole official language and thereafter 
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Romanian was quickly eradicated from the school system. By 1867 there 
were no schools in Bessarabia which taught in the Romanian language.209 
In the second half of the century, the education system expanded beyond 
its original core of ecclesiastical schools and those established by the 
Moldovan princes prior to the annexation of Bessarabia by Russia. 
By 1912 there were some 1,709 primary schools, over a thousand of 
which had been set up by the government, while the rest were run by the 
ecclesiastical authorities. Not one, however, taught in Romanian. Like¬ 
wise, of Bessarabia’s 56 secondary schools in 1912, none taught in 
Romanian. Paradoxically, it was the Russian lycee, opened in 1833 in 
Chisinau, which allowed pupils the opportunity to learn Romanian, until 
a halt was called to this in 1873.210 The only other important exception to 
this russification of the school system was in the three southern districts of 
Bessarabia, Ismail, Cahul and Bolgrad, which were returned to the juris¬ 
diction of the principalities at the end of the Crimean war in 1856. Despite 
the fact that Romanian-speakers were not in the majority in this part 
of Bessarabia, the new Romanian administration opened a number of 
schools and churches, operating in Romanian, as well as a seminary in 
Ismail. In addition, the Romanians introduced the Latin alphabet in these 
districts, (a point to which we shall return). Unfortunately for the 
Romanians, however, the districts were returned to Russia under the 1878 
Treaty of Berlin and the Russians reversed these reforms.211 
The effects of this russification of the education system had various out¬ 
comes on different sections of the Moldovan population. The policy was 
successful with regard to the nobility and to most of the small Moldovan 
intelligentsia and middle class. As Romanian disappeared as the language 
of education and administration, wealthy and well-connected young 
Moldovans went from Russian high schools to imperial universities. 
Russian, rather than Romanian, became the language of the educated 
and cultured: a circumstance that remained largely unchanged during 
the interwar period.212 The vast majority of the Romanian-speaking 
autochthonous noble class disappeared during the course of the nine¬ 
teenth century. Their ranks were increasingly ‘diluted’ by an influx of 
non-Romanian-speaking ennobled families from outside Bessarabia, par¬ 
ticularly Russians who had held state office in Bessarabia, together with 
Greeks, Armenians and Poles. The common language of these nobles was 
Russian and thus their assimilation into Russian culture was assured.213 
As far as the Moldovan peasantry was concerned, however, russifi¬ 
cation of schooling had little impact, except in increasing their ignorance. 
The Russian school-system passed most peasants by, primarily due to the 
government’s inability to supply a sufficient number of Russian-speaking 
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teachers. Under Tsar Alexander II’s educational reforms, the church 
was expected to establish schools in every parish. An impressive 400 
schools with 7,000 pupils were functioning in rural parishes in Bessarabia 
in the mid-1860s, but only 23 remained by 1880. This was due to the fact 
that village priests, who usually also acted as the village teachers, were 
largely ignorant of Russian. An attempt to revive the system in 1884 
failed for the same reason.214 Charles Upson Clark’s comment that the 
Russian education system ‘resulted not in acquisition of Russian by the 
Moldavians, but in their almost complete illiteracy in any language’, is 
borne out by Russian statistics of 1897. These revealed that only 10.5% 
of all Moldovan men were literate, and a mere 1.7% of all women. The 
Moldovans, together with the Gypsies, shared the honour of being the 
least literate groups in Bessarabia, with the Germans emerging as the most 
literate.215 Nicolae Iorga also noted a further defect of the school system 
which negated the attempts to russify the Moldovan rural population. 
Even those children enrolled at a school were only required to attend for 
three years, while the school ‘year’ itself was limited to only a few months 
during the winter.216 This was barely enough time to acquire more than a 
rudimentary knowledge of Russian. 
The Russian government’s attempts to russify the church in Bessarabia 
met with similarly mixed results. Following the death of Gavril Banulescu- 
Bodoni in 1821, the spiritual head of the church in Bessarabia was demoted 
from metropolitan status to that of a mere archbishop and no Moldovan 
was appointed to the position after the death of Bodoni. Following the 
death of Dimitrie Sulima in 1844, the new archbishop, Irinarh Popov 
(1844-1858), sought to ensure that all higher administrative and spiritual 
positions in the church in Bessarabia were occupied by Russians, brought 
into the province for that purpose. Some of the larger parishes in Bess¬ 
arabia were also forced to install Russian priests in their churches. In 1870 
worship in the Romanian language was officially banned and, between 
1871 and 1882, a further period of intense russification of the church was 
undertaken by Archbishop Pavel Lebedev. Russian became the language 
of the liturgy and even the Romanian hymnal was discarded for a Russian 
one. From 1875 Russian-language schools were established in Bessarabia’s 
monasteries. In 1878, following the return of the southern Bessarabian dis¬ 
tricts of Ismail, Cahul and Bolgrad from Romania to Bessarabia, Lebedev 
obliged all the Romanian-speaking priests to learn Russian or to lose their 
parishes. Archbishop Lebedev closed the Romanian seminary at Ismail 
and forbade the use of Romanian at the Chisinau seminary. He was also 
responsible for the closure of some 336 Moldovan churches because their 
priests could not conduct services in Russian.217 
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Archbishop Pavel, however, came up against the same problem as the 
russifiers of the education system. He was unable to find enough Russian- 
speaking priests for Bessarabia’s churches. Consequently hundreds of 
churches remained entirely without spiritual heads, while others simply 
ignored his orders. Of Bessarabia’s churches, 207 held their services in 
Romanian, 211 in Romanian and Russian and 608 continued to use Old 
Church Slavonic, a language which had long since died out in the 
Orthodox churches west of the Prut. Of the province’s eighteen monas¬ 
teries, thirteen continued to hold divine offices only in Romanian.218 Since 
the great bulk of the Moldovan peasantry remained ignorant of both 
Russian and, needless to say, of Old Church Slavonic, the results of Pavel’s 
measures was to sink many of them into religious ignorance and apathy. 
A story circulating in Bessarabia at the turn of the century, tells of a 
Ruthenian priest in a Moldovan village, who discovered, after com¬ 
mencing his service, that he had forgotten his prayer-book. Undaunted, 
the priest recited from memory a famous poem by a Ruthenian poet, ‘to 
the entire satisfaction of his hearers, who understood not a word, either 
of the Church Slavonic or any dialect of Russian’.219 Moreover, the policy 
of russification undoubtedly affected the quality of the clergy both at the 
higher, as well as at the village, level. Knowledge of Russian and acqui¬ 
escence to the Russian regime were now considered more important than 
spiritual qualities. Sergei Urussov, who became governor of Bessarabia in 
1903, was sufficiently unimpressed with the bishop of Chisinau to conclude 
that he ‘seemed to have none of the qualities of a spiritual pastor and 
minister of the Gospel’.220 
It was perhaps not altogether surprising, therefore, that the Moldovan 
peasants, especially in areas where the liturgy was not conducted in 
Romanian, were increasingly drawn to religious movements which 
developed outside the confines of the official church and which were of a 
more mystical and emotional nature. Many Moldovans were drawn to the 
cult growing up around Inochentie, a Moldovan monk, from the 
monastery of Balta, east of the River Dnestr, who preached in Romanian 
and taught that the end of the world was at hand. He was also reputed to 
have the power of healing, such that by 1910 the monastery at Balta had 
apparently become a ‘Moldavian Lourdes, with shelters on every side for 
the invalids brought for [Inochentie’s] ministrations’.221 When the Russian 
authorities, worried by his popularity, exiled the charismatic monk to a 
monastery north of St Petersburg, many of his flock simply sold their 
possessions and followed him there. Inochentie was finally exiled to an 
island in the White Sea, but his spirit lived on as some of his better- 
educated followers continued to preach to the ‘faithful’ in Bessarabia. 
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The meetings of Inochentie’s followers, who were overwhelmingly 
Moldovan, were based on services in Romanian, led usually by non¬ 
priests, and Bible readings, as well as more ecstatic forms of worship. The 
Russian church authorities, worried by this phenomenon which was taking 
place entirely outside their control, undertook investigations into the 
movement. They concluded that the primary cause of the movement’s 
popularity lay in the fact that the church in Bessarabia had become alien- 
tated from its flock due to its failure to provide for the Moldovans’ 
spiritual needs in their mother-tongue.222 
While spoken Romanian clearly survived the onslaught of russification, 
the printed word in Romanian did not entirely die out either. Although 
the importation of books from the principalities had been forbidden since 
1812, books from Wallachia and Moldova clearly continued to circulate. 
Moreover, a number of important libararies were located in Bessarbia’s 
monasteries, such as Capriana. The significance of these in helping to keep 
the Romanian language alive in the province was recognized by 
Archbishop Pavel Lebedev who consequently ordered priests to destroy 
all works in Romanian held in eccelesiastical libraries, although the 
outcome of his order is unclear.223 The period between the 1870s and 
the early twentieth century saw, however, a marked decline in the number 
of works in Romanian printed in Bessarabia. In 1882 the press set up 
by Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni was shut down and, by the end of the 
century, the public library in Chisinau did not possess a single work in 
Romanian.224 
Nevertheless, throughout the 106 years of Russian rule, some printed 
matter in Romanian continued to be produced by a number of presses in 
the Bessarabian capital. In particular, the production of leaflets and 
pamphlets in Romanian was deemed necessary in order to inform the 
Moldovan population about new laws, to provide information regarding 
censuses or health matters, or news relating to the imperial family, or 
foreign affairs. When, for example, the districts of Ismail, Cahul and 
Bolgrad in southern Bessarabia reverted to Russian rule in 1878, the local 
population was informed of this by a proclamation written in Romanian 
in the Latin script.225 It should be noted, however, that publications 
printed in the Latin script were exceptional. 
In his study of printed works in Bessarabia under Russian rule, Paul 
Mihailovici lists several hundred works, mainly leaflets and pamphlets, but 
also books, printed in Romanian. These were written in a variety of 
scripts. Although the Russian civil alphabet had been introduced in the 
Russian empire in 1710, a number of alphabets appear to have been in 
use in nineteenth-century Bessarabia. Mihailovici’s study reveals that Old 
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Church Slavonic was still used to express written Romanian, especially in 
texts of a religious nature, but also in other documents.226 Romanian 
works were also produced in both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ Russian alphabets, 
or even a mixture of the Russian and Old Church Slavonic alphabets.227 
The mixture of alphabets made the Bessarabian population’s grasp of 
letters even harder. 
Although the number of printed books in Romanian began to decline 
after Dimitrie Sulima’s death in 1844, a small number of Romanian 
language manuals were produced thereafter, including one by Iacob 
Hancu in 1848. Hanoi went on to teach Romanian at St Petersburg 
university where the language was taught between 1848 and 1858 and 
again from 1894 to 1905.228 Romanian was taught at the university owing 
to the Russian foreign ministry’s need to prepare officials for the judiciary 
in Bessarabia, for the language of the courts had still necessarily to be 
conducted in the popular idiom. Moreover, although books from Romania 
were forbidden in Bessarabia, they were allowed into Russian universities, 
in particular at Dorpat, Kiev and Odessa, where Moldovan students were 
often in attendance.229 
Another important Romanian-language manual was produced by loan 
Doncev in 1865 which, unlike any manual or grammar previously 
produced, was printed in the Latin alphabet. It was used, briefly, in some 
Bessarabian schools in 1866 to 1867, the last year in which any Romanian 
was allowed in Bessarabian schools. Thereafter, however, the book 
penetrated into Moldovan intellectual circles, where it was used and read 
right up until the First World War. It was also used at the church-run 
school for girls in Chisinau where Romanian re-appeared as a subject from 
1906 to 1917.230 
Thus, the written Romanian word continued to retain a presence in 
Bessarabia, albeit expressed overwhelmingly through the medium of the 
Church Slavonic and Russian alphabets. Moldovan students at some of 
the Russian universities were also able to make some contact with 
Romanian writings from beyond the River Prut through the university 
libraries. This was sufficient to keep interest in the Romanian language 
alive. This interest, together with growing apprehensions amongst the 
clergy in Bessarabia of the effects of linguistic russification in the church, 
ensured that the Romanian-language question emerged as a major 
cultural issue during the 1905 revolution in Bessarabia. 
During the early years of the twentieth century, the church authorities 
in Bessarabia agreed to allow greater use of the Romanian language in 
order to counteract the growing drift amongst the Moldovan peasantry 
towards religious apathy or religious movements developing outside the 
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church.231 The congress of priests even stipulated that village priests should 
preach in Romanian. The press originally established by Bodoni in 
Chisinau was reopened and over the next couple of years, in the relatively 
liberal cultural atmosphere that followed the 1905 revolution, a number of 
publications in Romanian were produced. These included the religious 
publication, Lumindtorul (‘The Illuminator’), in 1908. One of the young 
clergymen who worked for this publication was Gurie Grosu, who became 
the metropolitan of Bessarabia after the union with Romania in 1918. 
Important also to the cultural activity in Bessarabia during and after 
1905 were Ion Pelivan and Pantelimon Halippa. These young Moldovans 
had studied at the university in Dorpat (in present-day Estonia) and 
had established there an underground Romanian-speaking students’ 
association with links to intellectual circles in Romania. In 1905 its leader, 
Pelivan, together with Halippa, founded the ‘Society for Moldovan 
National Culture’ in Bessarabia and secured funds for a publication 
entitled Basarabia which appeared from 1906 to 1907. This was the 
province’s first Romanian-language journal, written in the Russian 
alphabet, and it demanded autonomy for Bessarabia within the Russian 
empire, and the use of Romanian in Bessarabia’s schools and adminis¬ 
tration. We should note, however, that many publications and groups 
which emerged in Bessarabia at the time of the 1905 revolution were 
avowedly pro-Russian. Such was the case, for instance, with the weekly 
publication, Moldovanul, edited by Gheorghe Madan, despite its call for 
‘national awakening’. Other such groups included the ‘League of True 
Russians’ and the ‘Union of the Russian People’. 
Much of the work of the 1905 revolutionary period was, however, 
undone by the installation of Serafim Chichagov as archbishop in 1908. 
Serafim returned to the policy of russification of the church and shut down 
all Romanian presses with the help of the influential and russophile 
Krupenski family.232 Nevertheless, the ‘Society for Moldovan National 
Culture’ managed to produce another Romanian publication in 1913, 
Cuvantul Moldovenesc, (‘The Moldovan Word’) which appeared in both 
the Latin and Russian alphabets. 
There are a number of points which should be made relating to the 
outcome of russification policies in Bessarabia in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. The overall failure of the attempt to russify 
the Moldovans was most obvious amongst the peasantry, who continued 
to use the Romanian language in their daily lives and private worship. 
A nineteenth century proverb puts it thus: ‘a man may die of thirst in 
Bessarabia if he cannot ask for water in Romanian’. The Moldovans’ 
loyalty to their mother-tongue, however, should not lead us to conclude 
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that they had a ‘Romanian’ national consciousness. Apart from the three 
districts of southern Bessarabia, reunited with the principalities between 
1856 and 1878, the Romanian-speaking peasant population east of the 
River Prut were not part of the Romanian nationalist movement devel¬ 
oping in the principalities and Transylvania during the course of the 
nineteenth century, which created a sense of common identity based 
on the presumed ‘Latinity’ of the Romanian language and its speakers’ 
Roman, or Daco-Roman, origins.233 Moreover, the Moldovan peasantry 
was not exposed to the Latin alphabet except in the southern Bessarabian 
districts of Ismail, Cahul and Bolgrad, where a large number of members 
of other national groups also lived, between 1856 and 1878. 
Crucially as well, the russification of the church in Bessarabia, through 
the elimination of the Romanian language at seminaries and the dismissal 
of many Romanian-speaking priests, meant that the church as an insti¬ 
tution was ‘stripped of its potential for Romanian nationalism’, which was 
the role that the church fulfilled in the principalities and Transylvania, 
under an increasingly ‘nationally-conscious’ clergy.234 Moreover, although 
the linguistic russification of the church in Bessarabia failed, many of the 
other measures served to bring the Orthodox church in Bessarabia closer 
to that of Russia. The existence of a distinct ‘Bessarabian Orthodoxy’ was 
noted by Romanians from west of the Prut following Bessarabia’s union 
with Romania in 1918. The more elaborate forms of services and priestly 
vestments, the use of Russian hymns and religious texts of Russian origin 
(it will be remembered that most of Gavril Banulescu-Bodoni and 
Dimitrie Sulima’s translations had been from Russian originals), as well 
as the supposedly distinctive ‘religious mentality’ of the Moldovans were 
regarded by many at the time as being closer to the traditions of the 
Russian Orthodox church than to those of the Romanian Orthodox 
church.235 
Furthermore, the introduction of military service amongst the 
Moldovans in 1874 drew many Moldovans towards a sense of affinity with 
the Russians. Obliged now to spend seven years, primarily in the Russian 
far east, exposed to the Russian language and to Russian military culture, 
it was hardly surprising that many of these recruits returned to their 
Moldovan villages ‘feeling half Russian’.236 Some certainly developed a 
loyalty to the Russian imperial family which continued into the interwar 
period in Bessarabia, to the exasperation of Romanian administrators. 
The continued existence of the antiquated social categories whose 
privileges had been maintained by the Russian government throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, may also have been a factor 
in preventing the emergence of a strongly-held sense of national identity, 
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whether ‘Moldovan’ or ‘Romanian’. In the principalities and Transylvania 
collective identities based on region or privilege were in the process of 
giving way to a new sense of identity based on a common language. 
Evidence that these corporate identities, and the privileges that went 
with them, were still fiercely guarded was revealed in 1905 when Russian 
attempts to disregard the rights of the mazali were met with a revolt. 
That these social categories served to divide the Moldovans rather than 
unite them, is borne out by observations made by John Kaba, a captain 
in the US army who visited Bessarabia shortly after the union with 
Romania. Kaba records that the three classes: mazali, raze$i and farani, 
‘while they may be equally poor, or equally rich, or equally illiterate, 
behave with certain reservation toward each other, and do not usually 
intermarry’.237 
If we turn to the small Moldovan middle and intellectual class, 
however, we do find a number that had developed a ‘Romanian’ identity, 
or a strong sense of identification with the Romanians west of the Prut, 
over the course of the nineteenth century. Amongst these were Ion 
Pelivan, whose journal Basarabia introduced its readers to literary 
currents from Romania. Amongst other ‘pan-Romanianists’ we should 
include Bogdan P. Hasdeu (1838-1907), the philologist, historian and poet 
who moved to Bucharest from Bessarabia, and whose equally scholarly 
father had written an ‘epistle to the Romanians’ to celebrate the union of 
the principalities in 1859. Constantin Stere (1865-1936) was another influ¬ 
ential ‘pan-Romanian’. Stere was exiled to Siberia for anti-tsarist activities 
and in 1892 fled across the Prut to Ia$i where he became a professor of 
law and rector of the university. He was responsible for the theory of 
poporanism which sought to place the social and economic problems of 
the Romanian peasantry, as well as the affirmation of peasant culture, at 
the heart of the Romanian state’s political agenda. Through his publi¬ 
cation, Viafa romaneasca, which began in 1906, he put forward his 
arguments in favour of land reform, universal suffrage, and constitutional 
reform. In 1906 he returned temporarily to Chisinau where he was instru¬ 
mental in helping produce Pelivan’s Basarabia. Fiercely anti-Russian, 
Stere was a vital influence in the negotiations leading up to Bessarabia’s 
union with Romania in 1918.238 
This sense of affinity with the Romanians west of the Prut was by no 
means universal amongst members of the Moldovan intellectual elite 
and middle class. It has already been observed that many of these rapidly 
russified. Those living in the cities with large Russian-speaking popula¬ 
tions were often ‘russified’ through a natural process of assimilation. 
Moreover, even the development of a Romanian national consciousness 
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did not necessarily imply a belief in the necessity of Bessarabia’s political 
union with Romania, or a denial of the importance of the Slavs in the 
‘ethno-genesis’ of the Romanians. We have already discussed the import¬ 
ance of Bogdan P. Hasdeu’s arguments relating to the partial Slavonic 
origins of the Romanian people. The Moldovan poet Alexie Mateevici 
(1888-1917) provides a further illustration. This priest-poet who wrote in 
Romanian and was part of the Moldovan students’ movement at the the¬ 
ological college in Kiev, was very much against any attempts to introduce 
the Latin alphabet and literary language of Romania into Bessarabia. In a 
scholarly article of 1910 on the origins of the Romanian language, 
Mateevici stressed the positive importance of the Slavonic influence on the 
language. Furthermore, he argued that the annexation of Bessarabia by 
Russia had been beneficial for the Moldovans since it had allowed them 
to retain the Old Church Slavonic script, which had disappeared west of 
the Prut.239 Such pro-Russian feeling amongst Moldovans was by no means 
uncommon in the period preceding Bessarabia’s union with Romania in 
1918. Before turning to the events leading up to the union, however, we 
will give a short survey of Bessarabia’s social and economic position on the 
eve of the First World War. 
In 1900 the Bessarabian economy was still overwhelmingly agricultural. 
The province’s main exports had changed little over the course of cen¬ 
turies and consisted primarily of fruit, vegetables, grain, wine and wool, 
with some more recent additions such as tobacco. Most of these products 
were destined for Russia, with wine and grain also exported to other 
European countries. Only some 30,000 people were employed in the 
industrial sector, and food-processing accounted for 90% of all industry.240 
Bessarabia was thus one of the least industrialized areas of the Russian 
empire, while also possessing one of its highest population densities. 
By the 1860s all of Bessarabia’s open lands had been colonized and as 
the forests were cut down to make room for the expanding population, 
the province began to suffer from severe de-forestation. Moreover, the 
application of the 1868 agricultural statute in Bessarabia, which allowed 
the transfer of allotments, favoured the creation of larger peasant 
holdings. As a result of this measure, and of the rapid expansion of the 
population, by 1905 some 23% of the peasantry were entirely landless. 
Rural misery was compounded by a lack of agricultural machinery. The 
American, Captain Kaba, observed in 1919 that methods for working the 
land were extremely primitive, and what little there had been in the way 
of machinery had been destroyed by the bolsheviks.241 Preferring to live 
in the towns, the landowning nobles had little direct contact with the 
peasantry, while tension between the latter and the Jewish population was 
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exacerbated by the leasing of estates by absentee landlords to Jewish 
middle-men who then sublet to the local peasants. 
Chisinau, which had become the Bessarabian capital in 1818 in place 
of Tighina, also underwent a rapid expansion of population during the 
century. The town had only some 12,000 inhabitants in 1812 and four 
years later General Kiselev described Chisinau to Alexander I as ‘a large 
dirty village with only four or five stone houses’.242 The Bessarabian 
capital was obviously considered sufficiently remote by the Russians to be 
granted the honour of acting as Pushkin’s place of exile in the early 1820s. 
By the 1900s, however, the city had obviously undergone a transformation 
and Governor Urussov observed that Chisinau was a well-laid out city 
with many elegant buildings. He added, however, that the city lacked an 
adequate water-supply to sustain a larger population.243 In the 1860s a 
canal was built linking Bessarabia to Russia through the Ukrainian lands, 
together with a telegraph link to Russia. In 1871 the railway line to Odessa 
was completed. There was no railway link beyond this, however, and the 
roads remained rudimentary. 
A number of Westerners visited Bessarabia just after the union with 
Romania and were appalled at the state of the province’s roads. In 
southern Bessarabia, in a Bulgarian-inhabited district, the Frenchman, 
Professor de Martonne, observed that ‘on the plateau, skeletons of horses 
abandoned on the roadside are not a rare occurrence. At a crossroads, 
two magnificent vultures, busy feeding on a fresh piece of carrion, fly 
away a few yards from my car’.244 Captain Kaba commented that Russia’s 
administration of the province was particularly evident in the poor state 
of the roads, which measured only 350 km. ‘In no country in Europe’, 
he wrote, ‘have I seen such bad roads as in Basarabia’, which are, ‘... full 
of holes, four or five yards apart, causing great damage to vehicles and 
animals. On May 6th, 1919, I travelled from Chisinau, by automobile, to 
Orhei, 45 km distance, and saw four broken down vehicles, and three 
dying horses. The road is full of dead horse bones.’ The railway network 
too remained primitive, with only some 1050 km of track.245 
The landowning nobility continued to retain considerable influence 
over Bessarabian affairs right up to the First World War, despite the intro¬ 
duction of imperial reforms to the province. The memoirs of Sergei 
Urussov, the last Russian governor of Bessarabia, attest to this. In 1869, 
for example, the zemstvo system of local councils was introduced in the 
Russian empire, which permitted some local autonomy in areas such as 
education and public health. The Bessarabian zemstvo was regarded by 
Governor Urussov as generally progressive in its attempts to develop local 
institutions. In the elections of 1906, however, ‘due to the machinations 
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of various reactionary landlords and corrupt noble families’, such as the 
powerful Krupenskis, the liberal element was ousted and subsequently 
many of the previous reforms undertaken by the zemstvo were revoked, 
including measures supporting public education.246 As Charles King has 
commented, ‘greater local control in Bessarabia usually meant greater 
power for the most reactionary elements ... A small stratum of nobles 
... exercised firm control over a region far from the imperial capital and 
far from the eyes of central officials’.247 
Urussov also recorded high levels of bribery and corruption in the 
police force despite his efforts to curb these excesses, as well as a 
thorough-going exploitation of the peasantry by the noble-dominated 
local administration. The peasants were still forced to bear the costs for 
the maintenance of the local police, lawyers and gendarmes, even though 
this practice had generally died out in the rest of Russia. Meanwhile, the 
local garrison in Chisinau, far from being the bearer of law and order, 
added to incidents of ‘night-larceny, street brawls, and debauchery in 
nocturnal dives .. .’.248 The nepotism and corruption of the administration 
also clearly hampered the development of the Bessarabian economy. 
Urussov recorded the attempts made by the excise office to undermine 
the wine-industry in Bessarabia in order to promote the consumption of 
whisky, which was a government monopoly. Even the ‘combined evils’ of 
a lack of skilled workers and the spread of phylloxera, commented 
Urussov, were not as bad for the wine-industry ‘as the noxious activity of 
the excise office’.249 
Bessarabia and the 1918 Union with Romania 
Romanian historians have traditionally argued that the unification of 
Bessarabia with Romania was the outcome of the will of the whole 
population of Bessarabia, which had long seen in the Romanian 
‘motherland’ a saviour from tsarist oppression and had, moreover, never 
forgotten their Romanian, and Latin, origins. The proliferation of texts to 
this effect in the interwar period reflects, however, a certain uneasiness 
amongst Romanian politicians and intellectuals regarding exactly how the 
province had been acquired in 1918. In particular, the Romanian 
government had refused to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia to measure the 
extent of actual support for union with Romania. Typical is a pamphlet 
written by Andrei Popovici in 1931 in which he states that ‘... the hundred 
years of Russian oppression not only did not suppress the nationalistic 
sentiments of the population, but, on the contrary, the revolution of 1917 
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was seized upon by the Bessarabians as an opportunity to shake off the 
Russian yoke and to return to the mother country from which they were 
torn off by force a hundred odd years ago ... Their activity and relentless 
efforts on behalf of their union with Romania are eloquent proofs of their 
sentiments which no “plebiscite” can or could ever express better’.250 
Pro-Romanian writers sought, furthermore, to ‘prove’ to the outside 
world the ‘Romanianness’ of Bessarabia by seeking to diminish the extent 
of Russian influence in the province. P. Cazacu, writing in 1926, for 
instance, rather defensively stressed the importance of Roman remains in 
Bessarabia as evidence that the area ‘had begun to take an active part 
in the life of civilized Western Europe, as far back as the third century of 
the Christian Era, when Kiev and Moscow had yet hardly begun their 
existence’. Having recounted the evils of Russian administration in 
Bessarabia, Cazacu went on to deny ‘any ties between the Bessarabians 
and the Russian State, Russian Culture or the Russian people, in spite of 
the hundred years of Russian domination here’.251 
In reality, however, there was no consensus, even amongst Moldovans, 
let alone the population of Bessarabia as a whole, in favour of union with 
Romania. Moreover, the acquisition of Bessarabia was of rather less 
importance to the Romanian government than the annexation of Transyl¬ 
vania and other Romanian-inhabited areas of the Habsburg monarchy. 
Unification came about largely as a consequence of the international 
situation in the last year of the First World War, and in particular the 
events surrounding the Russian revolution and Romania’s diplomatic 
relations with the Central Powers. Unification with Romania thus had 
relatively little to do with the ‘will’ of the Bessarabian population. 
The Moldovan cultural and political activity which had resulted 
from the 1905 revolution had been crushed by the russification policies of 
Archbishop Serafim. It was not until the February revolution in Russia 
in 1917 that the Moldovans were once again stirred into significant 
political action. Councils of soldiers soon sprang up, demanding Bess¬ 
arabian autonomy and the creation of a national assembly, as well as the 
use of the Romanian language in education and administration. In April 
1917 the Moldovan National Party was created out of the ‘Society for 
Moldovan National Culture’ which had been founded by Ion Pelivan and 
Pantelimon Halippa in 1905. The creation of the party, however, was by 
no means a victory for pan-Romanianism, and cannot be seen as the first 
step in an inevitable unification with Romania. Indeed, it was not unusual 
for the party’s meetings to be held in Russian. Although some party 
leaders, such as Ion Pelivan, had spoken of the necessity of union with 
Romania even before 1917, this was not part of the party’s public 
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platform. Rather, the party programme, elaborated at the party congress 
in May 1917, envisaged a democratic, federal Russia in which Bessarabia 
would have autonomy. This would include a legislative assembly based on 
universal suffrage, and the use of the Romanian language in the adminis¬ 
tration and education.252 
One of the leading figures in the creation of the Moldovan National 
Party, and in drawing up the party programme, was the Transylvanian 
Romanian, Onisifor Ghibu, who later wrote that in 1916 the Moldovans 
‘were the most loyal subjects of Nicholas II’.253 Ghibu had apparently 
encountered considerable opposition from many party members who 
resented his stress on the national question at the expense of social issues, 
and in particular were concerned about the whole question of land reform 
and the distribution of estates amongst the peasantry. Indeed, in 1917 
many Moldovans were preoccupied with social, rather than national, 
issues. A number of social radicals in the party were not prepared to 
collaborate with ‘class enemies’, such as landowners or priests, for the sake 
of Moldovan ethnic solidarity, let alone Romanian.254 These even included 
Ion Pelivan’s colleague, Pantelimon Halippa, who informed Ghibu that 
he was unwilling to establish links with Romanian politicians who he 
believed would prevent large-scale land reform from taking place in 
Bessarabia. Halippa, in particular, greatly resented what he described as 
‘alien’ landlords, ‘who sustained by the tsarist administration became 
masters of our land and our exploiters’ and was unimpressed by the 
Romanian government’s plans for land reform in Romania put forward 
in 1917.255 
Moreover, Moldovan organizations from beyond the borders of Bess¬ 
arabia had been instrumental in the creation of the Moldovan National 
Party, especially Moldovans living in Odessa and Kiev. These sought 
protection of their linguistic and cultural rights within their component 
states, not unification with Romania.256 Consequently, it was largely left 
to Romanians from outside Bessarabia, in particular those from 
Transylvania and from the Bukovina, to attempt to instil a sense of 
Romanian nationalism and identity into the Moldovans in 1917 and 1918. 
In addition to Onisifor Ghibu, these included, the great Transylvanian 
poet and Romanian nationalist Octavian Goga. The poet’s visit to 
Bessarabia in March 1917, however, did not leave him with a favourable 
impression of the Moldovans.257 
We should now examine briefly some of the events during the First 
World War which led to the Romanian state’s involvement with Bess¬ 
arabia. Prior to the outbreak of the war, there were certainly politicians 
and intellectuals in Bucharest who regarded Bessarabia as part and parcel 
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of a future ‘Greater Romania’. Many publications put forward Romania’s 
‘right’ to Bessarabia on both historic and national grounds. The historian 
Nicolea Iorga, for instance, did not omit to wield his pen on many 
occasions in the interests of Romanian claims to the province. In this he 
followed in the footsteps of the poet, Mihai Eminescu, who had written a 
series of newspaper articles in 1878, to publicize newly-independent 
Romania’s claims to both Bessarabia and the Bukovina.258 
Notwithstanding this interest in Bessarabia, however, it was the 
Romanian-speaking regions of the Habsburg monarchy, Transylvania and 
the Bukovina, which were the main object of Romanian irredentism 
before and during the First World War. As a result, despite Romania’s 
adherence to the Triple Alliance of the Habsburg monarchy, Germany 
and Italy in 1883, the country remained neutral in 1914. The government, 
headed by the National Liberal politician Ion. I. C. Bratianu, used the 
period of neutrality to begin laying the diplomatic groundwork for 
Romania’s ultimate intervention on the side of the Entente.259 Bratianu 
expected the Entente of Britain, France and Russia eventually to win the 
war and thus the Entente would advance Romania’s claims to Habsburg 
territories. Bratianu accordingly took no interest in the Central Powers’ 
repeated offers of Bessarabia as the reward for entering the war on their 
side against Russia and did not enter into serious negotiations over the 
issue.260 Finally, in August 1916 the Bratianu government signed military 
and political conventions with the Entente in which Romania agreed to 
declare war on the Habsburg monarchy in exchange for a guarantee of 
the right to self-determination of the Romanians of the monarchy and 
their subsequent union with Romania. There remained, however, some 
public figures, such as Alexandru Marghiloman, leader of the opposition 
Conservative Party, and the anti-Russian Constantin Stere, who had fled 
from Bessarabia to Romania, who were committed to the cause of the 
Central Powers, and to Germany in particular. Marghiloman entered into 
discussions with the Central Powers with regard to a possible reversal of 
Romania’s foreign-policy position in the future. He was promised 
Bessarabia as a reward for this in the event of the victory of the Central 
Power over Russia.261 
As a result of Romania’s uneven military performance in 1916, how¬ 
ever, some two-thirds of Romanian territory was occupied by the Central 
Powers, and the Romanian army and government were forced to flee to 
Romanian Moldova. The government installed itself in Ia§i, together with 
a French military mission headed by General Berthelot. It was events in 
Russia, however, which eventually forced Romania out of the Entente 
camp and into that of the Central Powers. Following the bolshevik seizure 
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of power in November 1917, Lenin sued for peace with the Central 
Powers. Bereft now of Russian military support, Romania was forced to 
sign an armistice with the Central Powers at Foc$ani on 9 December, 
although she remained formally allied with the Entente. 
Meanwhile, in Bessarabia, following the bolshevik revolution in 
November, officers and soldiers had convened an assembly in Chisinau, 
declared autonomy for Bessarabia and called for the creation of a national 
council, the so-called Sfatul Jdrii, which convened in Chisinau later in the 
month. On 2 December the Sfatul Jdrii, with Ion Inculef as president, 
declared Bessarabia an autonomous republic within Russia. Later in 
December, however, the Sfatul Jarii, now facing bolshevik incursions into 
Bessarabia, approached the French military mission which was still 
stationed in Ia$i. Representatives of the Sfatul requested that a French 
consulate be opened in Chisinau and for French instructors to be sent to 
help build up the security forces in Bessarabia. Three French foreign 
ministry officials were duly dispatched to Chisinau. A second delegation 
from the Sfatul Jdrii arrived soon after, however, headed by Ion Pelivan, 
who was now director of foreign affairs of the Sfatul Jdrii, who requested 
more help against the bolsheviks. Despite Pelivan’s subsequent avowals 
of the thoroughly Romanian make-up of Bessarabia, he turned down 
the French offer of regular Romanian troops in favour of units of other 
national groups, or Transylvanian ‘volunteers’. Pelivan was concerned 
about the anti-Romanian sentiment amongst Bessarabia’s ethnic minorit¬ 
ies and the Moldovan peasantry. The latter feared that if Romanian troops 
entered Bessarabia they would halt moves towards thorough-going land 
reform. The French foreign minister in Ia§i also agreed to Pelivan’s 
request for ‘an explicit, public French declaration affirming the autonomy 
of Bessarabia vis-a-vis Romania’.262 The disorganization of the Transyl¬ 
vanian volunteers, however, meant that the French mission in Chisinau 
was forced to recommend the use of Romanian troops to guard railways 
and supply depots in Bessarabia from bolshevik attacks. Nevertheless, 
the possibility of Romanian troops entering Bessarabia caused consid¬ 
erable controversy in the Sfatul Jdrii. The president, Ion Inculef, was 
forced to calm national-minority deputies by stating that ‘here there is 
only a handful of men who turn their looks across the [River] Prut. The 
paths of Bessarabia merge into the paths of Russia, for Russia is a country 
much freer than Romania’.263 
Indeed, Romanian political and military leaders were themselves 
reluctant to send Romanian troops into Bessarabia in late 1917 and early 
1918, fearing that such an action could sour relations with Russia, and with 
the Entente, to whom they were still technically allied.264 The Romanian 
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military and government thus found themselves precariously poised 
between the Entente and the Central Powers. Over the following year, 
however, Romania’s deft handling of the diplomatic and military situation 
was to lead to the creation of a Greater Romania containing both Tran¬ 
sylvania and Bessarabia, something which Romanian politicians had not 
envisaged in 1916 when entering the war on the side of the Entente. 
Early in 1918, the Germans suggested that the Romanians should 
occupy Bessarabia. This was attractive to those prepared to collaborate 
with the Germans, led by Alexandru Marghiloman, who believed that the 
Central Powers were now bound to win the war, following Russia’s with¬ 
drawal. By mid-January 1918, moreover, the Romanians were thoroughly 
alarmed by bolshevik activities in Bessarabia and the possibility that 
the violence would spread to Romania. On 17 January, the bolsheviks 
occupied Chisinau and dissolved the Sfatul Jarii, while Rumcerod (‘the 
central executive committee of the soviets of the Romanian front, 
Black Sea fleet and the Odessa region’) spread its tentacles throughout 
Bessarabia.265 Consequently on 19 January, the Romanian army, led by 
General Bro^teanu, entered Bessarabia. Evidently neither Bro$teanu nor 
his troops made themselves especially popular with the inhabitants of 
Bessarabia. They crushed all signs of hostility towards the Romanians 
which Bro^teanu, not without justification under the circumstances, 
regarded as evidence of bolshevik sympathies. 
The Romanian army, nevertheless, succeeded in driving the bolsheviks 
out of Bessarabia and restored the Sfatul Tarii but meanwhile further 
complications had developed as a result of Ukraine’s declaration of 
independence on 13 January 1918. This broke the direct geographic 
link between Bessarabia and Russia and brought with it the possibility of 
annexation by Ukraine which harboured claims on Bessarabia on account 
of its substantial Ukrainian population. In an attempt to outmanoeuvre 
Ukraine, the Sfatul declared the independence of Bessarabia as the 
‘Moldovan Democratic Republic’ on 24 January and attempted, unsuc¬ 
cessfully, to gain official French recognition of Bessarabia’s independence. 
The independent republic, however, was militarily and economically weak 
and was increasingly dependent upon the Romanian army to maintain 
order and to run utilities.266 Furthermore, Ukraine continued to make 
territorial claims on the newly independent republic and this proved a 
crucial factor in the SfatuVs declaration of conditional union with 
Romania on 27 March 1918.267 Under the terms of the union, Bessarabia 
was to retain a number of privileges within Greater Romania, including 
an elected assembly, budgetary control, rights for national minorities and 
the completion of land redistribution. 
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Of paramount importance also in the Sfatul's declaration of conditional 
union with Romania, was the fact that the Romanian government had 
signed a preliminary peace with the Central Powers at Buftea on 5 
March 1918. Accordingly, Bessarabia had been offered to the Romanians 
as compensation for Romania’s loss of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria. Austro- 
German troops had already occupied northern Bessarabia in February 
and were thus in a position to give the Romanians military support, 
if necessary, in their acquisition of Bessarabia. Moreover, under the con¬ 
ditions of the peace of Buftea, the French military mission was forced 
to leave Ia$i. Consequently, the Sfatul Jdrii was left with no basis of 
support against the bolsheviks other than Romania and her German 
ally.268 
It seems, therefore, that the Sfatul Jdrii did not play the central role in 
the unification with Romania, as the traditional Romanian historio¬ 
graphical account suggests. Indeed, it was the Romanian government and 
the Central Powers which were the main actors in Bessarabia’s union with 
Romania. Thereafter, conflict between the Romanian government and the 
Sfatul Jdrii was avoided due to the diplomatic intervention of Alexandru 
Marghiloman, who took over the Romanian government on 19 March, 
with the leaders of the various factions in the Sfatul Jdrii. Marghiloman 
was joined in his endeavours by Constantin Stere.269 
The Sfatul Jdrii's vote on the issue of union with Romania was held 
on 27 March 1918 and was won by 86 votes in favour, with only three votes 
against. 49 deputies, however, either abstained or were absent. As Charles 
King has written ‘with Romanian troops already in Chisinau, Romanian 
planes circling above the meeting hall, and the Romanian prime minister 
waiting in the foyer, many minority deputies chose simply not to vote’.270 
On 3 April, Constantin Stere was voted president of the Staful Jdrii.211 
During the course of 1918, however, Romania’s foreign policy was to 
undergo a transformation leading to Bessarabia’s integration into Greater 
Romania irrespective of the previously-agreed conditions. The failure of 
the German offensive on the Western Front in July 1918 and the subse¬ 
quent collapse of the Habsburg monarchy in the autumn led to Romania’s 
re-entry into the war on the side of the Western Allies just before the 
armistice in November 1918. The Romanians were thus able to argue that 
they were one of the victorious powers of the war and to lay claim to 
Habsburg territories. 
By late November 1918, the Romanians of the Bukovina and 
Transylvania were preparing to declare their union with Romania. Under 
these circumstances, and encouraged by Pantelimon Halippa’s ‘Moldovan 
Bloc’, the Sfatul Jdrii in Chisinau voted for union with Romania and 
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subsequently dissolved itself.272 Deputies were encouraged to renounce 
the conditions attached to the 27 March vote on union with Romania by 
news of the Romanian government’s decision to go ahead with large-scale 
land reform.273 Fears that the Romanian government would not institute 
wide-ranging land redistribution had been a major factor in the 
peasantry’s animosity towards the Romanians in 1917 and 1918. 
Nevertheless, there were already signs that relations between the 
Romanians living west of the River Prut and the inhabitants of Bessarabia 
would not be entirely cordial. On 20 November, only a week before the 
vote which accepted union with Romania, a group of Sfatul Jarii deputies 
had submitted a memorandum, written in Russian, criticizing the 
behaviour of the Romanian administration in Bessarabia and demanding 
that the Romanians respect the privileges accorded to Bessarabia under 
the act of union of 27 March.274 
At the Paris peace conference, Western approval of Romania’s acqui¬ 
sition of Bessarabia came slowly and anti-Romanian elements within 
Bessarabia, such as the pro-Russian landowner Alexander Krupenski, 
whose family had remained staunchly pro-Russian since 1812, petitioned 
the peace conference against Romania. Krupenski denied that Romania 
had a historic right to Bessarabia since the Romanian state had not existed 
in 1812 when Bessarabia was separated from the principality of Moldova. 
He also denied the Romanian claim on national grounds, arguing that the 
Moldovans ‘cannot possess any other than pro-Russian sentiments’. 
Although clearly an exaggeration, Krupenski was near the mark in stating 
that ‘Romanian nationalism was born during the 30s of the last century, 
in Wallachia and Moldavia, and was progressively developed in Romania 
by the aid of schools and other institutions of the country. Bessarabia was 
always outside of this national movement .. .’.275 More significantly, 
perhaps, the US delegation were ‘sceptical about the way Romania had 
acquired the territory ... ’ and this was reinforced by Ion Bratianu’s 
refusal to hold a plebiscite in Bessarabia.276 Although the Treaty of 
Trianon, which confirmed the new frontier between Romania and 
Hungary, was signed on 4 June 1920, the Council of Ambassadors at the 
peace conference did not present the Romanian delegation with a treaty 
of union between Bessarabia and Romania until the end of October. The 
treaty was suitably ambiguous regarding the province’s status. Although 
Romanian sovereignty over the lands between the Prut and Dnestr rivers 
was confirmed, the treaty stipulated that ‘Russia should adhere to the 
treaty when a government comes to power with which the Allies can 
do business’. Negotiations for a settlement, however, were to be in the 
hands of Romania and Russia, with arbitration over details in the purview 
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of the League of Nations.277 The October treaty was thus hardly a ringing 
endorsement of Romania’s claim to the province, and signatories to the 
treaty included neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. 
Ratification of the treaty by the other Great Powers was also slow, with 
Britain signing in May 1922, France in 1924 and Italy in 1927. Japan never 
ratified the treaty. Most importantly of all, even after Romania’s diplo¬ 
matic recognition of the Soviet Union in 1934, the Soviets consistently 
refused to acknowledge Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. The issue 
was to remain a bone of contention between the two countries thereafter 
and was a major factor in Romania’s gradual diplomatic shift towards the 
Axis in the late 1930s. 
Interwar Bessarabia 
Meanwhile, the integration of Bessarabia into Greater Romania was not 
proving easy for the Romanian government. Bessarabia, in fact, reflected 
the national problems facing Romania as a whole.278 From being an 
overwhelmingly homogeneous Romanian kingdom before 1914, some 
30% of the population of interwar Romania consisted of national 
minorities. In Bessarabia, out of a total population of 2,864,402 people, 
only some 56.2% were Moldovans (that is to say, Romanian-speakers), 
with Russians making up 12.3%, Ukrainians 11%, Jews 7.2% and 
Bulgarians 5.7% of the population.279 
Furthermore, while Romanian-speakers throughout Romania were 
predominantly rural peasants, the urban centres and their related eco¬ 
nomic and professional sectors were dominated by members of the 
minority groups: Hungarians, Germans and Jews in Transylvania, for 
instance, and Russians and Jews in Bessarabia. The Bessarabian pro¬ 
vincial capital, Chisinau, was some 46% Jewish and 27% Russian, while 
some 37% of Bessarabia’s total urban population were Jewish.280 While 
the Romanian-speaking peasantry tended to distrust the ‘alien’ cities, the 
urbanized minorities tended to look down on the less educated and poorer 
Romanian rural population and looked upon Romanian culture in general 
as ‘parvenu’. The interwar Romanian governments, politicians and intel¬ 
lectuals, for their part, aimed to elevate the status of the Romanian rural 
majority, who were regarded as having been ‘disadvantaged’ over the 
course of many centuries as a result of their political domination by other 
national groups. The purpose of the ‘romanianization’ policies undertaken 
by the Romanian governments during the 1920s and 1930s, therefore, was 
aimed at reversing this situation by promoting the Romanians in the 
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country’s educational system, administration and economy and by adjust¬ 
ing the country’s cultural life to make it reflect the demographic balance. 
Bessarabia’s minorities, and even many Moldovans, particularly those 
in the towns, were clearly ill-disposed towards the Romanian government 
from the outset and remained staunchly russophile despite the seizure 
of power in Russia by the bolsheviks. Worryingly for the Romanian 
authorities, in 1920 the French military attache reported that even 
the minorities’ middle classes would welcome the Russian army into 
Bessarabia to rid them of the Romanians.281 A report by a member of the 
Romanian ministry of the interior the following year, pointed out that 
the various minority groups in Bessarabia each sought their own ‘state 
within a state’ which would include their own independent school system. 
That the urban population in particular was hostile to the new authorities 
were borne out by a French diplomat in 1922 who noted that the urban 
population of Bessarabia was ‘purely Russian and Israelite and violently 
anti-Romanian’.282 
Relations between the Romanians from west of the River Prut and 
the various peoples of Bessarabia were severely complicated by the 
continuation of numerous bolshevik incursions into Bessarabia, from 1917 
onwards, which were frequently combined with anti-Romanian propa¬ 
ganda designed to stir up the population against the Romanian 
authorities. There were some 118 bolshevik incursions over the Dnestr 
between 1921 and 1925 and several thousand smaller incidents within the 
province ranging from spying and sabotage of trains to minor incidents of 
violence. Between 1919 and 1925, the Romanian authorities made 3,002 
arrests in connection with bolshevik terrorist organizations in Bessarabia. 
818 arrests alone were made in connection with the Tatarbunar rebellion 
in September 1924, to which we shall return.283 Independent and, later, 
Russian and Soviet Ukraine had harboured irredentist ambitions over 
Bessarabia in 1917 and 1918, and did not fail to take advantage of 
Romania’s worsening relations with her minorities to disseminate both 
bolshevik and anti-Romanian propaganda amongst the national 
minorities. In June 1918 Ukrainian agitators in Ismail informed local 
people that Bessarabia would soon be annexed to Ukraine and urged the 
people to flee the province and join the Russian army.284 It will be remem¬ 
bered that, in any case, many of the inhabitants of Bessarabia had been 
much involved in the social questions surrounding the revolutionary 
period in 1917, and were thus open to such propaganda emanating from 
Russia or Ukraine. The Romanian government were thus forced to 
declare a state of emergency along all borders of the country in March 
1921 and to censor all bolshevik and anti-Romanian propaganda material. 
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Bessarabia’s desperate economic plight in the immediate post-war 
years and relations between the Romanian authorities and the 
Bessarabian population was severely aggravated by the large number of 
refugees fleeing from east of the River Dnestr into Bessarabia, many of 
whom were suspected by the authorities of being bolshevik infiltrators. 
Between January 1918 and April 1922, 168,000 refugees entered 
Bessarabia and in some towns in the province the ‘floating population’ 
could be as high as 60% of the overall population. Most of these refugees 
were of Russian, Ukrainian or Jewish origin.285 In Chisinau alone, which 
had a permanent population of 133,000, there were some 66,500 additional 
people there in 1919.286 This expansion of the population was clearly 
difficult for the authorities to cope with in view of Romania’s acute post¬ 
war economic and social problems. 
It was not only the national minorities which the Romanian authorities 
suspected of Russian and bolshevik sympathies. A further problem was 
posed by the fact that the majority population, in whose name the 
province had been acquired by Romania, had little sense of a ‘Romanian’ 
identity. Amongst the small Moldovan urban middle class and intelli¬ 
gentsia many were strongly russophile and regarded Romanian as a 
peasant language, and only Russian as the language of high culture. One 
of the results of the russification process in the nineteenth century had 
been the alienation of much of the Moldovan intelligentsia from the 
peasantry and from the Romanian language which they spoke. This was 
particularly problematic for the Romanian government in the sphere of 
education where many teachers of Moldovan origin, whom the 
government hoped to employ as teachers of Romanian, identified so 
heavily with Russian language that their knowledge of Romanian was 
often rudimentary. In part, this was due to the fact that the Romanians of 
the principalities had converted from the Old Church Slavonic to the Latin 
alphabet in 1862, while in Bessarabia, the Slavonic and Russian alphabets 
had been in use right up to 1918. 
We should at this point make some brief comments about the Romanian 
language and its relationship to ‘Moldovan’. Moldovans, such as Dimitrie 
Cantemir, for instance, usually referred to the language spoken in the 
Moldovan principality, and subsequently Bessarabia, as the ‘Moldovan 
language’. According to one Western commentator, however, ‘Moldovan’ 
is, in fact, one of the six regional sub-dialects of ‘Daco-Romanian’ 
and, therefore, ‘a recognized dialect of standard Romanian .. ,’.287 In the 
years following Bessarabia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union during 
the Second World War, many words of Russian origin were incorporated 
into the language, either through a natural process of assimilation or by 
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‘forced injection’ by the Soviet authorities. Nevertheless, even in the 
interwar period there was clearly already a strong Slavonic influence on 
the language as a result of the Moldovans’ long cultural and political rela¬ 
tions, and indeed frequent inter-marriage, with the East Slavs, and in 
particular the Ruthenes and Poles. Dimitrie Cantemir, writing in the 
early eighteenth century, observed that the ‘Moldovan language’ spoken 
by the Moldovans who lived on the Dnestr river included many words of 
Polish origin.288 The historians Alexandru Boldur and Gheorghe Bratianu 
likewise observed early in the twentieth century that the Ruthene connec¬ 
tion had greatly influenced both the language and customs of the 
Moldovans over the course of many centuries, especially in the north of the 
Moldovan principality.289 The Moldovans had long lived ‘cheek by jowl’ 
with the Ruthenes and this was reinforced in Bessarabia after 1812 by the 
number of settlers entering the province from Russian Ukraine. 
Commenting on the contemporary ‘Moldovan’ language, Donald Dyer 
states that ‘Moldovan is a dialect of Romanian which is spoken in Moldova 
and which displays Romanian dialectical features peculiar to its geographic 
region. It also shows certain influences on its grammar from the grammars 
of Russian and the Ukrainian language with which it has been in contact 
for centuries’.290 
West of the River Prut, however, the introduction of the Latin alphabet 
in the nineteenth century and the stress on the Romanians’ links to the 
Latin nations of Western Europe, and especially France, led to the intro¬ 
duction of many words of French, Italian and Latin origin into the 
language during the nineteenth century. As a result, the language was 
‘much changed by terms and phrasing imported from Latinate Western 
Europe’.291 The different cultural and political orbits of Bessarabia and of 
the Romanian lands west of the River Prut thus were themselves felt in 
language and, since language is the badge of nationality, in popular 
perceptions of identity. 
The differences which had developed in the Romanian used on either 
side of the River Prut, together with the Russian-orientation of many of 
the Moldovan middle class, made the ‘romanianization’ of education in 
Bessarabia hard. As early as the summer of 1917 the Romanian 
government set up courses in the Romanian language for Moldovan 
teachers. The Latin alphabet was introduced and courses on the literature, 
history and geography of Romania were also delivered to potential 
teachers. Adult language courses were set up in rural areas, and Romanian 
books and maps distributed amongst the population. Romanian libraries 
were opened throughout Bessarabia and in 1917 the historians §tefan 
Ciobanu and Ion Nistor lectured on Romanian culture and history. 
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Nevertheless, the lack of fully-trained Romanian teachers made it 
necessary to send teachers from elsewhere in Romania to Bessarabia. 
Language tests were also introduced to ascertain the proficiency of the 
local teachers. Neither measure was welcomed warmly in Bessarabia. 
Specific measures were now taken to ‘romanianize’ the whole education 
system in Bessarabia. In 1922 the ministry of education in Bucharest 
banned the use of Russian as a means of communication in schools. 
Russian teachers were purged from the education system. By the late 
1930s, there were no state-financed schools operating in either Russian or 
Ukrainian. Although minorities were allowed to set up their own privately 
funded schools, even these schools were forced to give instruction in 
Romanian. Yet despite the government’s efforts at ‘romanianizing’ the 
province, the Bessarabian population retained an attachment to Russian 
culture. Many of the new teachers of Romanian continued to converse in 
Russian at home, and, to the disgust of Romanian officials, peasants were 
often found to have pictures of the former Russian imperial family still 
adorning their wall in the 1930s. Indeed, in the 1930s there were indications 
that the Russian language was re-emerging as the vehicle of instruction in 
many schools, despite the government’s prohibition. Southern Bessarabia, 
with its large number of long-established minority groups, was particularly 
vulnerable. A school inspector reported in 1936 that ‘the twenty years of 
Romanian rule and of nationalization of the minority villages through the 
schools in Cetatea Alba county have not born fruit’.292 
A similar policy of ‘romanianization’ was conducted within the 
Bessarabian administrative system inherited from the tsarist period. 
Russian-speaking bureaucrats were gradually squeezed out of the admin¬ 
istration, yet even some of the bureaucrats of Moldovan origin were 
frequently impervious to the admonitions of the Romanian authorities to 
use the Romanian language or to take an oath of loyalty to the Romanian 
king and state. As with the ‘romanianization’ of the education system, 
however, the lack of Romanian-speaking trained personnel proved a 
problem, and many administrators had to be sent from Bucharest. Indeed, 
for several years after the 1918 union russophile functionaries had to be 
utilized and until 1925 there was considerable administrative overlap 
between the new Romanian and the old Russian systems. It proved im¬ 
possible, for example, to immediately dispense with the zemstvo system 
in Bessarabia owing to Russian opposition, despite the many examples of 
corruption and malpractice which emerged.293 In October 1924, however, 
a Romanian language-test was introduced for administrators in 
Bessarabia and in June 1925 the Romanian administrative system was 
finally applied to Bessarabia. 
108 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
Even attempts to ‘romanianize’ the Orthodox church in Bessarabia 
proved controversial.294 In an ironic reversal of Archbishop Lebedev’s 
russification policies of the previous century, Russian churches were either 
closed or forced to conduct their services in Romanian. This outraged 
Russian priests and their congregations and, early in 1918, the last Russian 
archbishop in Bessarabia, Anastasie, vainly attempted to create an 
autonomous Bessarabia church outside Romanian control. There was also 
opposition amongst the Orthodox faithful of all national groups to the 
conversion from the traditional Julian calendar to the Gregorian in use 
west of the Prut. It was recognized by many Romanians from west of the 
River Prut that religious fife in Bessarabia had a markedly different 
quality to that in the rest of Romania, being suffused with Russian influ¬ 
ences. The existence of the so-called ‘Bessarabian Orthodoxy’ often 
created tensions between the local population and Romanian officials as 
a result of the relative religious indifference often displayed by teachers, 
administrators and policemen ‘imported’ from elsewhere in Romania. In 
particular, the ‘faithful’ in Bessarabia resented the fact that many priests 
were detained by the civil authorities in the early years of the union on 
suspicion of being pro-Russian. The Romanian authorities feared that the 
Orthodox church in Bessarabia might become a ‘stalking horse’ for Soviet 
Russia. In 1930 a professor from Ia$i reported to the metropolitan of 
Moldova that the Russian elements within the Orthodox church in 
Bessarabia, including the continued use of Russian music, constituted 
‘a national peril’. 
Bessarabia’s interwar economic problems also made it difficult to 
reconcile the Bessarabian population to the Romanian central govern¬ 
ment, even though few of Bessarabia’s problems can be ascribed directly 
to the machinations of Bucharest politicians.295 The general economic 
problems affecting Romania as a whole during this period were, however, 
particularly acute in Bessarabia which had a greater proportion of rural 
peasants amongst its population than any other part of Greater Romania. 
Land reform failed to solve the problem of rural overpopulation. As the 
population grew, peasant holdings were further sub-divided and were 
soon unable to provide for the needs of the peasant households. There 
was already a rural crisis in Bessarabia in the early 1920s as a result of the 
loss of agricultural markets east of the Dnestr and the closure of the 
border with Russia. The fruit-growing villages on the Lower Dnestr were 
especially affected by this, and many plantations close to the border were 
simply neglected. To this we should add the problems created by the 
liquidation of the Russian banks in 1918 and the lack of cheap peasant 
credit. Some peasants were paying interest as high as 40% to their 
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creditors. As a result many were forced to sell their livestock to make 
money. Whereas the number of horses and livestock had stood at over 
four million animals in 1923, this had fallen to well under three million by 
1929. Matters were made worse by the frequent droughts which afflicted 
southern Bessarabia and by the onset of the Great Depression after 1929 
which depressed the price of grain in Bessarabia by 30 to 50%.296 
Matters did improve in the agricultural sector in the later 1930s as a 
result of Romania’s exploitation of new European markets, primarily in 
Germany, for the export of fruit. Fruit-growing on the Lower Dnestr 
revived and the area became one of Romania’s most important economic 
regions. Its produce accounted for almost one-quarter of Romania’s total 
exports and was dubbed the ‘California of Romania’.297 
The Romanian central government, however, made no attempt to 
expand Bessarabia’s tiny industrial sector, envisaging that Bessarabia 
would remain an agricultural producer. Industrial levels in the 1930s 
were much the same as they had been in the late tsarist period, and were 
largely restricted to food-processing. This included flour milling and the 
production of vegetable oil, as well as basic consumables such as textiles 
and soap. Much of the food-processing industry, it should be noted, was 
barely industrialized. The Bessarabian milling industry, which was the best 
developed in the whole of Greater Romania, consisted of one thousand 
small peasant-owned mills. 
There was certainly a feeling amongst many in Bessarabia that the 
central government was doing little to help Bessarabia’s economic plight. 
The vegetable oil industry, for example, was damaged by competition 
from Bucharest factories which were able to undercut Bessarabian 
producers as a result of preferential rates of transport on the railways. 
Likewise, Bessarabia’s small textile industry was now forced to acquire 
wool from Romanian middle-men instead of directly from abroad, forcing 
the closure of many factories. The establishment of a new transport 
infrastructure and of rail links to the rest of Romania did not relieve the 
overall condition of poverty and ‘underdevelopment’ in Bessarabia. 
On the eve of the Second World War, Bessarabia was, of all the terri¬ 
tories Romania had acquired after the First World War, still the least 
assimilated into the body of Greater Romania. It was by no means clear 
that the Romanian government had persuaded the Moldovans that they 
were indeed ‘Romanians’. Many amongst the russophile Moldovan 
middle class remained largely unmoved by the attempts to persuade them 
of their affinities with the Romanians west of the Prut, while many of the 
‘pan-Romanianists’, such as the politician Ion Pelivan, had long since left 
Bessarabia for other parts of Romania. Moreover, although literacy rates 
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had risen, the literate still only amounted to some 30% of the Bessarabian 
population, compared to some 60% of the population in Transylvania.298 
Continued confusion over the use of the Latin alphabet probably 
accounted for some of this, as well as traditionally low attendance at 
school. Almost 30% of children in Bessarabia were still not attending 
elementary education as late as 1939.299 It seems unlikely, therefore, that 
the Romanian authorities had great success using the education structure 
to persuade the peasantry that they were, in fact, Romanians. 
Moreover, Bessarabia’s urban environment continued to be over¬ 
whelmingly dominated by Russians and Jews in the 1930s, despite the 
‘romanianization’ policies. Even the daily press in Chisinau and other 
cities remained largely in their hands. The Jewish population of 
Bessarabia, in particular, remained a community apart from the Moldovan 
peasant majority. Of the 206,958 Jews in Bessarabia in 1930, some 201,278 
declared Yiddish to be their native language, while their second language 
of operation was invariably Russian rather than Romanian.300 Traditional 
anti-semitic feelings in the province and elsewhere in Romania, were 
exacerbated by the Romanian authorities’ suspicions of the Jews as 
bolshevik agents, following the influx of Jewish refugees into Bessarabia 
in the wake of the Russian civil war. 
The Moldovans’ weak sense of kinship with the Romanians west of the 
Prut, and the province’s other national divisions and social and economic 
problems, made Bessarabia, as we have seen, an easy target for infiltration 
by its powerful Soviet neighbour. As a contemporary observer noted, 
‘Bessarabia was honey-combed with revolutionary organizations, financed 
and directed from Soviet Russia. These exploited the post-war economic 
and political difficulties of the country, [and] the mistakes of the new 
regime .. .’.301 Although this account doubtless exaggerates the extent of 
revolutionary activity, there can be no doubt that Bessarabia remained a 
target of Soviet ambition. 
The Soviet Union and Bessarabia 
The most significant Soviet incursion into Bessarabian territory occurred 
on 14 September 1924, when the revolutionary agitator known as Nenin, 
(Andrei Culschnikoff), a former revolutionary commissar and head of the 
Odessa revolutionary committee, launched an occupation of the southern 
Bessarabian town of Tatarbunar, mainly inhabited by ethnic Bulgarians. 
Nenin, armed by the Russians, hoped to incite the local population into 
rebellion against the Romanians. Although the Romanian authorities 
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were able to curb the uprising, Nenin’s frequent references to the 
imminent foundation of a ‘soviet republic of Moldova’ indicated that the 
Soviets were not about to end their pressure on Bessarabia. Only a few 
weeks later, in October 1924, the Soviet Union announced the creation of 
the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR), created 
out of Ukrainian lands on the left bank of the Dnestr, which the 
Romanians knew as ‘Transnistria’. The purpose of the MASSR was to 
place pressure on the Romanian state regarding its sovereignty over 
Bessarabia and to stimulate revolution in Bessarabia against Romania. 
Consequently, the Soviets declared the whole of Romanian Bessarabia to 
be officially part of the new MASSR, with the official capital at Chisinau 
(in Romanian Bessarabia) but with a provisional capital first at Balta and 
later at Tiraspol, both on the left bank of the Dnestr. 
Although the new republic was ostensibly ‘Moldovan’, almost 50% of 
its population were in fact Ukrainian, and there were also substantial 
Russian and Jewish minorities. Less than a third of the MASSR’s 
population were Romanian-speaking. Furthermore, the territory of the 
new MASSR had never formerly been a part either of the historic princi¬ 
pality of Moldova or the subsequent Romanian state. Nevertheless, the 
MASSR provided a territorial base from which the Soviets could continue 
their physical and propagandistic incursions into Romanian Bessarabia. 
Moreover, it was hoped that the Soviet republic would act as a magnet to 
the Moldovans of Bessarabia and thus help to undermine the unity of the 
Greater Romanian state. 
To this end, the Soviet authorities within the MASSR began to claim 
that the Moldovans of Bessarabia and the MASSR were an ethnic group 
distinct from the Romanians, who spoke a separate and entirely indepen¬ 
dent language.302 Soviet linguists set about to create a Moldovan language, 
based upon the language spoken by the Moldovan peasantry in Bessarabia 
and in Transnistria, where the peasants had been particularly influenced 
by the Ukrainian language. Out of this, they hoped to construct a stan¬ 
dardized grammer and a literary Moldovan which would be quite distinct 
from the ‘frenchified’ Romanian employed west of the Prut. Thus, in 1929 
a Moldovan grammer, in the Cyrillic script and based upon the language 
spoken by the peasantry of Bessarabia and Transnistria, was produced by 
the linguist Leonid Madan, who even went so far as to claim that there 
were racial differences between the Moldovans and the Romanians. 
The Soviet authorities then began a campaign to impose this language 
on the Romanian-speaking population of the MASSR. They very quickly, 
however, ran into the problems that had faced the imperial ‘russifiers’ in 
the nineteenth century and the ‘romanianizers’ in interwar Bessarabia: a 
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lack of trained teachers and sufficient textbooks. In any case in 1932, the 
Soviet authorities did an about-turn in their ‘moldovanization’ campaign 
and drew a halt to the theory of a separate Moldovan identity. The Latin 
alphabet was introduced to the MASSR and linguists were now informed 
that the Moldovan language should be comprehensible throughout 
Romania. The Soviets now hoped that, through these policies, they could 
facilitate Soviet influence throughout Greater Romania and exploit the 
political tensions that had developed in Bucharest as a result of King Carol 
ITs return to the throne in 1930. Madan’s works, together with those of 
his colleagues who had advocated the existence of a separate Moldovan 
language and identity, were removed from all libraries. In 1938, however, 
the Latinization phase also came to an end, and the Cyrillic alphabet was 
re-introduced, as part of a Union-wide policy. Despite the change to the 
Cyrillic script, however, there was no reversion to Madan’s construction, 
so that thereafter, the Moldovan written language ‘represented little more 
than a Cyrillic version of literary Romanian’.303 
By the mid-1930s there was some improvement in Soviet-Romanian 
relations and in 1934 Romania finally established full diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union. The Soviets, however, still refused to acknowledge 
Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. This factor, together with the 
strong anti-bolshevik sentiments of King Carol II and the Romanian 
political establishment, as well as that of Romania’s Polish ally, prevented 
the Romanian foreign minister, Nicolae Titulescu, from concluding a 
mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union in 1936.304 Indeed, from 1936 
onwards, particularly following France’s failure to respond to Hitler’s 
remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936, a growing number of 
people in Romania began to see in Germany a potential counter-weight 
to the spread of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe and as a bulwark 
against Soviet ambitions regarding Bessarabia. 
In 1937 incidents once again flared on the Soviet-Romanian frontier on 
the River Dnestr as Soviet-Romanian relations worsened. With the 
German-Soviet carve-up of Poland in September 1939, Romania lost her 
sole military ally against a potential Soviet attack. Moreover, with the 
Soviet Union’s occupation of Polish territory which bordered on to 
Romania, the Soviets were now regarded as an immediate military threat 
to Romanian security. In late September 1939, when the French ambas¬ 
sador in Bucharest informed the Romanian foreign minister, Grigore 
Gafencu, that France’s aim in the war was the complete defeat of 
Germany, Gafencu replied that this was contrary to Romanian interests, 
‘for if Germany is destroyed, bolshevism will come to Central Europe and 
Romania will be lost’.305 
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During the winter of 1939 and 1940, rumours began to circulate in 
Bucharest regarding the Soviet Union’s ‘interest’ in Bessarabia, as agreed 
under the terms of the August 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. Romanian diplo¬ 
mats attempted to convince German officials of their countries’ common 
anti-bolshevism and need to contain Soviet expansion. Germany’s need 
to retain Soviet goodwill throughout 1940, and the concentration of 
German forces in western and northern Europe meant, however, that 
Germany was in no position to support Romania against the Soviet claim 
to Bessarabia, which they had, in any case, already accepted in the Nazi- 
Soviet Pact. Taking advantage of Germany’s concentration on events 
in western Europe in the summer of 1940, the Soviet’s presented their 
ultimatum for the surrender of Bessarabia, together with northern 
Bukovina, which had not formed part of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and to which 
the Soviet Union had no historic claim. In addition, the Soviets demanded 
the town of Herfa, which belonged to neither Bessarabia nor northern 
Bukovina, but was in fact part of Romanian Moldova. The Soviet annex¬ 
ation of Herfa came about due to a conveniently thick pencil fine drawn 
by Molotov, the Soviet commissar of foreign affairs, on a map of the area 
which he handed to the Romanians on 26 June. The line covered a seven- 
mile band of territory which the Soviets, needless to say, interpreted to 
their own advantage. 
Although the Romanian government had at first been prepared to fight 
for Bessarabia, King Carol eventually accepted the ultimatum on 28 June 
1940. He had been strongly advised to do so by German and Italian 
advisers, who feared that Romania was not military prepared for a con¬ 
flict with the Soviet Union. As a result of the annexation, Romania lost 
51,000 km2 of territory and some 3.9 million people, of whom the largest 
national group were the Moldovans. 
The loss of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, and the fear of further 
Soviet incursions into Romania, led directly to King Carol’s rapproche¬ 
ment with Germany and requests for an alliance during the summer of 
1940. Such a policy seemed justified in view of the fact that during July and 
August, the Soviets began to back Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionist 
claims on Romania openly. By late August, the Romanians were expect¬ 
ing an imminent invasion by the Soviets from newly-annexed northern 
Bukovina. Romanian rapprochement with Germany, however, did not 
prevent Romania’s loss of northern Transylvania to Hungary under the 
Axis Vienna Award of 30 August 1940. 
Nevertheless, during the course of events in the summer of 1940 which 
led to Romania’s loss of northern Transylvania to Hungary, it was once 
again clear, as it had been during the First World War, that both the 
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Romanian government and public opinion regarded Transylvania as more 
integral to the Romanian state than Bessarabia, hard though the loss of 
this province was. On 27 August 1940, the Romanian minister president, 
Ion Gigurtu, sent a letter to German foreign minister Ribbentrop. Gigurtu 
stated that public opinion had accepted the need to cede Bessarabia to 
the Soviet Union in June 1940, on Axis advice, in order to avoid war with 
the Soviet Union. The question of ceding part of Transylvania to Hungary, 
however, was of a quite different order since, ‘Transylvania’, wrote 
Gigurtu, ‘was always considered by us as a fortress of Romanianism, in 
which our nation ... developed’. The Romanian people had accepted the 
necessity to cede Bessarabia, argued Gigurtu, precisely in order to be able 
to resist revisionist claims on Transylvania where the Romanians ‘have 
lived for eighteen centuries’.306 
Despite the great shock and anger resulting from the loss of northern 
Transylvania, it was clear to King Carol and the majority of Romanian 
politicians, that in view of the geographic distance which separated 
Romania from the West, protection from further attack by the Soviet 
Union, and indeed the possible disappearance of Romania from the map 
of Europe, could only be provided by Germany. Moreover, alliance with, 
and loyalty to, Germany in a war against the Soviet Union could bring 
with it the possibility of the return of both northern Transylvania and 
Bessarabia as part of a post-war peace settlement. 
Ion Antonescu’s signing of the Tripartite Pact on 23 November 1940 
was thus the culmination of the policy of rapprochement with Germany 
begun by King Carol as a direct result of the Soviet annexation of 
Bessarabia in June 1940. One year later, on 22 June 1941, the Romanian 
army, commanded by Marshal Antonescu, crossed the River Prut into 
Soviet Bessarabia as Germany’s ally in the invasion of the Soviet Union. 
By late July, the Romanian territories annexed by the Soviet Union 
had been re-conquered and on 3 September 1941 Bessarabia and north¬ 
ern Bukovina were officially reincorporated into Romania. Although 
Antonescu took the decision to continue the fight against the Soviet Union 
beyond the former Romanian-Soviet Dnestr frontier, Antonescu did not 
wish the Romania occupation of Transnistria to become permanent. He 
feared that in this event, the Germans would regard Romanian gains in 
the east against the Soviet Union as a sufficient compensation to the 
Romanians for their loss of northern Transylvania to Hungary. 
Antonescu’s objective was the reconstruction of Romania in its pre-June 
1940 borders and not an expansion of Romanian territory to the east.307 
It was, nevertheless, necessary for Antonescu to establish a Romanian- 
run administration, for the duration of the occupation, pending a post-war 
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settlement. As it turned out, the Romanian occupation only lasted until 
late in 1943 when the Romanians withdrew in the face of the Red Army’s 
victorious advance through Ukraine. Short though it was, the period 
witnessed a savage Romanian policy towards the Jews of Transnistria 
itself and those deported from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, whom 
many Romanians accused of assisting the Soviets in their annexation of 
these Romanian territories in June 1940. Dennis Deletant’s contribution 
to this volume provides a vivid account of this dark period in 
Transnistrian, and Romanian, history. 
Despite Antonescu’s unwillingness to countenance a permanent occu¬ 
pation of Transnistria, a number of works were published during the 
Romanian occupation justifying a Romanian claim to the area on historic 
and national grounds. Indeed, such claims to Transnistria had been put 
forward shortly after the First World War. The industrious historians 
Nicolae Iorga and Ion Nistor had claimed that the Romanian population 
of the Transnistria area was some 400-500,000. This was clearly an exag¬ 
geration since, as Dennis Deletant points out in his article, in the 1920s the 
Romanian-speaking population was only some 10% of a total population 
of about two-and-a-half million. Iorga and Nistor further claimed that 
although the River Dnestr had been the eastern border of the medieval 
principality of Moldova, it was a political, rather than a national, border. 
As Iorga wrote, ‘by 1400 the Dnestr was not only a Moldovan border, but 
a Romanian river’. In other words, the Dnestr river was populated on both 
banks by Romanian-speakers. Both historians stressed the importance of 
Moldovan landowners and traders throughout the centuries in 
Transnistria which, as we have discussed, was not without foundation, but 
denied any significant Slavonic presence or influence in the area before the 
eighteenth century (in the face of much evidence to the contrary).308 
These themes were taken up again during the Romanian occupation 
of Transnistria in the Second World War. Thus, Emil Diaconescu claimed 
a continuous Romanian-speaking presence in the area from antiquity up 
until the contemporary occupation. Indeed, apparently the Dacian ruler 
Burebista’s ancient kingdom stretched further east than the lands of 
twentieth-century Romania, even beyond the River Bug. Like Iorga 
before him, Diaconescu stressed a Romanian-speaking presence in, and 
administration over, the Transnistrian area right up until Catherine the 
Great’s conquests of the lands in the late eighteenth century. Diaconescu 
claimed that before Catherine’s reign, ‘life in Moldova beyond the Dnestr 
did not differ from the rest of the Romanian lands’.309 A more explicitly 
‘blood and soil’ argument was put forward by Vasile Netea who stated 
in 1943 that, ‘the Transnistrians are blood of our blood and their soul 
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part of the great soul of Romania’, and failed to find any differences in 
life-style, culture or folklore between the ‘Romanians’ on either side of 
the Dnestr.310 Without denying the presence and influence of Romanian- 
speakers beyond the Dnestr throughout the previous centuries, their true 
numbers in Romanian-occupied Transnistria in the early 1940s were 
hardly sufficient to justify long-term occupation. 
The existence of the works cited, however, suggests that some 
Romanians believed the permanent annexation of Transnistria to 
Romania to be possible. The Romanian Orthodox Church was particu¬ 
larly active in war-time Transnistria and a number of writers stressed the 
links between the Orthodox churches in Moldova and Transnistria from 
the seventeenth century onwards. There is some truth in this in that eccle¬ 
siastical links on either side of the Dnestr were strong during the late 
eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, when Gavril Banulescu- 
Bodoni was active in both the Russian church and the church in the 
principalities. In particular, the eparchy of Chisinau and Hotin created in 
1813 and presided over by Bodoni and his successor Sulima had extended 
from the Prut to the Bug river until 1837, when a separate archbishopric 
of Odessa and Cherson was created.311 
During August 1941, when the Romanian administration was being 
established in Transnistria, the organization Misiunea Ortodoxe Romand 
in Transnistria was also set up, with the intention of ‘re-christianizing’ the 
area and reorganizing the church. Some 250 ‘missionary’ priests were sent 
to the area from Romania to work together with 219 local priests. By 1943 
the mission had apparently rebuilt several hundred churches and chapels 
and re-established religious instruction in schools in Transnistria. Two 
seminaries had also been opened, as well as a theology department, in 
Odessa.312 
Notwithstanding these successes in the revival of Christianity in 
Transnistria, it became clear to the Romanians following the Battle of 
Stalingrad in 1943 that the Soviet Union was capable of defeating 
Germany. The Romanians, therefore, opened negotiations with the 
Western Allies, and subsequently the Soviet Union as well, in order to 
bring Romania into the war on the Allied side, hoping thereby to restore 
Romania to her pre-1940 borders. By March 1944, however, the Red 
Army had reached the River Prut, and in April the Soviet government 
declared the Prut to be the frontier between Romania and the Soviet 
Union. This was confirmed in the armistice between Romania and the 
Soviet Union which was signed following the ‘palace coup’ of 23 August 
1944 which led to Marshal Antonescu’s fall from power and Romania’s 
entry into the war on the Allied side. The Soviet Union’s possession of 
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Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and Flerfa was subsequently confirmed by 
the Paris peace treaty of February 1947. 
Soviet and Post-Soviet Moldova 
The boundaries of the post-war Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MSSR) were not, however, identical to those of Romanian interwar 
Bessarabia. Following the Soviet seizure of Romanian territories in June 
1940, Stalin had incorporated northern Bukovina, together with the Herfa 
region, the northern Bessarabian district of Hotin and the southern 
Bessarabian districts of Cetatea Alba and Ismail, which included the port 
of Chilia, into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. All these terri¬ 
tories had substantial Ukrainian populations, and Chilia and Cetatea Alba 
were renamed Kilija and Bilhorod Dnistrovsky respectively. In placing 
large areas of Bessarabian territory within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, Stalin ensured that the strategically important Danube mouth 
and a large area of the Black Sea coast was in the more loyal hands of 
the Ukrainians, although thereby Ukraine also gained some 337,000 
Moldovans.313 
On 2 August 1940 the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) had 
been created from the union of the remainder of Bessarabia with the 
western part of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MASSR), which the Soviets had created on the left bank of the River 
Dnestr in 1924. The area which formed part of the new MSSR thus 
included left-bank towns such as Tiraspol and Dubasari which had never 
belonged to the principality of Moldova or to Bessarabia.314 The larger 
eastern area of the former MASSR was returned to the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, from which the lands making up the MASSR had been 
taken in 1924. The MSSR was reconstituted in the above form following 
the withdrawal of the Romanian army early in 1944. The population of 
the new MSSR was some 2.4 million of which Moldovans made up some 
68.8% of the population in 1941, with 11.1% Ukrainians and 6.7% 
Russians.315 Ironically, the one ‘benefit’ of Bessarabia’s annexation by the 
Soviet Union was thus to increase the proportion of Moldovans in 
the population through the award of the areas with high Ukrainian 
populations to Ukraine. 
The population of the MSSR had already suffered greatly as a result 
of the executions and deportations which were the inevitable result of the 
Soviet annexation of the province in June 1940. Between 1940 and 
the Romanian re-annexation in 1941, some 25,000 Moldovans were 
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deported.316 Economically primitive at the best of times, Moldova was 
devastated by the war, with massive loss of livestock and agricultural 
equipment. With the onset of Soviet agricultural collectivization, came the 
attendant evils of grain requisitioning and ‘de-kulakization’, which was 
especially aimed at the Moldovan peasantry. These factors, together 
with a drought in 1946, led to a famine in which at least 115, 000 peasants 
died.317 Waves of deportation to Central Asia and Siberia, again primarily 
aimed at the Moldovans, took place following Moldova’s incorporation 
into the Soviet Union, with the intelligentsia, landowners and ‘kulaks’ 
specifically targeted. In the 1950s a policy of ‘voluntary migration’ to 
collective farms in the Soviet east also began. An accurate number of the 
persons deported is difficult to assess, but may have up to half-a-million 
people between 1944 and the 1960s.318 The levels of deportation were 
sufficiently high such that by the 1950s there were villages made up solely 
of Romanian-speakers in the area between the Urals and Altai mountains 
in the Soviet Union.319 
The purpose of the Soviet deportations was clearly aimed to ensure 
economic and ideological conformity. Furthermore, Stalin was well- 
known for his persecution of peoples who had been exposed to non¬ 
communist systems. Thus, the Soviets clearly regarded the Moldovans, 
who had belonged to ‘bourgeois’ and ‘capitalist’ Romania during the inter¬ 
war period, as less trustworthy than the Slavs. Similarly, in the decades 
after 1945, Soviet leaders sought to ‘dilute’ the potentially disloyal indige¬ 
nous Moldovan population by encouraging immigration by Russians and 
Ukrainians into the MSSR. Between 1944 and 1979 more than half- 
a-million Slavs migrated into the republic, which had the effect of 
neutralizing the Moldovans’ higher birth rate. Nevertheless, by 1989 the 
Moldovan population, which had stood at 68.8% of the total population 
in 1941, was still relatively ‘healthy’ at 64.5% of the total population, with 
a Ukrainian population of 13.8% (11.1% in 1941) and an increased 
Russian population of 13% in 1989, compared with 6.7% in 1941.320 
Significantly, however, it was primarily the Russians and Ukrainians 
who dominated the communist party in Moldova, together with its organs 
of coercion, and the state-run economic sector. Moldovans who did rise 
to importance, such as Semion Grossu, first secretary from 1980 to 1989, 
tended to come from the left bank, or ‘Transnistrian’ side, of the Dnestr, 
and were completely loyal to the Soviet Union and integrated into 
Russian culture, much like the russophile Moldovan nobility in imperial 
Bessarabia. As we have already noted above, the left bank of the Dnestr 
had never formed part of the Romanian state as such, apart from the brief 
period of occupation during the Second World War, nor officially to the 
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medieval principality of Moldova, or to Russian Bessarabia. Despite the 
contacts between right and left bank Moldovans, the Moldovan 
population on the left bank of the Dnestr had been more heavily influ¬ 
enced by the numerically predominant Slavonic population for centuries, 
which had also left its imprint on the Moldovan spoken on the left bank 
of the river.321 
The Cyrillic alphabet had been introduced into the MSSR in May 1941 
and during the 1940s ‘Moldovan’ was once again regarded as a separate 
language to Romanian and the Slavonic elements to Moldovan history 
and culture were stressed. There was a general agreement on this among 
Soviet linguists until the 1970s.322 The stress on the use of the Russian 
language of the ‘Soviet people’ from the early 1960s onwards, however, 
and the consequent ‘russification’ of the Soviet Union’s languages, had a 
marked effect on the Moldovan spoken in the MSSR.323 The increasing 
Russian influence on spoken Moldovan was thus a result of the spread 
of bilingualism amongst the Moldovans. As Dennis Deletant wrote in 
1991, as a result of this, ‘colloquial Moldavian shows significant Russian 
lexical influence ... [but] the language of Soviet Moldavian writers is that 
of their Romanian counterparts west of the River Prut.. ,’.324 
Charles King has described the Soviet years in Moldova as being 
marked by ‘the quiet acceptance of standard literary Romanian (albeit in 
the Cyrillic alphabet) as the linguistic norm for the MSSR .. .’.325 
Following the Soviet abandonment of attempts to create a Moldovan 
literary language in the MASSR in the 1930s from the language spoken 
by the peasantry, linguists in Moldova were forced to turn to the literary 
Romanian used west of the River Prut. As a result, according to King, 
\ .. Moldovan in its standard form was more Romanian by the 1980s than 
at any point in its history’.326 
Meanwhile, in post-war communist Romania, all references to 
Bessarabia in history books were quietly dropped and Romanian histori¬ 
ography began to tow a slavish pro-Russian line in which the historic 
links between the Romanians and Slavs, and especially the Russians, 
were stressed to an absurd degree. As Wim van Meurs has written, ‘the 
Russian state and people were consistently portrayed as altruistically 
aiding the Romanian people in its struggle against foreign imperialists 
and oppressors’.327 Typical of the genre is an article written by Victor 
Chereste^iu in 1953 in which he traces the history of the close bonds 
between the Russian and Romanian peoples from the reign of Stephen the 
Great, through that of Michael the Brave and Dimitrie Cantemir, whose 
genuine links with Russia are much dwelt upon. From there we eventually 
arrive at the Second World War when the Romanian workers and peas- 
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ants threw down their tools in a frenzied rush to join the army to fight 
with their Soviet comrades. In this interpretation of events, Romania’s 
previous engagement on the German side is conveniently forgotten.328 
The deterioration of Russo-Romanian relations from the early 1960s, 
however, saw a reduction in such historiographical excesses and with the 
closure of various Russian cultural institutions in Romania, such as the 
Institutul romino-sovietic in 1963, the brief russophile tendency in 
Romanian historiography can be said to have come to an end. The insti¬ 
tution of the Ceau$escu regime and the policy of ‘independence’ from 
Moscow saw a return to the theory of the Latin origins of the Romanians, 
which was eventually to prove as exaggerated as the claims of the rus- 
sophiles, and a consequent diminution of the Romanians’ historic links 
with the Slavs.329 
The Bessarabian ‘question’ re-emerged in public debate in 1964. In 
particular, the Romanians published works by Marx and Engels in which 
the founding fathers of socialism themselves condemned the Russian 
seizure of Bessarabia in 1812. As Adrian Pop has written elsewhere, 
‘... Romanian historiography was one of the main channels through which 
many of the signs of insubordination towards the Kremlin were diffused’. 
By the 1970s Romanian historians were arguing the case for the Romanian 
nature of the lands between the Rivers Prut and Dnestr so vehemently that 
there were rumours in 1976 of a Soviet intervention on the Prut.330 None 
of this was lost on the Moldovans, many of whom by the late 1960s were 
demanding the official recognition of Moldovan and Romanian as the 
same language and the use of the Latin alphabet. As a result, the Soviet 
authorities renewed their stress on the supposed ‘independence’ of 
Moldovan from the Romanian language during the 1970s. 
Indeed, the MSSR remained a relatively ‘conservative’ backwater of 
the USSR right through into the 1980s. There had been little attempt in 
the post-war years to fully industrialize the republic, and what little was 
developed was located on the eastern side of the Dnestr. During the 1980s 
glasnost era of Soviet politics, the leadership in Chisinau, much like 
Ceau$escu in Bucharest, refused to ‘liberalize’. Nevertheless, the decade 
witnessed a growing ‘pan-Romanian’ intellectual movement, the 
adherents of which argued that the Moldovans were a part of the 
Romanian nation and demanded a greater use of the Moldovan language 
within the republic.331 The ‘Popular Front of Moldova’ (PFM) was estab¬ 
lished in May 1989, and its members looked forward to Moldova’s 
ultimate political union with Romania. On 31 August 1989 the Moldovan 
Supreme Soviet officially declared ‘Moldovan’, in the Latin script, to be 
the state language, and recognized its unity with the Romanian language. 
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Both Russian and Moldovan, however, were to be the languages of inter¬ 
ethnic communication. As Michael Kirkwood correctly predicted shortly 
after the introduction of these laws, however, the introduction of the Latin 
script, with which many Moldovans, as well as the republic’s numerous 
national groups, were unfamiliar, as well as the reinforcement of Russian 
as a language of communication, made it highly likely that ‘the new law 
will continue to act as a focus for inter-ethnic strife rather than as a 
blueprint for ethnic harmony’.332 
In elections early the following year, the PFM won the largest number 
of seats to the Moldovan Supreme Soviet and the Soviet subsequently 
adopted a modified version of the Romanian flag as the Moldovan 
national flag. On 23 June 1990, the Moldovan Soviet issued a declaration 
of sovereignty which specified the supremacy of the Moldovan consti¬ 
tution and laws throughout the republic. The Supreme Soviet, 
furthermore, declared that the name of the republic was the Romanian 
‘Moldova’, rather than ‘Moldavia’ as used during the previous Soviet era, 
an apparent victory for the pan-Romanianist view of Moldova as an 
integral part of Romania. On the following day, in commemoration of the 
Soviet Union’s annexation of Bessarabia fifty years previously, thousands 
of citizens of Romania and Moldova formed a ‘human chain’ across the 
River Prut as an act of national solidarity. 
The backlash by other national groups, predicted by Kirkwood, was 
not long in coming. Fearing that they would be ‘romanianized’, in August 
1990 five counties in southern Moldova declared independence as the 
‘Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic’. In September an autonomous 
Transnistrian Soviet Socialist Republic was also declared. Following the 
Republic of Moldova’s declaration of independence on 27 August 1991, 
civil war broke out late in 1991 in Transnistria between the ‘Dnestr guard’ 
and Moldovan government troops. A number of articles in this volume are 
concerned with this dispute. In 1995 Transnistria declared its inde¬ 
pendence. 
Meanwhile, in Moldova itself the ‘pan-Romanianists’ were beginning 
to lose public support. In the country’s first multi-party elections in 
February 1994, the Agrarian Democratic Party emerged as the largest 
party, and the Christian Democratic Popular Front (the former PFM) 
had a weak showing. The following month, an opinion poll showed 
that only some 5% of the Moldovan population favoured union with 
Romania. The fall in popularity for union with Romania may have been 
caused by the slow pace of political and economic reforms within Romania 
itself in the early 1990s, together with a perception that Romania was pres¬ 
surizing the republic into union, which revived ‘collective memories’ of 
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Bessarabia’s often harsh treatment within interwar Greater Romania. 
Within the Romanian nationalist-right in the early 1990s, there was cer¬ 
tainly a strong ‘annexationist’ contingent.333 
The ruling Agrarian Democrats and their ‘Moldovanist’ supporters 
were, therefore, able to revive, in a modified form, the former Soviet argu¬ 
ments regarding the distinctiveness of the Moldovans in relation to the 
Romanians, and thereby to argue that Moldova should remain indepen¬ 
dent. The ‘Moldovanists’ argued that although the Moldovans and 
Romanians share ‘common origins in Trajan’s Dacia ... the annexation of 
Bessarabia by the Russian empire in 1812 ... the proclamation of an inde¬ 
pendent [Moldovan] republic in 1918, the oppressive nature of Romanian 
rule between the wars, and the construction of a modern Moldovan state 
in the Soviet period have all contributed to the growth of a unique 
Moldovan nation’.334 Significantly, the government confirmed Moldova’s 
membership of the CIS in April 1994, a move which gave a clear indication 
that the government was not considering union with Romania. In July 1994 
the government declared Moldova to be a sovereign and independent state 
with ‘Moldovan’, written in the Latin script, as its official language. The 
parliament consistently refused the demands made by the ‘pan-Romanian’ 
nationalists that the language should be officially renamed as ‘Romanian’. 
Moreover, in Romania itself by the mid-1990s there was a growing feeling 
that union with their economically troubled Moldovan neighbour would 
place an unbearable strain upon the faltering Romanian economy. The 
Romanian elections of 1996 brought the ‘pro-Western’ Democratic 
Convention to power and reflected the fact that for most Romanians 
attempts to join Western institutions such as the EU and NATO were more 
important than union with Moldova. 
The worsening economic climate in Moldova and the unresolved 
tensions between the Moldovans and the national minorities brought the 
Communist Party of Moldova back to power in the 1998 elections and 
again in 2001. In April 2001 President Voronin pledged to strengthen 
the country’s political and economic ties with Russia and to boost the 
status of the Russian language within the republic. Policies to increase the 
status of Russian and to de-emphasize the historic links between Moldova 
and Romania, however, met with stiff opposition and the re-emergence 
of the ‘pan-Romanianist’ right-wing. Public demonstrations early in 2002 
over the language issue, and the intervention of the Parliamentary 
Association of the Council of Europe, forced the government to withdraw 
proposals to introduce compulsory Russian-language classes. Further 
evidence that the ‘pan-Romanianist’ position is far from dead, is reflected 
in the attempt by some Orthodox priests to found a ‘Bessarabian metro- 
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politan’ which would be subordinated not to the Russian patriarchate, as 
is the case with the metropolitan church of Moldova, but to the Romanian 
patriarchate in Bucharest. The Moldovan government has refused to 
register the church, but has now been set a deadline for so doing by the 
Council of Europe. 
Neither has the government been successful in resolving the Trans- 
nistrian dispute, despite its ‘Slavophile’ credentials. On his installment in 
early 2001, President Voronin offered Transnistria a large measure of 
autonomy. Pro-Russian separatists replied to this by demanding a loose 
confederation of two sovereign and independent states. At the time of 
writing, the relationship between the Moldovan government and the 
Transnistrian break-away government remains unresolved and 
Transnistria continues to run its own affairs. 
The status of the Russian army in Transnistria likewise remains un¬ 
resolved. The agreement for withdrawal of Russian troops signed by 
Moldova and Russia in 1994 has still not been ratified by the Russian 
parliament. Despite the 1999 OSCE agreement under which Russia 
pledged to withdraw all its troops and weapons from Transnistria by the 
end of 2002, so far Russia has made progress only on the removal of 
weapons. In November 2001, Moldova and Russia signed a basic treaty 
on friendship and cooperation which gave Russia various roles within 
Moldovan affairs, such as that of a peace guarantor in Transnistria. A plan 
drawn up by President Putin’s government, which would give Transnistria 
considerable autonomy and influence within the Moldovan legislature, 
proved, however, to be unacceptable even to President Voronin, let alone 
the nationalist right-wing in Moldova. 
Relations between the Moldovan government and the Gagauz Yeri 
autonomous area were also in decline in 2002 following Gagauz demands 
for an autonomous ‘republic’ with its own budget, as well as greater repre¬ 
sentation within the central parliament. At the same time, Moldova’s 
official relations with Romania also appear to be deteriorating. In late 
2001 the Moldovan justice minister accused the Romanian government of 
‘expansionism’ and in 2002 President Voronin accused the Romanians of 
sponsoring the nationalist opposition, who were at the time demonstrating 
against his pro-Russian language policies, with the aim of reincorporating 
‘Bessarabia’ into Romania. Nevertheless, Moldova’s incorporation into 
various international organizations continues. In June 2001 the republic 
entered the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe and in July 2001 
entered the World Trade Organization. 
As yet, however, there is no end in sight to the bleak economic condi¬ 
tions which prevailed during the late 1990s, as described by Ronald Hill in 
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this volume. On 9 July 2001, BBC 2’s Newsnight programme, reported on 
a growing number of young men in Moldova who are prepared to sell their 
kidneys for money. These young men are transported to Turkey, many of 
them in the belief that they are simply giving blood, where the operation 
is carried out, and are paid the sum of $2000. The organs are then sold on 
to Israel which has a serious problem with kidney donorship. In one village 
in Moldova as many as fourteen young men had sold their kidneys, with 
inevitable consequences for their health. Moreover, The Economist on 
15 July 2002 confirmed that Moldova was the poorest country in Europe, 
even as it had been in 1999, beating Albania to reach this unenviable posi¬ 
tion. The average wage in 2002 was only $3 per day and some staggering 
600,000 people have left the country over the past few years. 
In the midst of this economic crisis, the Moldovan ‘conundrum’ 
regarding the national identity of the Moldovans, their relationship to the 
Romanians across the River Prut, and their political orientation within 
the wider European context persists. Although President Voronin main¬ 
tains aspirations to eventually join the EU, his government’s relations 
with Russia are currently far warmer than his relations with his western 
neighbours. The last few years have seen the emergence of two other alter¬ 
native identities and political orientations to those put forward by the 
‘Moldovanists’ and the ‘pan-Romanianists’. One can be described as 
the ‘European’ orientation, the adherents of which regard the Romanians 
and Moldovans as related but different. Thus, the ‘Europeanists’ regard 
use of the Romanian language by the Moldovans as a ‘given’ but 
acknowledge that differences have developed between the Romanians 
and Moldovans as a result of diverging historical paths in the nineteenth 
century. Their vision for Moldova’s future development rests upon the 
strengthening of democracy and civil society and of cultural rights for 
ethnic minorities within a European framework. They are prepared to 
accept partnership with Russia only if that country is oriented towards the 
West. The ‘neo-Soviets’, on the other hand, are openly pro-Russian. They 
place no importance on the use of the Romanian language and regard the 
russification process which took place in the twentieth century as a 
positive process of ‘modernization’. They regard the independence of the 
Republic of Moldova as a historical ‘accident’ and seek union for Moldova 
with Russia and Belarus. Thus, the neo-Soviets have no interest in orien¬ 
tation towards Western Europe. At the time of writing, the neo-Soviet 
vision of Moldova’s future appears to be dominant.335 
Throughout its history, Moldova has stood at the edge of empire — of 
the Roman and Byzantine empires, of the empires of the nomads, of the 
expanding Hungarian kingdom and of the Ottoman, Habsburg and 
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Russian empires. Moldova’s people have on occasions been able to utilize 
this circumstance, balancing one neighbour against the other in order to 
preserve a fragile independence. On other occasions, however, the contest 
for its space has led to Moldova’s dismemberment and partition. The age 
of empires has given way to the age of nations, and with this the nature 
of the contest for Moldova has been rewritten in terms of linguistic affil¬ 
iation and cultural orientation. Moldovan identity rests, however, on 
foundations as fluid as its territory. It is for this reason likely to remain 
for the foreseeable future as contested a space as it has always been. 
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Map 1 The Principality of Moldova, Bessarabia and Bukovina, 1812 
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Map 2 The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), 1944-1991 
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The Holocaust in Transnistria: 
An Overview in the Light of 
Recent Research 
Dennis Deletant 
The Holocaust in Romania was unlike the Holocaust in other parts of 
Europe and the Soviet Union. In the first place, the murder of Jews there 
was carried out principally by the Romanian authorities. Romania under 
the military dictatorship of Marshal Ion Antonescu (1941-1944) indepen¬ 
dently implemented mass slaughter of Jews as a sovereign German ally. 
Secondly, the deaths of Jews at the hands of the Romanians was the result 
not only of the systematic, mechanical killing of Jews, but also of depor¬ 
tation and its consequences. More than 15,000 Jews in Bessarabia and 
Bukovina were shot by the Romanian and German army in the summer 
of 1941, and Romanian forces alone put to death an estimated 15,000 to 
20,000 Jews in Odessa in a similar manner in October in that same year. 
Of the 147,000 Jews who were deported from Bukovina and Bessarabia 
between 1941 and 1943 to Transnistria at least 90,000 died, the majority 
of typhus and starvation. During the same period, a further 170,000 local 
Ukrainian Jews are estimated to have perished in the same province.1 
These figures give the Antonescu regime the sinister distinction of being 
responsible for the largest number of deaths of Jews after Hitler’s 
Germany — the deportation of 500,000 Jews in Hungary to the death 
camps in Poland was carried out after the German occupation of that 
country on 19 March 1944.2 Thirdly, Romania’s ‘Jewish policy’ was 
independent of Germany. Proof of this is the fact that Antonescu changed 
his mind in the summer of 1942 about acceding to German requests that 
the remaining Jewish population of Romania — from the Banat, southern 
Transylvania, Wallachia and Moldova — be deported to the extermina¬ 
tion camps in Poland. 
For the English-reading public, access to the horrors of Antonescu’s 
treatment of the Jews and Gypsies is now provided for the first time by 
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Radu Ioanid’s study The Holocaust in Romania? His task has been facil¬ 
itated by the hundreds of thousands of pages of documentation on the 
subject which the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) 
has assembled since 1993 from Romania and Ukraine under the guidance 
of Ioanid and Paul Shapiro. Some of this material was used by Jean Ancel 
in a remarkable three-volume work on Transnistria published in 1998, but 
this is in Romanian. Other eminent scholars, such as Randolph Braham 
and Paul Shapiro, have in recent years made incisive incursions into the 
fate of the Jews from northern Bukovina and Bessarabia. A major 
reference-work in English on the Romanian administration in Transnistria 
remains Alexander Dallin’s study on Odessa between 1941 and 1944, 
written as a RAND report in 1957 and published for the first time in 1998. 
Pioneering as he was at the time, Dallin did not enjoy the cooperation of 
the Soviet or Romanian authorities and was unable to consult the files 
now available in the USHMM’s archive. By drawing on this rich source 
of documentation — which is currently being consolidated by the 
USHMM with fresh material — Ioanid has provided a path-breaking 
synthesis, cataloguing and describing Antonescu’s systematic measures to 
drive and eliminate the Jews and Gypsies from Romania. This paper 
offers an overview of Ioanid’s work and complements it with an appreci¬ 
ation of the Holocaust in Transnistria which this author was able to 
formulate as a result of his own research into the subject at the USHMM 
from 2000 to 2001. 
Just as Antonescu’s solution to the ‘Jewish problem’ differed from that 
of Hitler, so too did his anti-semitism. Whereas for Hitler Jews were a 
deadly disease, infesting and debilitating the Aryan race, for Antonescu 
they were unpatriotic and disloyal to Romania, as well as being economic 
exploiters. But the greatest danger which the Jews posed to Romania in 
Antonescu’s mind was their predilection for bolshevism. The epithet 
‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ was frequently employed by Antonescu and his vice- 
president, Mihai Antonescu, in their speeches to characterize Jews, 
especially the Russian-speaking ones in Bessarabia — the Jews in 
Bukovina were predominantly Yiddish- and German-speakers. 
Antonescu’s obsession with the bolshevik menace drove his policy 
towards the Jews. The vast majority of those living in the provinces 
bordering on, and occupied by, the Soviet Union between 1940 and 1941 
— Bessarabia and Bukovina — were deported to Transnistria, as well as 
those from the county of Dorohoi in northern Moldova, and more than 
sixty per cent of them were murdered or died of disease and starvation. 
Amongst Transnistrian Jews, more than eighty per cent are estimated to 
have perished. On the other hand, the Jews in the Old Kingdom of 
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Romania — in the provinces of Wallachia and Moldova — and in southern 
Transylvania, which remained in Romanian hands after the Vienna 
Award of August 1940 gave the northern half to Hungary, were more 
assimilated, and were deemed by Antonescu to be less communist in their 
propensities, and were, therefore, largely spared. 
Transnistria was the name given by the Antonescu regime to the region 
of Ukraine between the rivers Dnestr and the Bug, which it occupied 
following Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. As a 
separate administrative entity Transnistria had no historical pedigree; it 
had never been ruled by Romanians and in the population, put at two and 
a half millions in the Soviet census of 1926, the Romanian element 
amounted to only ten per cent. The majority of its inhabitants were 
Ukrainians and Russians, but there was a significant Jewish population of 
about 300,000. 
Under Antonescu Transnistria was the graveyard of between 200,000 
and 250,000 Jews, and for up to 20,000 Gypsies. Most of these deaths 
resulted from inhuman treatment and a callous disregard for life rather 
than from industrialized killing. The forced marches of Jewish deportees 
— including young, old and sick — to the eastern extremity of Trans¬ 
nistria with the intention of driving them across the River Bug into 
German hands, the murder by Romanian and Ukrainian guards of those 
unable to keep up with the columns, the massacre by the Germans of 
those who did cross, the eventual refusal in the late summer of 1941 
by the Germans to accept any more for fear of spreading typhus beyond 
the Bug, the consequent herding of Jews into makeshift camps without 
proper food or health care, these actions resulted in the initial wave of 
deaths through malnutrition and disease in the autumn and winter of 1941, 
and were the hallmark of the fate in Antonescu’s hands of Romanian Jews 
from Bessarabia and Bukovina, and of local Ukrainian Jews. Later, 
several thousand Jews were shot in 1942 and 1943, largely by SS units in 
the south-eastern part of the province who were aided by the German 
colonists there. 
For those Jews who survived — both Romanian and Ukrainian — 
administrative incompetence and endemic corruption plagued their 
existence, but these very features of Romanian rule offered a chance of 
salvation to those who were fit enough to withstand the physical and 
material torments of life in Transnistria. To this we should add the 
particular human factor, borne out by witness statements at the war- 
crimes tribunals held at the end of the war in Romania: that actions against 
— and in a few cases — to the benefit of the deportees depended a great 
deal on the personality of the camp commandant. 
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In examining the fate of the Jews at the hands of the Romanians and 
Germans in Transnistria a distinction should be made between the 
Romanian Jews deported to Transnistria from Bessarabia and Bukovina 
after these areas were reannexed by Romania in July 1941, and the fate 
of the local Jews in Transnistria itself. 
Deportation 
According to Mihai Antonescu, the Romanian vice-president and a distant 
relative of the Marshal, the decision to deport the Jews from Bessarabia 
and Bukovina was not taken at any cabinet meeting but ‘was taken by the 
Marshal when he was in [Romanian] Moldova, near the front’. Under 
questioning on 17 April 1946 before his trial, Mihai Antonescu declared 
that Ion Antonescu took the decision ‘to begin the deportation of Jews 
from Cernaufi and from Chisinau’ while he was in Ia$i’ (at the beginning 
of July 1941, it would seem).4 On 8 July 1941, Mihai Antonescu reiterated 
his support for the expulsion of the Jews. At a meeting of the cabinet over 
which he presided in the absence of Ion Antonescu, he declared: ‘At the 
risk of not being understood by some traditionalists who may still be 
amongst you, I am for the forced migration of the whole Jewish popula¬ 
tion in Bessarabia and Bukovina, which must be expelled over the frontier 
[author’s italics]. Similarly, I am for the forced migration of the Ukrainian 
population which has no place here at this time’.5 In practice, expulsion 
meant driving the Jews across the River Dnestr into German-controlled 
territory. It is also worth noting that Mihai Antonescu spoke here of 
'the whole Jewish population in Bessarabia and Bukovina’ [author’s 
italics]. An insight into Ion Antonescu’s motives is provided by his res¬ 
ponse to two petitions sent to him in October 1941 by Wilhelm Filderman, 
the head of the ‘Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania’, protest¬ 
ing at the deportations. Replying on 19 October, Antonescu asked 
Filderman to think of events of the previous summer during the Romanian 
withdrawal from Bessarabia and Bukovina: ‘What did you do last year 
when you heard of the Jews’ behaviour in Bessarabia and Bukovina 
towards our withdrawing troops who up to then had protected the peace 
and wealth of those Jews ? I shall remind you. Even before that appear¬ 
ance of the Soviet troops the Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina, whom 
you defend, spat on our officers, ripped off their epaulettes, tore their uni¬ 
forms, and when they could they beat our soliders to death in a cowardly 
fashion. We have proof. These same bastards welcomed the Soviet troops 
with flowers and celebrated their arrival with wild enthusiasm’.6 
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Although there was allegedly some photographic evidence of the above 
accusations, and there were several reports of such incidents from the 
Romanian troops withdrawn from the two provinces,7 the behaviour 
described was not representative of most Jews, especially the more wealthy 
amongst them who had every reason to fear for their fortunes at the hands 
of a communist regime and showed that concern by withdrawing with the 
Romanian forces. Moreover, if retaliation against the Jews for their treat¬ 
ment of the withdrawing Romanian forces from the provinces in June 1940 
was a motive for deportation, then it made no sense to include the Jews 
from southern Bukovina and Dorohoi county in northern Moldova which 
were not annexed by the Soviet Union and remained part of Romania. 
Nevertheless, at the beginning of August Romanian gendarmes began 
to drive columns of Jews on foot from the whole of Bukovina and 
Bessarabia towards the north of the latter province and over the Dnestr 
into what was at the time German-controlled territory. Those that had the 
opportunity took with them clothes, food, money and jewellery. The 
Germans were unwilling to accept large numbers of them and sent them 
back. The Romanian gendarmes in Soroca — in northern Bessarabia — 
reported on 5 August that there were about 20,000 Jews from Hotin and 
Storojinef whom the Germans had refused to receive at Moghilev. Three 
days later the gendarme inspectorate in Cernaup telegraphed that 20,000 
from the county of Hotin had been driven across the Dnestr but that the 
Germans had begun on 7 August to send back from Ukraine everyone 
from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, irrespective of their ethnic 
background.8 In the words of a German SD report, the Jews were ‘chased 
back and forth until they dropped ... Old men and women lay along the 
road at short distances from each other.. .’.9 
With nowhere to send the Jews, the Romanian gendarmerie set up 
transit camps at Secureni, Edinep, and Vertujeni into which more than 
50,000 Jews were herded. Poor sanitation, a shortage of water and a lack 
of food quickly led to the outbreak of disease. The mortality rate was high. 
The dumping-ground for these Jews, once the military situation permitted, 
was Transnistria. In a cabinet meeting of 6 September 1941, Antonescu 
declared that ‘we have tens of thousands of Jews whom I intend to cast 
into Russia’.10 At the beginning of October 1941, the deportation of the 
occupants of the transit camps to Transnistria began. The deportation 
ceased in mid-November. About 25,000 Jews were left in the ghetto of 
Cernaup and some 500 in Chisinau. In early summer 1942, the deportation 
of 10,000 of the Cernaup Jews and those in Chisinau resumed.11 
Jews were not the only victims of deportation. It was a hybrid of social 
and racial criteria that drove Antonescu’s policy towards the Gypsies. 
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Their deportation was ordered in May 1942 and carried out in August. 
Gypsies ‘without visible means of support’ and with a ‘criminal record’ 
were rounded up in many areas by the police and deported by train to 
Transnistria. By and large, only Gypsies in the above categories were 
seized. In some counties Antonescu’s order fell on deaf ears; in the Banat, 
for example, in western Romania, scarcely any Gypsies were rounded up 
since the police regarded them as valuable members of the community 
and refused to take action against them. But in other areas the order 
was carried out. Almost 25,000 Gypsies were deported — by train — with 
the opprobrium of ‘criminals’ attached to them, and such were the 
appalling conditions in the villages in which they were settled that many 
of them contracted disease and perished. Others were shot by the 
Romanian gendarmerie, and by SS troops based in Golta county in south¬ 
eastern Transnistria. How many Gypsies died is impossible to tell, but the 
number registered as returning from Transnistria in May 1944 was no 
more than 6,000, while several hundred more arrived in Bucharest from 
the province later in the summer. There is much uncertainty as to the 
size of the pre-war Gypsy population — the 1930 census gives a figure of 
less than 300,000 — but it is clear that a very high proportion of those 
deported died. 
The Jewish Aid Committee 
No greater contribution was made to the alleviation of the living condi¬ 
tions of the Jewish deportees in Transnistria than by the Romanian Jews 
themselves. An Aid Committee (Comisiunea de Ajutorare) was estab¬ 
lished in February 1942 to distribute food and clothing to the Jews.12 
It was technically part of the Central Jewish Office in Romania (Centrala 
Evreilor din Romania) but was in effect driven by an unauthorized Jewish 
council set up by the leading Jews in Romania, most notably Wilhelm 
Filderman, formerly head of the ‘Federation of Jewish Communities in 
Romania’ (FJCR), Mi$u Benvenisti, a leading Zionist, and Chief Rabbi 
Alexandru $afran. 
The Central Jewish Office was a government-controlled institution 
set up by Antonescu on 16 December 1941 to replace the FJCR. It was 
charged, amongst other things, with the exclusive representation of the 
interests of Romanian Jewry, with the organization of Jewish ‘work 
projects’ and other forms of forced labour, and with the creation and 
updating of files on all Romanian Jews, including the issue of photo 
identity cards that Jews had to carry. Its head was Radu Lecca. 
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This constellation of Jewish agencies was in all respects unique in 
Europe, First, the existence of an official government body to regulate 
Jewish affairs was without parallel; secondly, the idea that an aid 
committee could function under a regime that was bent on removing 
unwanted Jews seems fantastic, not to mention the fact that the committee 
was in inspiration and action Jewish and was subordinate to an illegal 
Jewish Council; and thirdly, the acceptance by Antonescu of direct 
personal communication with Filderman, as an unofficial spokesman for 
the Jews despite the disbandment of the FJCR — they exchanged letters 
and held meetings to discuss the plight of the Jews — all of these points 
underline the ambivalence of Antonescu’s treatment of the Jews. 
When news of the ordeals experienced by the Jews from Bessarabia 
and Bukovina reached Filderman, he appealed to Antonescu to change 
his mind. His plea fell on deaf ears. Subsequent representations from 
Filderman and others to allow the dispatch of aid and money to the 
deportees by the Jewish community in Romania were more successful. On 
10 December 1941, Antonescu’s decision to allow the FJCR to send 
money and medicines to the deportees in Transnistria was relayed to the 
relevant government bodies. But it took several months for Alexianu and 
the Central Jewish Office — the successor to the FJCR — to come up with 
a solution as to the means by which the aid should be sent. It was agreed 
in March 1942 that the monies could be sent through the National Bank 
in Bucharest in the account of the Transnistrian government and that the 
medicines be sent to the prefect’s office in Moghilev from where they 
would be distributed by the province’s drug administration.13 Initially, 
sums were deposited individually by relatives and friends of the deportees 
but this practice caused such confusion that Antonescu subsequently 
ordered that all monies should be channeled through the Aid Committee. 
Unfortunately for the deportees, they often failed to receive the sums 
of money sent to them, or were short-changed. A similar fate occurred 
with monies sent through — illegal — couriers, most of whom were 
Romanian officials or gendarmerie personnel stationed in Transnistria. 
Several of the latter were court-martialled for acting as go-betweens and 
sentenced to short terms of imprisonment. But it was not only Romanian 
officials who were deemed guilty of corruption. The Aid Committee 
received complaints that a number of ghetto heads sold the food and cloth¬ 
ing which had been sent in their care to Jews in the ghetto, or in some cases 
embezzled the funds transmitted through the Central Jewish Office.14 
A significant change took place in the method of distributing aid in 
1943. Acting on the recommendations of a delegation of Romanian Jews, 
headed by Fred $araga, which visited several ghettos and camps in 
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Transnistria between 1-14 January 1943, the Aid Committee targeted 
their assistance at specific ghetto heads who enjoyed the trust of their 
communities.15 As a result, there was a significant increase in the amounts 
of money and goods that reached their intended recipients. That said, 
it should be borne in mind that the local Ukrainian Jews received no 
such assistance. Many of them watched enviously as their fellows from 
Bukovina and Bessarabia were given the means of making their fives just 
a little more bearable. 
The Massacres at Bogdanovka, Golta County 
There were approximately two hundred camps and ghettos in Trans¬ 
nistria; they had several things in common: they were cold, crowded, the 
food-supply was meagre and in many cases at starvation level, they were 
ravaged by typhus, and the death rate, particularly in the period between 
October 1941 and the spring of 1942, was calamitous. In the thirty months 
of their existence the camps and ghettos witnessed the deaths of tens 
of thousands of Jews. Fear of the spread of typhus to Romanian and 
German soldiers led to several cases of pre-meditated mass murder by 
the Romanian authorities, the most notorious being the killings at the 
Bogdanovka camp in Golta county. 
The original areas for concentrating the Jews on the River Bug, in 
preparation for their expulsion into the German-controlled area of 
Ukraine, were fisted as Mitkin, Pechora, and Rogozna in northern 
Transnistria, the town of Obodovka and the village of Balanovka in the 
county of Balta, Bobrick, Krivoye Ozero, and Bogdanovka, a large state 
farm in the county of Golta. However, the large numbers of deportees 
involved created huge logistical problems for the Romanian authorities 
who had made no plans for feeding or caring for the Jews either en route 
or at their destination. A typhus epidemic amongst the Jews led the Trans- 
nistrian government to divert all Jewish convoys in southern Transnistria 
to the county of Golta. The prefect, Modest Isopescu, a lieutenant-colonel 
in the gendarmerie, was ordered to concentrate the convoys around the 
Bogdanovka state farm and by November 1941 some 28,000 Jews had 
been assembled. On 13 November, Isopescu sent a confidential report to 
Alexianu describing the situation in his county: 
When I took over the county I found several camps of kikes (jidani in Romanian), 
some of whom had been assembled in the towns here, while the great majority 
had been sent from across the Dnestr. Approximately 15,000 had gathered in the 
village of Vazdovca in the district of Liubashevka, a Romanian commune, while 
Dennis Deletant 151 
there were about 1,500 each in Krivoye Ozero and Bogdanovka. Those in 
Vazdovka were striken with typhus and about 8,000 died, including those who 
died of starvation. The mayor of the commune appealed in despair for permission 
to move them because of the continual danger of infection. I ordered the 20th 
Infantry Regiment, which was quartered there, to place a guard on them so that 
the civilian population did not come into contact with them, and to transport 
them to Bogdanovka, a village on the banks of the Bug, with the intention 
of sending them across the Bug. Those from Krivoye Ozero were sent to 
Bogdanovka as well, and were placed in the pig sties of the state farm. 
Before the convoy of jidani from Vazdovka arrived, 9,000 kikes were sent from 
Odessa, so that today, with those who were already there and those who arrived 
in the meantime, there are 11,000 jidani in pig sties which could not hold 7,000 
pigs. The mayor of the village and the manager of the state farm came to me 
today in despair because they were told that there were 40,000 more jidani on 
the way from Odessa. 
Since the state farm cannot hold them all, and those outside the sties kill those 
inside in order to take their places, and the police and gendarmes cannot keep 
pace with the burials, and since the waters of the Bug are being used as drinking- 
water, an epidemic will soon spread over the entire area. 
They are not fit for labour, for of the 300 brought to Golta for construction 
work almost 200 have died, while another 50 are dying despite being relatively 
well-cared for. The majority have tuberculosis, and suffer from dysentry and 
typhus. 
To avoid contamination of the region we beg you to give the order immedi¬ 
ately that no more jidani should be sent to this area. I hope to be able to soon 
send those already here across the Bug, so that we will soon have the air 
completely clean. I ask, however, that we should not be infected again by new 
convoys of jidani.16 
It goes without saying that the herding of Jews into pig sties was the 
ultimate debasement of their dignity. 
Isopescu’s difficulties had been aggravated by events in Odessa. On 
22 October 1941, the former NKVD headquarters in Odessa on Engels 
Street, occupied by the Romanians as their military headquarters, was 
blown up by Soviet agents. Romanian records show that there were 
61 victims, including General loan Glogojanu, the city commandant, 
16 officers, 35 soldiers and 9 civilians. Four German naval officers and two 
interpreters were among the dead. Marshal Antonescu ordered swift, 
indiscriminate and bloody retaliation, the mass murder of innocent 
civilians: for every Romanian and German officer killed, 200 communists 
were to be hanged; for every soldier, 100 communists. During the night 
of 22 October, the military authorities carried out the order and by 
daybreak 450 Jews, considered communists, were left hanging on the 
streets of Odessa. In addition, about 50,000 Jews were force-marched to 
Dalnik, about 8 kilometres outside the city, to be executed. On the inter¬ 
vention of Odessa’s mayor, Gherman Pantea, and General Nicolae 
Macici, the column was sent back to Odessa, but not before those Jews at 
the head of the column were herded into four large sheds and machine- 
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gunned to death, after which the sheds were set on fire. How many Jews 
were killed in this way is not known exactly but a figure of 20,000 was 
mentioned at Macici’s trial in May 1945. This is corroborated by a German 
army report that, ‘on the morning of the 23rd, about 19,000 Jews were 
shot on a square in the port, surrounded by a wooden fence. Their corpses 
were doused with gasoline and burned’.17 This gruesome retaliation was 
succeeded by an order, issued on 7 November 1941, requiring all male 
Jews between 18 and 50 years of age to report to Odessa jail within 
48 hours, and five days later Governor Alexianu issued ordinance no. 23 
providing for the establishment of ghettoes and concentration camps. 
Several thousand Odessa Jews were moved to Bogdanovka. 
Isopescu still hoped that the Jews would be sent across the Bug into 
the hands of the Germans. In his report of 19 November, he noted: ‘There 
are still Jews hiding out in the villages. I ordered searches so that they 
could be brought to Bogdanovka where we could concentrate them in 
one place before transferring them over the Bug, and we are negotiating 
with the Germans to this end’.18 By the end of November the situation 
at Bogdanovka, and at the other improvized camps at Domanovka 
and Acmecetka, had reached crisis point through overcrowding and the 
spread of typhus which had reached endemic proportions amongst the 
inmates. At Bogdanovka there were about 48,000 Jews, most of them from 
Odessa, and around 7,000 from southern Bessarabia. Domanovka held 
around 18,000 Jews, gathered from three districts in the south of 
Transnistria, while the Acmecetka camp, located on an abandoned pig- 
farm halfway between the other two camps, had some 4,000 sick and 
elderly Jews, as well as women, described by the gendarmes as unfit for 
labour.19 Still the convoys of Jews continued to arrive, despite Isopescu’s 
pleas to Governor Alexianu that the populace of the town of Golta itself 
was in danger of infection. Contact between the Jews and the local 
Ukrainian inhabitants, who went to Bogdanovka to sell food, the 
Ukrainian militia and the Romanian gendarmes who guarded the camp, 
had spread the disease, while at Domanovka the able-bodied Jews were 
sent out to work the land. 
By the middle of December, Isopescu’s nightmare had become reality. 
He estimated the number of Jews in Bogdanovka at 52,000; some were 
crammed into the forty-odd cowsheds, while others were out in the open, 
scattered over an area of 3 kilometres on the west bank of the Bug, 35 
kilometres south of the town of Golta. Overcrowding, typhus and temper¬ 
atures of minus 30 degrees centrigrade, all contributed to a sudden rise in 
the death rate; in the cowsheds the living and dead lay alongside each 
other. According to the gendarmerie commander based in the camp, 
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sergeant-major Nicolae Melinescu, the death-rate jumped from between 
50 and 100 Jews a day, to 500 per day.20 
An added torment for the Jews was Governor Alexianu’s order to 
Isopescu, issued by telegram at the beginning of November, to ‘collect’ 
valuables from the Jews, i.e. the money, gold rings, and jewellery which 
they had taken with them to trade for their survival. These belongings 
were to tranferred to the Romanian National Bank. On 19 November, 
Isopescu reported to Alexianu that some of the Jews: 
had items on them of great value in gold and jewels. The guard over them at the 
state farm is weak owing to a shortage of men ... I found that even the local 
[Ukrainian] police who had been summoned to assist with the guard had robbed 
them and then killed them. All these policemen have been arrested.21 
Yet according to statements made by survivors at his trial in 1945, 
Isopescu, in concert with his deputy Aristide Padure, Melinescu and the 
praetor of Golta, Gheorghe Bobei, grossly abused their positions by 
keeping many of the valuables collected from the Jews instead of handing 
them over to the National Bank. Their method of ‘collection’ was original 
and based on extortion. As the food shortage in Bogdanovka took its toll 
of the hapless Jews, so Bobei set up a bakery with the help of a Jewish 
inmate called Izu Landau. Its capacity for baking bread was 500 loaves a 
day, for a population which stood at about 48,000 at the end of November. 
Bobei and Landau offered the bread to deportees at five gold roubles a 
loaf. This exortion lasted only a few days since most of the Jews did not 
have such sums and the bakery ran out of flour.22 
Isopescu’s description of the Jews’ plight at Bogdanovka and his pleas 
that no more columns should be sent to his camp prompted Alexianu to 
take drastic measures. A complete paper trail leading directly to the 
massacre of Jews in Bogdanovka cannot be established — although this 
should not surprise us given that similar portentious orders were never 
communicated in writing by Antonescu nor by Alexianu. The records 
available relating to events at Bogdanovka indicate that an order from 
Alexianu was delivered verbally and in person to Isopescu by a special 
envoy that the Jews in the camp should be shot. Isopescu passed the order 
down to Padure, who seeing nothing criminal in it, committed it to paper 
and sent it on to Vasile Manescu, the praetor of Domanevka. The latter, 
in his turn, passed the order to Nicolae Melinescu, the senior gendarmerie 
officer at Bogdanovka. At this point, as the indictment against those 
involved in the massacre relates that: 
Melinescu showed a spark of humanity. He knew how to rob the Jews, he knew 
how to torture them, he knew how to shoot them from time to time, or to beat 
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them, but the extermination of those 48,000 persons was something he told 
[Manescu] that he did not understand and could not carry out. He could not.23 
In the face of this refusal either Isopescu or Padure, or perhaps both, 
decided to use the local Ukrainian police to carry out the mass murders. 
Seventy police were assembled at Golta and placed under the command 
of Afanasie Andrushin, a fifty-one year old Ukrainian policeman born in 
Chisinau. His knowledge of Romanian was fragmentary — he could not 
read or write the language. Before leaving for Bogdanovka he received, 
according to Melinescu, a written order dated 13 December from Padure 
to shoot all the Jews remaining in Golta, with the exception of a number 
of ‘specialists’ — these included doctors. This was Padure’s solution to the 
problem of typhus. There were no survivors of this operation; the only 
information about it comes from declarations made during the 1945 trial.24 
After the Golta Jews had been murdered, Andrushin received a written 
order, signed by Padure, to shoot all the Jews in Bogdanovka camp. He 
presented this order to Manescu, the official responsible for the camp. 
Manescu kept the order and in its stead gave Andrushin a signed piece of 
paper on which he had copied the original. 
Andrushin reached Bogdanovka on the morning of 20 December and 
told Sergeant-Major Melinescu that he had written orders to shoot all the 
Jews. Melinescu asked to see the order but Andrushin, who could not read 
Romanian, was unable to identify it amongst his papers and left them all 
on Melinescu’s desk. Melinescu found the order, summoned two of his 
men, showed it to them and, contrary to instructions, kept the^ piece of 
paper until 1943 when he showed it to a court martial investigating abuses 
committed by civilian staff in Golta and by members of the gendarmerie. 
The paper, signed by Manescu, was quoted during the 1945 trial: 
Gendarmerie post Bogdanovka: Mr Andrushin from Golta will report to you 
with 70 policemen who will execute the Jews in the ghetto. The gendarmes will 
not take part. The valuables will be collected by me. Tear up this piece of paper. 
Vasile Manescu, 20 December 1941.25 
The massacre began on the following morning. According to the prose¬ 
cutor’s statement at the post-war trial, the intended victims were split into 
two groups. The first were the sick, elderly and infirm, who were crammed 
into stables. Hay was scattered on the stable roofs, doused with petrol, 
and then torched. It was estimated that four to five thousand souls 
perished in the inferno. The remaining 43,000 Jews were driven in groups 
to a nearby forest, stripped of their belongings, made to kneel at the edge 
of a ravine, and shot in the nape of the neck. The murders took place over 
several days. On the orders of Isopescu the bodies were cremated. Such 
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was the number of dead that the cremations lasted throughout January 
and February 1942.26 
M&nescu was also found guilty at his trial in 1945 of ordering the 
murder of 18,000 detainees at Domanevka. Many of the Jews were suffer¬ 
ing from typhus and again fear of the disease spreading seems to have 
driven the massacre. Once again the executioners were local Ukrainian 
policemen, under the command of Mihail Cazachievici, a Ukrainian-born 
Romanian. The shootings began about 10 January 1942 and continued 
until 18 March.27 
Several thousand Jews are estimated to have perished through disease 
and hunger in the camp at Acmecetka — the numbers range from four to 
fourteen thousand. The camp served as a giant sickness-centre, in which 
infirm and sick Jews were concentrated. Isopescu allowed the patients to 
die of hunger, providing them with only the most meagre of supplies. These 
were principally made up of corn meal, which the inmates were unable to 
cook, hence they ate it raw. According to depositions made at his trial, 
Isopescu often showed up drunk at the camp and took photographs.28 
The record of bestiality shown by the Romanian authorities at 
Bogdanovka, Domanevka, and Acmecetka ranks alongside the most 
horrific acts of mass butchery carried out in the twentieth century. Based 
on trial records, a figure of about 70,000 Jews has been computed as the 
number murdered in the three localities between 21 December 1941 and 
the end of February 1942. This was a solely Romanian affair. The part 
played by the Germans was largely that of spectators. They may well have 
put pressure on Alexianu to give the initial orders to Isopescu, fearing as 
they did a typhus epidemic that would spread across the Bug into their 
own area of Ukraine, but the evidence suggests that they did not partic¬ 
ipate directly in these murders. 
Reversal of the Deportation Policy 
In the summer of 1942, Antonescu reversed his policy on deportation. Not 
only did he decide against acceding to German requests that the remaining 
Jewish population of Romania — from the Banat, southern Transylvania, 
Wallachia and Moldova — be sent to the death camps in Poland, but he 
also suspended the deportations to Transnistria A conjunction of consid¬ 
erations persuaded him: first, a growing concern that Germany might lose 
the war and that therefore he would possibly be called to account for his 
actions — this was underlined by a call to the Romanian government 
by the US Secretary of State Cordell Hull in September 1942 for a halt to 
156 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
the deportations to Transnistria on pain of measures being taken against 
Romanians living in the United States; and secondly, protests at the 
German-Romanian plan for the deportations to Poland by Helen, the 
Queen Mother, the Swiss charge d'affaires Rene de Veck, the Apostolic 
Nuncio Andrea Cassulo, and the Metropolitan of Transylvania, Nicolae 
Balan which pointed out that deportation, the institution of ghettos, and 
the wearing of the Star of David had been measures taken only in satellite 
and occupied countries such as Croatia and Poland, and not in other 
sovereign Axis members such as Italy and Hungary.29 At a Council of 
Ministers meeting held on 13 October 1942, which the Marshal did not 
attend, Mihai Antonescu announced that ‘all despatches of Jews across 
the Dnestr are suspended for the time being’.30 Reversals on the eastern 
front in the winter of 1942 could only convince Antonescu of the wisdom 
of reconsidering his policy towards the Jews. He therefore decided to 
remove the Jews from the labour camps to the ghettos where they would 
be less exposed to the ravages of winter. 
By mid-December 1942, with deportation out of the reckoning, 
Antonescu had come round to the view that emigration was the solution 
to the Jewish problem in Romania. On 12 December, Manfred von 
Killinger, the German minister in Bucharest, informed the German 
foreign ministry that Radu Lecca, head of the Central Jewish Office, had 
received instructions from the Marshal to organize ‘the emigration of 
75,000 to 80,000 Jews to Palestine and Syria’. The only condition for 
emigration was payment by each emigrant of 200,000 lei.31 German objec¬ 
tions were to no avail. Emigration was not an option for the Jews surviving 
in Transnistria. Return to Romania was expressly forbidden by Governor 
Alexianu, unless a case for wrongful deportation could be made. Jews 
there resigned themselves to life in the ghettos and the camps. 
Flight from the Ghetto 
In late summer 1943, reports from the gendarmerie in Golta point to a 
growing number of escapes by Jews from the ghettos and camps in that 
county. Word had reached the Jews of the German defeats at the front. 
The prospect of falling into the hands of the retreating Germans filled the 
Jews with terror. Their alarm was compounded by rumours about the fate 
of their fellows who had been sent across the Bug to work on various 
German projects. 
When the German need for labour became pressing, the authorities in 
the Reichkommissariat Ukraine requested Jewish workers from Trans- 
Dennis Deletant 157 
nistria since the Germans executed the Jews under their own jurisdiction 
once they were considered surplus to requirements. Deals were struck 
between the Todt organization and other German construction agencies 
with the Transnistrian government for the supply of Jewish labour. In 
some cases, the prefects were glad of this opportunity to get rid of recal¬ 
citrant or infirm Jews, in others happy to hand over the Jews, merely to 
avoid the problem of feeding them, and on occasions both. The first 
detachment of such Jews — 3,000 in number — had been despatched in 
June 1942. The old and children amongst them were immediately shot by 
units of the SS, made up largely of German colonists from the area. Most 
of the able-bodied survivors, after performing the labour required, 
suffered the same fate. It has been estimated that at least 15,000 of the 
Jews supplied from Transnistria met their death in this way between 1942 
and 1944.32 
One project of the Todt organization in Golta county was the 
construction of a bridge over the Bug to link southern Transnistria with 
the Reichkommissariat Ukraine. The bridge was built between Trihati on 
the west bank and Oceakov on the east, and its construction undertaken 
by German companies. Work began in spring 1943 and finished in 
December. Marshal Antonescu himself approved the despatch of Jews for 
labour. Four thousand Jews, the majority deportees from Romania, were 
provided and concentrated in three camps on the Romanian-administered 
side of the Bug, at Trihati, Varvarovka and Kolosovka. More than 800 
Jews from Golta county were handed over to the German authorities to 
work on the bridge.33 
On learning of these developments several Jews took their fate into 
their own hands by taking flight from the ghetto in the town of Golta. Poor 
security and the proximity of the railway line facilitated their escape. 
Some of these escapes were made with the connivance of Romanian 
officials and Jews who worked in the Golta prefect’s office and falsified 
identity cards.34 A general alert was put out by the Police Directorate in 
Bucharest on 28 October 1943 for the arrest and deportation back to 
Transnistria for forty-two Jews who had escaped from the Golta town 
during the previous month. Replies from regional police headquarters 
throughout Romania show that none of them was apprehended. 
Those taking flight from the labour camp were, in fact, merely jumping 
the gun. Pressure from two fronts was beginning to have an effect on 
Romanian policy towards the deported Jews. The first was the eastern 
front, where Soviet advances reminded the Romanian dictator and his 
closest associates of the precariousness of their position and a probable 
reckoning with the Allies. The second was Filderman, who bombarded 
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Antonescu and General Vasiliu, the head of the gendarmerie, with 
memoranda demanding the repatriation of all [author’s italics] Jews from 
Transnistria. Some progress was made in this respect when on 30 
September 1943 the Romanian Council of Order (Consiliul de Ordine), a 
new state body for repatriation, ordered the gendarmerie in Transnistria 
to repatriate all Jews sentenced for contraventions of the forced labour 
requirements who had completed their terms of punishment. Upon arrival 
in their places of origin, the Jews concerned were to report to the local 
police. 
Consideration of the repatriation of other categories of Jews was given 
by Vasiliu in November, but no firm action was taken. It was not until 
8 December that the repatriation of the Jews from Dorohoi and a small 
group of Jews deported for political reasons was ordered. Between 20-25 
December, 6,107 Jews, mostly from Dorohoi, were moved from 
Transnistria to (Romanian) Moldova. Only on 14 March 1944, with Soviet 
forces already in Transnistria and retreating German troops venting their 
anger in murderous fashion on Jews they came upon, did Antonescu agree 
to allow the return of all Jews from Transnistria.35 
The experience of Jews in Transnistria is indicative of the manner in 
which Antonescu’s treatment of the Jews differed from that meted out 
by Hitler. While German and Romanian forces joined in mass execu¬ 
tions of Jews in Bessarabia and Bukovina in the summer of 1941, after 
that date Romanian treatment of the Jews broadly-speaking followed a 
separate course. If, as in the German case, discrimination was followed 
by deportation, in the Romanian case deportation did not lead to the gas- 
chamber. Tens of thousands of Jews from Bessarabia, Bukovina and 
Transnistria were indeed shot in the period from winter 1941 until early 
spring 1942 on Romanian orders in Golta county, but subsequently the 
plight of the Jews in Transnistria was characterized by degradation and 
callous neglect. Jews residing in Ukraine beyond Transnistria were likely 
to suffer a quick death by shooting at the hands of the Germans, but in 
Transnistria Jews often faced a slow death by typhus or starvation. The 
contrast between German and Romanian actions is illustrated by the fact 
that the largest proportion of Jews to survive Axis rule during the World 
War II in the Soviet Union was in Transnistria. 
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The Moldovan Economy: 
From ‘Model’ to ‘Crash’? 
Ronald J. Hill1 
The performance of the economy of the Republic of Moldova has been 
fraught with difficulties and successes. At the time of writing, there is no 
clear indication of long-term prosperity, and difficult years he ahead. 
There can be no doubt that the politics and economy of independent 
Moldova are closely intertwined — possibly more so than in other 
countries undergoing the transition from communism. At stake is the 
republic’s very existence as a separate state, quite apart from the more 
specific question of whether or not economic conditions can be created 
that will foster and support democratic institutions. 
The Inheritance 
The Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) was the second smallest 
of the Soviet republics after Armenia, and one of the poorest in terms 
of natural endowment, apart from its rich black soil. It suffers from 
extreme aridity in the south, depends heavily on irrigation from the 
Dnestr in the north and east, relies on transit through the territory of other 
states (Romania and Ukraine) for its imports and exports (but it has a 
frontage on the Danube, which, although less than a kilometre in length, 
could give access to the Black Sea), and is almost entirely dependent on 
externally-sourced energy and other raw material inputs into its economy. 
It has a rapidly rising population, which became significantly urbanized 
in the period of Soviet rule from 1944 until 1989: the capital city, Chisinau 
(better known in its Russian variant, Kishinev), expanded from 216,000 in 
1959 to 356,000 in 1970 and more than 750,000 thirty years later, acquiring 
the attributes of a republican capital: the presence of universities and an 
Academy of Sciences, a television and radio centre, government buildings, 
hospitals, hotels, museums, theatres and concert halls, and the republic’s 
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only international airport (which, however, only acquired its international 
status with the collapse of the Soviet Union). Other cities, such as 
Tiraspol, the largest city to the east of the Dnestr and Balfi (Beltsy) in the 
north, also gained the characteristics of regional centres, with adminis¬ 
trative, educational, cultural and trading establishments, plus industrial 
enterprises that steadily attracted the population from the rural 
hinterland. With the Soviet government’s policy of industrialization and 
integration, tractor-assembly, washing machine and refrigerator manu¬ 
facturing and similar light- and medium- engineering and manufacturing 
were set up in the capital, along with clothing and textile production and 
much food-processing in Tiraspol. The traditional wine production 
and cognac distillation were expanded and placed on an industrial footing, 
and in the south the cultivation of tobacco, sunflowers, maize and other 
‘industrial’ crops was encouraged. Under the long-serving Communist 
Party First Secretary Ivan Ivanovich Bodiul, honey and walnut production 
was also promoted, and the republic was the scene of a number of experi¬ 
ments in economic management: the ‘link system’ was established on 
collective farms in the mid-1960s (whereby teams of workers were given 
responsibility for cultivating particular pieces of land in quasi-family 
units), and in the following decade the ministry of agriculture was 
abolished and replaced by local management. On the Dnestr a major 
hydroelectric scheme was built at Dubossary (Dubasari), and in Tiraspol, 
(on the Ukrainian or left-bank side of the river), defence-related heavy 
industry was developed, along with a military airfield for use by a sizeable 
Soviet army contingent (a second air base was built in the north near to 
Balfi). When I lived in Chisinau and Tiraspol thirty-odd years ago, those 
cities were both expanding rapidly. Tiraspol was introducing its first 
trolley-bus routes, new estates, factories and other ‘modern’ facilities were 
being built and permanently changing the traditional character of these 
and other towns and cities in the Soviet republic. 
Nevertheless, Moldova remained one of the least advanced former- 
Soviet republics when it gained independence in 1991. Some 54 per cent 
of the population were rural dwellers and agriculture still accounted 
for 40 per cent or more of the net material output and agriculture-based 
activities (including food-processing, wine-making, tobacco-curing and 
so on) made up a similar proportion of industrial output. Moldova — and 
specifically the ‘Bessarabian’ part (i.e. the lands between the rivers Prut 
and Dnestr) — had, indeed, been treated as essentially part of the Soviet 
Union’s food-producing periphery; and, following re-adoption of the 
Russian imperial strategy of development, most of the heavy industry and 
much of the processing industry was located in what is now referred to as 
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Transnistria. Practically, all the republic’s energy was (and is) imported 
from Russia; virtually all production was geared for consumption within 
the USSR. Only 5 per cent or so of exports from the republic left the 
USSR in 1989. ' 
Effects of the Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The break-up of the Soviet Union led directly to severe interference in 
the trade links with other former Soviet republics, with the institution of 
new trade barriers in the form of customs and other imposts, new bureau¬ 
cratic formalities, the disintegration of the rail, road and air networks, and 
the partial breakdown of law and order in newly independent territories 
on which Moldova depended. The establishment of new links with 
Romania (including the building of new bridges over the River Prut) has 
facilitated Western-oriented trade, but Moldova has suffered greatly from 
the fragmentation and economic collapse of its former markets (hardly 
markets in the sense that this word is understood in the capitalist system: 
materials and products were allocated and markets did not have to be 
‘conquered’ inside the command economy, so that sales of products were 
guaranteed). The heavy dependence on Russia for energy, in particular, 
and its supply through pipelines that cross Ukraine and Transnistria, has 
left the new regime very vulnerable and open to economic blackmail. 
As a supplier, Moldova’s contribution to the economy of the former 
Soviet Union was modest (although Moldova supplied specific agricultural 
products, notably tobacco, wine and cognac, these were largely non- 
essential products), and the Moldovan economic collapse was a peripheral 
element in the total picture. From the opposite perspective, however, the 
almost complete collapse of its suppliers and of its market had a 
catastrophic impact on the economy of Moldova. Almost two-thirds of the 
aggregate social output of the republic was accounted for by imports from 
and exports to other parts of the Soviet Union — possibly the highest ratio 
of all the Soviet republics. The disruption of trade on this scale was devas¬ 
tating. By 1997, the republic’s GDP stood at only 35 per cent of its level 
in 1989, beginning with a fall of 18 per cent in 1991, the year in which 
Moldova gained independence and the Soviet Union was replaced by the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Changes in government from 
conservative to centre-left socialist followed by a war in Bender (in 
Romanian, Tighina, a right-bank city opposite Tiraspol), presidential 
elections and a change in government, plus a sharp rise in Russia’s charges 
for energy (from 16 to 43 per cent of all import costs), led to a further 
166 Occasional Papers in Romanian Studies 
decrease of 21 per cent in 1992. Then, following a year of relative stabi¬ 
lization in 1993 (the year in which Moldova finally joined the CIS 
economic union), the year 1994 witnessed a further decline of 30 per cent 
in GDP, which continued in subsequent years. 
For most of the population, this has been disastrous. Poverty is every¬ 
where to be seen, especially in rural areas and in the public amenities. 
Roads, pavements, parks, and public buildings throughout the republic 
are in need of repair and restoration work. The public transport system, 
particularly buses, is in poor repair and travel safety must be a concern. 
Wages and pensions, as elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, go unpaid 
for months. Moreover, the transition to a market economy and democracy 
has been accompanied, as in other transition states, by rising unemploy¬ 
ment, inflation and the rapid expansion of the unofficial economy, and the 
whole situation has been exacerbated by the unresolved politics of the 
separation of the Dnestr Moldovan Republic.2 Nevertheless, in the early 
years of independence, Moldova was well regarded by outside commen¬ 
tators for the effectiveness of its economic performance. 
Moldova as Model — and its Decline 
Moldova moved swiftly in the direction of privatization and the market 
economy. The first privatization law was adopted in July 1991 (that is, 
before Moldova gained independence). In several phases of voucher 
privatization, citizens were given vouchers in quantities related to the 
number of years they had worked in the state, and these were used in 
auctions to buy housing or shares in commercial companies. The auctions 
began with small enterprises in 1992 and continued in subsequent years, 
so that by the end of 1994, 80 per cent of the housing stock and 
approaching 2,000 enterprises (more than a third of state assets) had been 
privatized. Moreover, after the rampant inflation that accompanied 
continued use of the rouble, Moldova introduced its own currency — the 
leu — in November 1993, and succeeded in maintaining a low level of 
inflation that retained the dollar value of the currency far more effectively 
than most of the transition economies. Inflation, which had reached 2,000 
per cent in 1992, was down to 104.6 per cent in 1994, 23.8 per cent in 1995, 
15.1 per cent in 1996 and 11.2 per cent in 1997. The currency has remained 
fully convertible, and, from a rate of 3.666 to the US dollar in January 
1994 (a slight hardening over the previous month, the first full month of 
the currency’s existence), it declined only very steadily, with some fluctu¬ 
ations, over the next four and a half years, and stood at an annual average 
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of 4.60 through 1996 and 1997. Results such as these led The Economist 
in March 1995, in a phrase that has been much quoted in official Moldovan 
commentary and government economic prospectuses, to identify Moldova 
as ‘the model of right reformism — it has firmly intended to take the road 
of revival after the economic crisis ... a government which possesses the 
reputation of reformer, as well as compact territory (which makes the 
country a perfect laboratory for reforms), all this deserves positive 
appraisal and support’.3 
It has proved impossible to sustain the optimism of early 1995, 
however. The following year was a year of unbalanced financial stability. 
An unsuccessful attempt was made to stimulate renewed growth in output, 
and the economy and its management became issues in the presidential 
election campaign. By early 1997, at least 40 per cent of enterprises were 
standing idle, operating at a loss, or both. A spurt in output in early 1996 
was outweighed by a recession in the second half of the year, leading to 
a decline of 8.5 per cent for the year as a whole. Lack of an adequate 
capital base meant that necessary renewal projects could not be under¬ 
taken. And there was a knock-on deterioration in the quality of fife, 
measured by health and safety, deterioration in education, healthcare and 
cultural provision, and a rise in crime. 
The following year, 1997, showed that the optimism of just two years 
earlier was misplaced. In its report entitled, Republic of Moldova: Strategy 
for Development, dated 1998 (and produced in April of that year), the 
Center for Strategic Studies and Reform stated bluntly that: ‘as became 
clear later, these assessments were exaggerated’. And, although the 
government had achieved an impressive level of macro-economic stability, 
the investment needed for restructuring and re-equipping industrial plant 
in preparation for renewed growth simply was not forthcoming. It was 
not available in either the state budget or private hands, and foreign 
investment was withheld for a variety of reasons, some of them relating 
to the problems over Transnistria (see below). 
Certainly, in the first seven years of Moldovan independence, more 
than 400 new laws and statutes were enacted, the private sector expanded 
to 50 per cent of the GEP; the currency was relatively stable; inflation was 
controlled and stood at a monthly average of 0.85 per cent in 1997; banks, 
stock exchange and other institutions appropriate for a market economy 
were set up and the service sector increased its share of GDP to about 30 
per cent — a sign of a modernizing economy. But production remained 
obstinately stagnant, and there were indications that the shadow economy 
was absorbing more and more economic activity — 40 per cent in 1997, 
and estimates (or guesses) rising to 60 or 70 per cent by mid-1998, and a 
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belief that criminal elements were becoming involved. By that time it 
was being argued that the inability of the state to collect taxes and excise 
and customs duties — to some extent because of corruption on the part - 
of those charged with levying them — had exacerbated the fiscal prob¬ 
lems that prevented the government from meeting its commitments 
to pensioners, to its own salaried employees, and to the public who 
depended on state-run education and health-care facilities. Emergency 
measures introduced by the president in January 1997 helped to alleviate 
the situation, but it was clear that the state would need to take steps to 
support entrepreneurship, attract foreign investment, promote exports 
and introduce social reforms which treated ‘the socio-economic organism 
as a whole rather than [offering] ad hoc solutions’. Accordingly, a more 
comprehensive approach was advanced, based on the concept of a 
‘strategy for development’ of Moldova as a ‘small open economy’, and 
beginning with an elaboration of the concept of national interests: 
The national interest of the Republic of Moldova today can be identified as: the 
affirmation of its statehood, preservation of territorial integrity, creation of [a] 
united and viable economic ensemble with a market economy , where the welfare, 
physical and spiritual development of the people resides on personal results, and 
the determination in the nearest future of a well-deserved place for Moldova in 
the European and world context.4 
This thinking represented a clear orientation of Moldova towards 
the West, aiming at eventual membership of the European Union, a 
task that seems unlikely to be attained in less than 15 years (one study 
allowed for 20-30 years),5 and on pessimistic scenarios would take 
substantially longer, and might never be reached without positive assis¬ 
tance on the part of the European Union itself. Yet the government of 
Ion Sturza, formed in March 1999, formally announced entry to the EU 
as part of its strategic goal — indeed, as its top foreign-policy priority. 
After the statement of that goal, in conjunction with other economic stabi¬ 
lization measures, the IMF, the World Bank and other international 
agencies resumed contacts, and the promises of loans to Moldova, which 
had been suspended in 1998. 
The International Dimension 
Relations with the rest of the world are obviously crucial for the develop¬ 
ment of Moldova. It lies at the meeting-point of several historic empires: 
the Russian, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman, and accordingly 
of the Orthodox Christian, Roman Catholic and Islamic religions. 
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Its population, while dominated by ‘Moldovans’ (culturally Romanian), 
has a significant admixture of Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Jews 
and Poles, Greeks and members of other nationalities, including the 
Christianized Turks of the south, the Gagauz, who negotiated a measure 
of autonomy at the time of independence. In early 1999, a Bulgarian- 
populated county held a referendum on its local administration, wishing 
to retain its cultural identity. The Romanian nation and state have not 
totally abandoned their irredentist claims on Moldova, and the prospect 
of Romanian membership of the European Union in a future wave of 
enlargement undoubtedly affects thinking in Chisinau. The problem 
of identity of the Moldovan nation and state is clearly a factor that deters 
foreign direct investment. On the one hand there is a residual belief 
that the republic — or at least the ‘Bessarabian’ part of it (between the 
rivers Prut and Dnestr) — will eventually be absorbed by Romania. 
On the other — and of greater immediate concern — there is the secession 
of ‘Transnistria’. This is not only a political problem that has already 
(in the summer of 1992) led to a brief war in which several hundred were 
killed. It also involves other powers in the region, notably Ukraine and 
Russia, the second of which tacitly — and in some quarters openly — 
supports the breakaway region and its regime, and maintains an army 
garrison in Transnistria in breach of the constitution of the Republic of 
Moldova which it otherwise officially acknowledges as valid. This dispute, 
which has continued for the best part of the 1990s and seems likely to 
endure for some time longer, has a deleterious effect on the economy of 
Moldova as a whole. 
The Problem of ‘Transnistria’ 
Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that, for political and constitutional 
reasons, the authorities in Chisinau cannot acknowledge the existence of 
‘Transnistria’ as a separate economy operating independently, whereas 
the authorities in Tiraspol have no such inhibitions: that is, of course, the 
point of their claim to statehood. The lack of control over the eastern 
region deprives the economy of Moldova of up to 40 per cent of its indus¬ 
trial capacity, including the bulk of the heavy industry (including its only 
iron and steel plant and its largest cement-production plant) and the 
republic’s main power-generation capacity, plus textiles, clothing and 
footwear factories that might in principle be capable of contributing to the 
country’s exports, or at least supplying a market that has to a considerable 
extent been filled by imports. 
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The isolation of Transnistria has a number of additional negative 
effects which are understood in Chisinau, and which were analysed in a 
discussion paper prepared by World Bank officials in Moldova in early 
1998.6 Apart from the loss of the major industrial plants, particularly 
engineering and heavy industry, depriving the republic of both the 
production (and potential profits) and taxation revenues that this implies, 
the separation of Transnistria also deprives the republic of substantial 
agricultural output (from a region that has developed irrigation to a high 
level, which is not true of the arid southern part of the republic), and of 
a population of some 670,000, or 16 per cent of the population of Moldova 
as a whole. Again, the loss of tax revenue from such a population is signifi¬ 
cant. In short, this was a substantial economic area, which is reckoned 
to have accounted for more than a quarter of the former Moldovan Soviet 
Socialist Republic’s GDP. Moreover, Transnistria’s location is strategi¬ 
cally important for the economy of the Bessarabian majority territory: 
it lies between Bessarabia and the key Ukrainian Black Sea port of 
Odessa; the main rail link with Ukraine and Russia passes through 
Tiraspol; road bridges across the Dnestr destroyed in the early 1990s, are 
vital to the republic’s exports to the east and north-east (Ukraine and 
Russia in particular); oil and gas pipelines from Ukraine and Russia 
into Moldova likewise cross the narrow territory of the Transnistrian 
republic, and electricity generated in the left-bank region supplies the 
needs of the main territory. Hence, to the extent that the easterly orien¬ 
tation of Moldova’s trade remains, Transnistria occupies a vital position, 
which gives the authorities in Tiraspol a powerful lever that can be (and 
was, in 1992) used to exert pressure on Chisinau. In July 1999, Transnistria 
plunged Chisinau into a three-day blackout by cutting power from the 
Cuciurgan electrical power plant in a dispute over claims for payments. 
Internally, the small market has been fragmented, and barriers to trade 
between the two territories, including complex and time-consuming 
customs regulations, were quickly put in place, disrupting trading patterns 
and having an inhibiting effect on both sides of the Dnestr. Lack of 
investment in plant upkeep has forced both Moldova and Transnistria to 
rely more heavily than before on imported energy, and enormous unpaid 
debts to Russia (notably to Gazprom) have become a serious political 
issue between Russia and its trading partner. By February 1997, energy 
debt-arrears to Russia had reached $400 million, and a further $217 
million were owed to Ukraine. Moreover, the Transnistrian authorities 
have adopted a profligate attitude towards energy use, and run up debts 
as great as those for the rest of Moldova. In effect, whereas I was told by 
the minister of the economy of Transnistria in May 1998 that personal 
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taxation was lower than in the Republic of Moldova, the Tiraspol author¬ 
ities have been exploiting Gazprom’s indulgence in order to subsidize 
their citizens, possibly on an unspoken assumption that, if and when a 
constitutional settlement is reached, Chisinau will pick up the bill. (It 
should also be noted that arrears in payments to state workers and 
pensioners are at least as bad in Transnistria as elsewhere. One family in 
three in Transnistria was owed salary payments by the state in 1997.) How 
far this is tolerated by Gazprom and the Russian state authorities for 
political reasons is open to conjecture. What is certain is that nationalist 
(including communist) circles in Russia have been among the staunch 
supporters of Transnistria’s independence, with periodic visits to the 
territory by nationalist Russian politicians. Moreover, both the Republic 
of Moldova and the Transnistrian republic presented sixty-fifth birthday 
awards to the head of Gazprom, Ren Viakhirev, for his contribution to 
the solution to their respective energy problems.7 
The isolation of the eastern territory and the hostile political relation¬ 
ship between the two regions has further pernicious economic effects, 
in addition to the loss of the contribution to the national economy that 
Transnistria would otherwise be making, and the restriction of the 
domestic market caused by customs tariffs imposed at the Dnestr. By its 
refusal to treat Transnistria as a separate state, and consequently not 
recognising the Dnestr as an inter-state border, in effect Chisinau has 
no real control over its eastern frontier. Consequently, the boundary 
with Ukraine — and the port city of Odessa is but 150 kilometres away 
— is virtually an open border. This means that opportunities exist for 
smuggling, tax evasion and what is reckoned to be a vast amount of 
unrecorded foreign trade, principally imports, mainly of tobacco products 
and alcoholic beverages, lubricants and fuel. In addition, it is clear that 
criminal elements — petty and organized — exploit the situation. One 
report from Chisinau, of an interview between the news agency Infotag 
and the republic’s minister of the interior, Victor Catan, on 27 January 
1999, claimed that smuggling through and from Transnistria, involving 
identified legitimate firms in Tiraspol as well as criminal elements, had 
inflicted damage amounting to some 800 million lei in 1998 alone. In 
addition, weaponry regularly crossed the boundary, it was claimed, adding 
to the problem of criminality inside Moldova. 
Unrecorded — and therefore unregulated and untaxed — goods 
appear to flood into the country from Turkey or Bulgaria via Odessa and 
Transnistria, where customs officers are not immune from the temptations 
of bribery. The large open-air markets in Chisinau, carrying a vast range 
of products, from padlocks and toilet bowls to wedding dresses and men’s 
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suits, plus counterfeit CD-ROMs of pre-release computer programmes 
issued by Microsoft and other Western companies, bear witness to the 
scale of this operation. The authorities in Chisinau may tolerate it as a 
safety-valve, without which social and political unrest might arise. 
Nevertheless, it has a negative impact on the capacity of the state to exert 
its authority, and it contributes to a culture of non-compliance. 
Perhaps even more significant at this stage of the country’s transition 
to the market as a ‘small, open economy’, however, is the effect on foreign, 
direct investment. Caught between the threat of absorption by Romania, 
on the one hand, and a secessionist territory on the other, Moldova has 
been largely shunned as a location for investment or as a trading partner. 
The attempt to identify an ‘image’ for projection to the world market, and 
to find niche products to serve that market, is proving extraordinarily 
difficult. Consequently, imports have steadily outpaced exports, so that 
the foreign-trade deficit rose from US$54 million in 1994 and 55 million 
in the following year to 234 million in 1996, 384 million in 1997 and 390 
million in 1998. (The nominal GDP, against which these figures should be 
measured, was as follows: 1994 US$1,164 million; 1995 1,443 million; 1996 
1,665 million; 1997 1,933 million; 1998 1,630 million.) Clearly, such a devel¬ 
opment is not sustainable, and Moody’s, the New York-based business 
assessment firm, reported on 31 August 1999 that the country was 
close to defaulting on its foreign debt.8 A settlement of the Dnestr dispute 
and consequent re-integration of the resources of Transnistria would un¬ 
doubtedly enhance the prospects of developing a positive approach to 
international marketing of Moldova, as a source of agriculture-based and 
manufactured products, and as a location for profitable investment, partic¬ 
ularly in projecting itself to the West, where, at the time of writing, opinion 
increasingly sees the country’s future to lie. The need for this was demon¬ 
strated by the catastrophic effect of the financial and economic crisis in 
Russia in August 1998. 
The Russian Crisis of August 1998 and its Repercussions 
As noted above, Moldova was one of the most heavily integrated republics 
of the former Soviet Union, dependent almost entirely on other republics 
for inputs and for markets. The disruption of those economic ties and the 
imposition of bureaucratic and fiscal controls on inter-republic trade have 
left the country extremely exposed. The collapse of the Russian rouble 
has drawn the Moldovan leu in its wake. After several years of stability 
at about 4.5 lei to the dollar, by the end of 1998 it had fallen to 8.32 and 
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was projected to fall to 11.58 by the end of 1999, according to the Center 
for Strategic Research and Reform.9 In practice, as the authors of the 1999 
economic survey put it: 
The events of 1998 dissipated the illusions in the country. Both the government 
and the population understood that... monetary policy alone could not ensure 
a sound macroeconomic stability, while basic institutional and structural reforms 
were procrastinated, inconsistent, and sometimes even reversed.10 
Indeed, performance figures for the end of 1998 were appalling. Industrial 
output stood at only about 60 per cent of its level in the early 1990s. Some 
two-thirds of enterprises were operating to only 10-20 per cent of their 
capacity. Gross agricultural output was down by figures in the range of 16 
per cent (sugar beet) to 73 per cent (fruit and berries), with staples such 
as cereals and maize down by 29 per cent and 47 per cent respectively. 
Yields were down, tilled acreage was down, less than a quarter of the 
needed fertilizer was applied, the harvest campaign was delayed. Only 
vegetables, sunflowers and potatoes escaped this severe decline. As a 
result, the processing plants likewise were under-employed — down to 
a third or so of their capacity, and some even suspended their employees 
and ceased operation. In total, agricultural production stood at only 85 
per cent of its 1997 level, and the insolvency of the principal markets 
(Russia, Ukraine and Romania) led to huge losses to the state coffers. 
While privatization of land continued through the year — the number of 
landowners rose by 66,000 to almost 241,000 — the phase of consolidation, 
modernization and re-equipping is still to come, and there is a severe lack 
of capital for investment. The accumulated debts of agricultural enter¬ 
prises amount to over 2 billion lei, and two-thirds of enterprises have debts 
greater than their sales, in some cases surpassing ten times their annual 
turnover. It is quite pitiful seeing former sovkhoz buildings steadily falling 
into disrepair, while whole families tend the ‘privatized’ fields with manual 
implements. This is clearly a serious situation, but in present circum¬ 
stances it cannot be solved by subsidies or special loans, and barter cannot 
be a long-term solution. An effective agro-bank and foreign investment 
are both needed. 
Across the economy, the position is extremely serious. No other former 
Soviet republic has suffered such a steep decline in economic performance 
as Moldova, and the per capita income, at US$454 in 1998 (and projected 
to fall to $311 in 1999, although the prime minister gave a figure of $500 
in mid 1999) places the country below Albania as the poorest country in 
Europe.11 Some 80 per cent of the population have an income of less than 
US$2 a day, and the discrepancy between the wealthiest and the poorest 
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10 per cent was of a magnitude of 15.4 times (more than twice the 
sevenfold differential of 1993). The social, and perhaps, political, reper¬ 
cussions of these negative developments are potentially very serious 
indeed. As the April 1999 economic survey comments, in 1998, ‘the 
economic security of the Republic of Moldova was at stake’, a view that 
was echoed by Prime Minister Sturza, who stated on 30 June 1999 that 
‘the country’s economic security was in danger and speedy, far-reaching 
reforms are the only solution to that situation’.12 
Prospects 
Extricating itself from this situation is clearly going to be extremely 
difficult. As the position worsens, the temptation to cut corners and not 
comply with the law grows, exacerbating the situation that begins with the 
incapacity of the state to perform its necessary regulatory functions. This 
is compounded by the inability or unwillingness of politicians to adopt the 
legal measures necessary for advancing the pace of reform. There is a fear 
that a vicious circle will become embedded in society: corruption on the 
part of state officials, partly associated with organized crime, leads to 
economic decline as reforms are watered down and compliance is not 
exacted. The economic failure then leads to an insufficiency of state 
revenues, so that the state is unable to budget for the salaries of its 
officials, let alone any enhancement in their financial position, and they 
turn to corruption as the only means of survival. 
For these and other reasons, international lending agencies such as the 
World Bank and the IMF are insisting on continuing progress with reform 
as the price of further financial assistance, notably the privatization of 
state assets. After a period of suspension of activity in Moldova, the World 
Bank agreed in early 1999 to provide loans to the tune of US$183 million 
over the period mid-1999 to June 2001. This is to support the attainment 
of macro-economic sustainability, private-sector development and reform 
of the public sector. Flowever, payment of the full loan was to depend on 
the government maintaining the pace of reforms, otherwise the loan 
would be drastically reduced. The performance has not been encouraging. 
A key element in economic development must be escaping the 
excessive reliance on Russia, and that obviously has an implication for 
the country’s political independence as well. Between 1992 and 1998, the 
proportion of Moldova’s exports taken by Russia rose from 40 per cent 
to 61 per cent; and 80 per cent of energy resources (100 per cent of natural 
gas) comes from just two sources, Russia and Ukraine. Hence the 
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profound impact of Russia’s financial crisis. But reduction of the level of 
dependency on Russia depends on two factors: first, raising the quality of 
production, packaging and marketing to world standards (even in the well- 
known Moldovan wine industry, production is not effectively marketed 
and it is believed that some bulk production is exported to Bulgaria, where 
it is re-bottled and sold in Western Europe as Bulgarian wine), but that 
requires significant investment in plant and in training; and secondly, 
sourcing alternative supplies of basics such as energy, in which the country 
is extremely dependent. It is not without significance that, in addition 
to promoting Moldova’s cause in the European Union, presidential 
and governmental visits to the Baltic states, Kazakhstan and elsewhere 
(including Russia) during the summer of 1999 aimed at re-establishing 
trade links shattered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the break¬ 
up of the rouble zone. Over the longer term, an opening to the world via 
the River Danube offers possibilities: a border treaty between Moldova 
and Ukraine, signed on 18 August 1999, gave Ukraine control over a 
section of road running through Moldova, surrendering in return a 100- 
metre strip of land along the Danube, which presents an opening to the 
Black Sea. The projected establishment of an international port on the 
Danube at Giurgiule$ti, in a joint venture with Romania and Ukraine, is 
an obvious means of escaping the constraints of the country’s land-locked 
position. But that would take Moldova well into the twenty-first century, 
and would in all probability depend on wider international collaboration, 
perhaps involving the European Union. 
Equally important, and more pressingly urgent, is the need to identify, 
target and penetrate alternative markets and products in which Moldova 
enjoys natural advantages. Obviously, the country has been isolated 
throughout its history until the 1990s. Its contacts with the outside world 
are few, its understanding of how the rest of the world’s markets function 
limited. Here, Western inputs of capital and, perhaps above all, expertise 
may be crucial. Austrailian-Moldovan joint ventures in the wine industry 
have had some success in creating wines acceptable to the Western palate; 
the tobacco-growing farms of the southern districts have attracted some 
attention from Western firms. But a strategy of promoting the image of a 
‘small, open economy’ needs to contain many elements designed to attract 
foreign interest. ‘Moldova’ is largely unknown, and the negative features 
of the propinquity of Romania and the Transnistrian problem quickly 
impinge. Quite simply, there is no positive image for exploitation, and the 
marketing of Moldovan wine under the ‘Kirkwood’ brand name fails to 
establish a strong image of something specifically ‘Moldovan’. For the 
moment, the republic can produce apple and tomato juice in bulk for 
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export, but it enjoys no particular identity as a ‘Moldovan’ product. It may 
well be necessary^ to go all out to attract and employ external marketing 
and brand-imaging expertise in order to penetrate the European and 
other non-CIS markets, and to adopt favourable tax regimes for export- 
orientated investors. 
Clearly, the country cannot live forever on loans from international 
banking and credit organizations; neither can it live forever with a steadily 
deteriorating balance of payments. The Center for Strategic Studies and 
Reform regularly prepares optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. In its 
April 1999 survey, the optimistic scenario had a GDP decline of 8.6 per 
cent in 1998 followed by a further decline of 2.5 per cent in 1999, followed 
by growth in the following years to 2002, while accompanied by further 
erosion of the value of the currency to the level of 14.5 to the dollar. The 
pessimistic scenario posits a decline of 5 per cent in 1999 and a further 
decline of 1.5 per cent in the following year, followed by slow recovery, 
and accompanied by a rapid fall in the value of the leu to 100 to the dollar 
by the end of 2002 . By the end of October 1999, the leu had fallen below 
11 to the US dollar, and it was reported that commercial banks in Chisinau 
had no dollars available for sale; the government was budgeting for a rate 
of 12.3 lei to the dollar in the year 2000.13 There were other signs of deteri¬ 
oration during 1999. In the first nine months of the year, external trade 
turnover stood at only $704.9 million, less than half compared with the 
same period in 1998. Exports stood at $314.4 million and imports at $390.5 
million.14 
The outlook is hardly encouraging for ordinary people, for whom 
everyday life has become extremely hard, and various manifestations of 
social dislocation are already evident. Crime was up by 11.4 per cent in 
early 1999 after a decline during 1998; the birth-rate has fallen; emigration 
has risen; life expectancy has declined from 68.1 years in 1959 to 65.8 years 
in 1995 (5-10 years lower than in much of Europe); and, as elsewhere, 
women have been hit particularly severely by unemployment and by the 
general hardship of everyday living. 
Furthermore, constitutional questions over presidential rule following 
an inconclusive referendum held in May 1999, combined with failure to 
pass privatization legislation because of blocking tactics by the communist 
party in this and other matters, raised the continuing threat of political 
instability. The sacking of the deputy chairman of parliament on 9 July, 
followed in rapid succession by the resignation of the prosecutor-general 
and demands for the resignation of the parliamentary chairman were all 
part of a crisis in which president and parliament were locking horns over 
the president’s constitutional ambitions.15 These and other factors led to 
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the suspension or postponement of an expected $35 million loan from the 
International Monetary Fund in late October 1999.16 
Quite apart from political stability, what is required is a complete 
change in the economic culture, from one in which the state takes the 
initiative in determining all aspects of economic development, to one in 
which individuals and organizations, state and private, at all levels, 
examine their advantages and opportunities, and study the local and inter¬ 
national market with a view to identifying niches that Moldova is 
particularly suited to filling. Switching to high-value crops such as soya, 
for which there is a clear export market, is one current example. 
Despite the gloom, however, some optimism was expressed following 
the formation of a new government in March 1999 (in somewhat contro¬ 
versial circumstances as the government was accepted by parliament on 
the basis of a crucial vote smuggled out of prison in Tiraspol by a member 
of parliament who had been imprisoned by the Transnistrian authorities 
since 1992). Unlike his predecessor, the former Gosplan apparatchik 
Ion Ciubuc, Prime Minister Ion Sturza, who took office in March 1999, 
had a degree in economics and considerable experience in business and 
banking. Born in 1960, he came from a younger generation of entre¬ 
preneurial politicians, and following the appointment of the government 
the World Bank swiftly came in with support. The situation was so drastic, 
and the pressure from the World Bank so patent, that moves to press 
ahead with reform seemed likely to follow. A possible move to a presi¬ 
dential system of rule after a referendum on the issue on Sunday, 23 May 
1999, might have had the effect of enhancing the pace. However, the vote 
did not attain the required level, leading to a drawn-out legal challenge 
and providing opportunities for political machinations; and in any case, 
given his past career in the Komsomol and the communist party, many 
inside and outside the country doubted President Lucinschi’s reformist 
credentials.17 
In identifying eventual membership of the EU as the Sturza 
government’s top foreign-policy priority, however, a strong signal was 
being sent both to the Moldovan population and to the West concerning 
the future direction of reform (with perhaps more than an unexpressed 
hint that the pace, too, would be accelerated). 
Nevertheless, whether it takes 15,25 or 35 years to attain membership, 
long before that Moldova is likely to be brought within the orbit of the 
European Union, particularly if, as expected, Romania joins in the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. Already ambitious plans are being 
discussed for heavy investment in infrastructure in Eastern Europe, 
including both east-west and north-south developments that could be of 
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immense benefit to Moldova. Over the longer term, therefore, there may 
be grounds for optimism. For many Moldovan citizens today, however, 
surviving the next two or three years is the height of their ambition. 
Notes 
1 lam not an economist but a political scientist, so my remarks on the Moldovan 
economy may not be couched in the kind of terms a professional economist 
might use. I have accumulated information, however, on the development and 
performance of the Moldovan economy before and since the establishment of 
the independent republic, and I acknowledge the assistance of my friend 
Anatol Gudim, at present Director of the Center for Strategic Studies and 
Reforms (CISR), Chisinau, in supplying me with various reports and surveys 
produced by the Center in the past two or three years. 
2 This is a more accurate version of the official name Republica Moldoveneasca 
Nistreana: ‘Transnistria’ — not only reflects the view from Chisinau — viewed 
from there Tiraspol is indeed across the Dnestr; from the left bank, 
‘Bessarabia’ is ‘across the Dnestr’ — but ignores the fact that the city of 
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■ 
Transnistria since 1990 
as seen from Chisinau 
Natalia Gherman 
The dramatic events which took place in the Republic of Moldova in the 
immediate aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, continue to 
be crucial for determining the future of the Republic of Moldova as a 
sovereign state. The evolution of the conflict in the eastern region of the 
Republic of Moldova (Transnistria), is yet another example of a long-term 
Soviet strategy which aims at perpetuating Moscow’s influence in the 
former Soviet republics under all circumstances. An overall assessment of 
the situation in Transnistria since 1990 is beyond the limits of this article. 
For the purposes of our analysis, therefore, we will focus on three major 
issues: the security situation in the region; the political settlement of the 
Transnistrian conflict, and human rights issues. 
The events of the 1990s cannot be properly analysed without referring 
to the strategies of the Soviet Union in the region in the earlier part 
of the twentieth century. In the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MASSR), founded on the left bank of the River Dnestr 
opposite the Romanian province of Bessarabia in 1924, the efforts of 
Soviet ideologues were directed towards cultivating a spirit of Tomano- 
phobia’ among the population. Following the creation of the Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) during the Second World War, these 
ideological efforts were supplemented by a policy designed to change the 
ethnic composition of the republic. The period of forced deportations of 
the Moldovan population from 1940 to 1949 was one of the most tragic 
events in the history of the republic. Subsequently, economic incentives 
were used to encourage emigration to the eastern zones of the Soviet 
Union. At the same time, the influx of people from Russia and Ukraine 
into Moldova was encouraged. The eastern part of Moldova on the left 
bank of the Dnestr — Transnistria — was always more industrialized than 
the rest of the country, which was yet another Soviet mechanism for 
making a potential territorial division easier. Those coming from Russia 
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and Ukraine settled in the more industrialized eastern regions, where they 
could more easily find employment. The statistical data for 1988, for 
example, speaks for itself: some 34,500 people left the MSSR for Russia, 
while 33,900 people from Russia entered the MSSR; some 20,900 people 
left the MSSR for Ukraine, while 20,800 Ukrainians arrived in the MSSR.1 
Amongst those entering the republic from Russia was the present 
leader of the separatist Transnistrian regime, Igor Smirnov, who was 
initially sent to head an enterprise in the town of Bender (Rom. Tighina) 
in 1987. 
Another important feature of the Soviet era, was the excessive milita¬ 
rization of the eastern region of the country. On having completed their 
tour of duty in the military units on the left bank of the Dnestr river, the 
officer corps of the Soviet army traditionally settled in Tiraspol and 
Bender, forming a reserve formation of the army. Consequently, while the 
autochthonous population in the whole of the MSSR was as high as 
65 per cent in 1989, in Transnistria it constituted only 40 per cent of all 
inhabitants.2 Moreover, the majority of the native population on the left 
bank of the river was dispersed in the rural areas, making their eventual 
political consolidation a far more difficult task. 
The Russian-speaking population of the industrialized cities in Trans¬ 
nistria proved to be exceptionally well organized for a major resistance to 
the efforts of Chisinau to transform the MSSR into a sovereign state. The 
introduction of the law on the functioning of languages on the territory of 
the republic and the law converting the official language of the country 
to the Latin script, provoked protests which had clearly been well 
prepared. Igor Smirnov was there to head the resistance, while the so- 
called OSTK (‘Joint Council of Workers’ Unions’) was ready to carry out 
any command of the new leaders. Later on this political organization 
proved to be the most reactionary force, eliminating any pluralism of 
opinion in Transnistria. 
The available sources of the period clearly demonstrate that the events 
which took place after 1989 were directed by Moscow. In a desperate 
attempt to prevent the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a group of deputies 
called Soiuz (‘Union’) of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, lead by 
Anatolii Lukianov (one of the main organizers of the 1991 Soviet putsch), 
instigated separatist movements in the potential break-away republics.3 
Indeed, years of thorough preparation yielded the expected result. 
Moldova, striving for political independence and the democratization of 
her society, was confronted with a separatist movement which aimed 
at the creation of another state within her boundaries. The presence of 
the Fourteenth Soviet Army in Transnistria and the support of the author- 
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ities in Moscow for the separatists, indicated that the chances of rapid 
success for the Moldovan government in a political confrontation would 
be unlikely. 
The Security Situation in the Region 
Open confrontation came in 1990 when a group of 64 deputies from 
Transnistria, elected at a general Moldovan election for the Supreme 
Soviet, declared the formation of the ‘Transnistrian people’s congress’ and 
proclaimed the creation of ..] the Soviet Socialist Dnestr Republic 
as part of the Soviet Union’.4 This anti-constitutional act was the begin¬ 
ning of a campaign aimed at the destruction of the state structures on 
the left bank of the Dnestr and the subsequent violent creation of new, 
self-styled ones. Since that time, massive and systematic violations 
of fundamental human rights have taken place in the eastern regions of 
Moldova. The first armed confrontation took place in the regional centre 
of Dubasari (Dubossary) in November 1990. An attempt by the Chisinau 
authorities to liberate the offices of the regional attorney and the police 
encountered armed resistance organized by the separatists, resulting in 
the loss of human fife. Thereafter, the process of ‘state formation’ on the 
left bank of the Dnestr was pursued with an ever-growing speed. The 
Soviet putsch in August 1991 had a catalytic effect on the situation. 
The Supreme Soviet, based at Tiraspol, rapidly adopted laws to establish 
a ‘republican guard’, as well as militia formations and a supreme court. 
The support of the Fourteenth Army was crucial for the consolidation 
of the separatist regime. As early as 3 September 1991, Mircea Snegur, 
president of the Republic of Moldova, issued a decree urging the with¬ 
drawal of the military formations of the Soviet army from the territory of 
the Republic of Moldova. Appealing to the officer corps to ignore 
Snegur’s decree, the separatist leaders encouraged the Russian officers to 
take part in the creation of ‘national guards’ and to place the units of the 
Fourteenth Army under the authority of the Tiraspol regime. Examples 
of direct involvement by the Fourteenth Army in the Transnistrian 
conflict have been reported by the media and political analysts around the 
world. Referring to the 1992 armed conflict in Transnistria, Mark Smith, 
for example, reported that, ‘the Fourteenth Army has supported, armed, 
and fought alongside the armed militias of the Dnestr republic .. .’.5 
Meanwhile, Mihai Gribincea, one of Moldova’s most prominent contem¬ 
porary historians, has provided evidence of a number of cases of Russian 
complicity in the establishment of a rival, separatist republic on the 
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eastern bank of the Dnestr river. The most revealing confirmations are, 
of course, those provided by the Russian officials themselves, such as 
Sergei Stankevich, former adviser to President Yeltsin, and Mikhail 
Kolesnikov, Deputy Head of the Russian General Staff, and one of the 
protagonists — General Lebed. Even after President Yeltsin had issued 
a decree proclaiming the transfer of the Fourteenth Army to the juris¬ 
diction of the Russian Federation (April 1992), the army continued its 
involvement in the events in Dubasari and Bender in 1992. The situation 
was aggravated by the presence of the large number of Cossack mercen¬ 
aries who, ‘... were fighting for mother-Russia on the Dnestr river banks, 
hundreds of kilometres from the Russian frontiers’. In fact, Gribincea 
argues that the Russian army continues to provide material, political 
and ideological support to separatists in the Republic of Moldova.6 
The armed conflict ceased on 21 July 1992 when the presidents of the 
Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation signed the ‘Agreement 
on the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the 
Transnistrian Region of the Republic of Moldova’, (hereafter, ‘the 1992 
Agreement’). 
The problem of the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army, subsequently 
re-named as the ‘Operational Group of Russian Forces Temporarily 
Located On the Territory of the Republic of Moldova’ (OGRF), remains 
crucial for ensuring stability not only in Moldova but in the region as a 
whole. In 1992, the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation 
began negotiations for the withdrawal of the army, resulting in the 
bilateral withdrawal agreement, signed by both sides on 21 October 1994. 
The agreement, which envisaged the complete withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Moldova over a period of three years, has not been ratified 
by the Russian parliament at the time of writing, and has little chance of 
being put into force by any composition of the Russian legislative body. 
The reduction of OGRF personnel, subsequently announced by the 
Russian side, was part of an overall reduction process taking place in the 
Russian armed services and was not connected with the bilateral 
withdrawal agreement. 
The Moldovan-Russian agreement, however, is by no means the only 
framework for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Moldova. The 
withdrawal can be fulfilled in accordance with the Moldovan constitution, 
since article 11 proclaims the neutrality of the state and the prohibition of 
stationing foreign troops on Moldovan territory. Furthermore, a number 
of international agreements, adopted by the Russian Federation itself, 
provide an excellent framework for the army’s withdrawal. Among these 
agreements are the decisions of the 1994 Budapest and 1996 Lisbon 
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summits of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), as well as numerous decisions of the OSCE Ministerial Councils 
and the resolutions of the Council of Europe. All these documents 
stipulate the necessity for an early, orderly and complete withdrawal 
of Russian troops from Moldova. The provisions of the adapted 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (the CFE Treaty), provide another 
opportunity for the Russian Federation to honour its commitments to 
withdrawal of its troops from Moldova. The withdrawal of the five types 
of conventional armaments under the provisions of the CFE Treaty 
(‘Treaty Limited Equipment’ or TLE) would constitute a promising start 
to the withdrawal process. Closely related is the issue of the ‘Unaccounted 
for Treaty Limited Equipment’ (UTLE). These are the conventional 
armaments which were transferred by the Russian army to the separatist 
paramilitary formations. It is to be stressed that the resumption of control 
over these armaments by the Russian Federation and their subsequent 
withdrawal into Russian territory should be of concern to all states which 
are party to the CFE Treaty. The so-called ‘armed forces of the Dnestr 
Moldovan Republic’ represent a major threat to the security and stability 
of the entire region. They consist of regular formations, Cossack units, 
popular militia and border guards. Current mobilization estimates of 
regular and reserve formations in Transnistria who could be called upon 
in the event of hostilities are as high as 15,000 men.7 
A major outcome of the 1992 agreement was the creation of a security 
zone between the right and the left bank of the Dnestr river and the subse¬ 
quent introduction of peace-keepers from Moldova, Transnistria and 
Russia. The administration of the security zone is regularly discussed in 
the framework of the joint control commission composed of the repre¬ 
sentatives of the three sides. Regrettably, the obstructionist position taken 
by the Transnistrians for several years, has prevented any progress in 
reducing military tension in the security zone. Indeed, one of the most 
flagrant violations of the security zone administration is the production of 
different types of armaments within the zone by the Tiraspol regime.8 
Evidence already exists that armaments are being smuggled to other 
European conflict zones, and the geographic location of the production 
sites in Transnistria threatens the stability of the Balkans.9 
The Political Settlement of the Transnistrian Conflict 
The negotiations for a statute of autonomy for the eastern regions of the 
Republic of Moldova started in 1994. Despite having signed more than 
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forty documents aimed at providing a basis for a future statute, the res¬ 
pective sides are no closer to any successful outcome at the time of writing. 
The intransigence of the Transnistrian negotiators has been internationally 
recognized. The very fact that Moldova has applied for assistance in medi¬ 
ating the negotiations with Russia, Ukraine and the breakaway republic to 
the OSCE (which is represented in Moldova by its permanent mission), 
speaks for itself. Numerous drafts elaborated by Moldovan experts and 
alternative projects proposed by the mediators themselves, were not 
acceptable to the Transnistrian side. The ‘Memorandum on the Principles 
of Normalization of the Relations between the Republic of Moldova 
and Transnistria’, together with the joint statement of the mediators, 
signed on 8 May 1997 in Moscow, represent two of the most important 
documents. The notion of a ‘common state’, introduced into the memo¬ 
randum by the Russian representatives, however, has proved to be a 
matter of contention between the two sides. Moldova considers that a 
common state within its frontiers as of 1 January 1990 already exists, 
the task being now to negotiate the degree of authority for the eastern 
region within the boundaries of this state. In contrast, Transnistria inter¬ 
prets this provision as a need to create such a common state, which will be 
composed of two independent entities — the Republic of Moldova and the 
‘Dnestr Moldovan Republic’. This crucial difference of interpretation 
does not permit any immediate progress towards a political settlement of 
the conflict. 
Human Rights in Transnistria 
Although there is no possibility for this region to be recognized as a 
subject of international law, the inhabitants of the area are forced to 
accept citizenship of the self-proclaimed republic. The population is, 
therefore, denied the right to participate in Moldovan general elections. 
The personal security of people is under constant threat from the 
region’s totalitarian regime. Arrests for political motives, together with 
detention of business people in order to extort money for the maintenance 
of ‘state’ structures, are common. The Ila$cu group, for instance, have 
been detained since 1992. In spite of the appeals of various international 
bodies and human rights organizations, the Tiraspol regime refuses to 
release these political prisoners. 
There is no basic educational freedom in Transnistria. The so-called 
‘educational law of 1992’ prohibits the use of the Latin script for the 
purposes of studying and using the Romanian (Moldovan) language. 
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Consequently, some 35,000 school children have no possibility to pursue 
a curriculum compatible with those in the rest of Moldova and are obliged 
to use Cyrillic script for studying their native language.10 
Conclusion 
The conflict in Transnistria is the result of the policies the Soviet regime 
has been implementing in its former republics, which have served to 
undermine the aspirations for independence of the peoples in those areas. 
The analysis of the present security situation, the attempts at a political 
settlement of the conflict and the situation regarding human rights in 
Transnistria, reveal the current tendency for the conflict to become frozen 
as a result of outside forces. 
The continuing presence of foreign troops on Moldovan soil, together 
with the threat emanating from the fully equipped paramilitary separatist 
forces, are factors which challenge the fragile security balance of a 
sovereign state. In spite of Moldova’s efforts to find solutions to these 
problems within the framework of universally recognized norms and the 
principles of international law, the search for a political settlement aimed 
at the creation of an autonomous status for Moldova’s eastern region, has 
not yet yielded the expected results. Human rights violations in the region 
are a matter of concern not only to the Republic of Moldova but to 
numerous human rights monitors across the world. 
Moldova’s own capacity for dealing with these complicated issues is 
limited. The diversified nature of the conflict, its destabilizing effect for 
the security of Europe as a whole, should make it a matter of concern to 
the international community. The political, economic and humanitarian 
support of the international community will be decisive in achieving a 
successful settlement of the conflict. 
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Security Concerns in Post-Soviet Moldova: 
The Roots of Instability 
Trevor R. W. Waters 
Introduction 
Conflict in Moldova quickened with the nationalist ferment over matters 
of language, culture and identity which consumed the Soviet republic in 
1989 and surfaced with the secession of Gagauzia and Transnistria in 1990. 
Civil war, continuing difficulties with territorial separatism, ethno- 
linguistic strife, Romanian irredentism and Great-Russian chauvinism 
number among the most important security concerns that have plagued 
the Republic of Moldova since its declaration of independence on 
27 August 1991. This article examines some of the background factors 
which generated such problems (some of which may appear to have a char¬ 
acteristic borderland nature, and may, indeed, be typical of borderland 
states), and reviews the progress that has been made towards their 
solution. 
History and Geography 
The territory of the Republic of Moldova is not coextensive with the 
historic Moldovan lands which are fragmented at the present time. The 
1940 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact allowed the Soviet Union to annex the 
eastern half of the Romanian province of Moldova and the annexation 
was confirmed in the 1947 Peace Treaty between the USSR and Romania. 
It is worth recalling, however, that Bessarabia (the Russian designation 
for the territory between the Dnestr and the Prut, derived from an 
erstwhile Wallachian ruling house of Basarab) was Russian from its liber¬ 
ation from the Turks in 1812 until 1917, when it proclaimed its 
independence from Russia as the Democratic Republic of Moldova, and 
joined Romania in 1918. 
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In accordance with Stalin’s ‘divide and rule’ nationalities policy, two of 
the three regions of the annexed territory, northern Bukovina in the north 
and southern Bessarabia in the south, were transferred to Ukraine (and 
now form Chernovtsy oblast and the southern part of Odessa oblast 
respectively). A strip of land along the eastern (or left) bank of the Dnestr 
(Transnistria) was detached from Ukraine, however, and added to the 
central region of the annexed territory to become (in 1940) the Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic and (in 1991) the sovereign Republic of 
Moldova. 
In 1990, the Popular Front of Moldova made strident calls for the 
reintegration of the ‘historic Moldovan lands’ of northern Bukovina and 
southern Bessarabia, while Ukraine flatly rejected what it regarded as 
irredentist pretensions. In November 1994, however, Moldova and 
Ukraine signed an agreement which stipulated that the two sides have no 
territorial claims on each other. That strip of territory along the eastern 
bank of the Dnestr, however, which constitutes 15 per cent of Moldova’s 
territory and provides the focus for the continuing confrontation, has 
never been considered part of the traditional Moldovan lands, although 
it has always contained a sizeable Moldovan population. Prior to the 
revolution in 1917 that left-bank Dnestr border territory formed part of 
the tsarist empire and, in 1924, became the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic. In Transnistria, then, unlike in western Moldova, 
sovietization, and with it russification, including the use of the Cyrillic 
alphabet, was enforced for more than seventy years. Indeed, since the 
region formed a border area until the Second World War, and was thus 
ideologically vulnerable because of ethno-iinguistic ties with Romania 
across the Dnestr, sovietization was enforced with especial vigilance and 
vigour. When the Romanian army — an ally of Nazi Germany — 
advanced into the Soviet Union during the Second World War it was 
wholly determined to destroy communism in Transnistria. Excess of zeal 
in pursing this aim resulted in brutality and atrocities which linger in the 
Transnistrian folk memory, reinforcing fear and suspicion of Romania to 
this day. 
Post-war economic policy sought to develop western Moldova as an 
agricultural area, while industrialization — often of a defence-related 
nature — was concentrated mainly in Transnistria which is said to contain 
some 37 per cent of the country’s economic potential. Moldovan agricul¬ 
tural development had not, of course, been subject to the Soviet 
collectivization disasters of the 1920s and 1930s, and the local peasantry 
on the west bank adapted well to the relatively painless collectivization of 
the post-war period. As was the case throughout the Soviet Union, the 
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peasants were allowed to engage in small-scale private enterprise farming. 
A successful, entrepreneurial peasant farming outlook and mentality 
survived better than elsewhere in Soviet territory and forms an important 
element in the mindset of the population in western Moldova (by which 
is meant that part of the Republic of Moldova lying west of the River 
Dnestr) today. Agriculture in Soviet Moldova was, on the whole, efficient, 
productive and successful — in sharp contrast to most other parts of the 
Union — and some of the best talent took up agricultural management 
as a career. 
Urbanized and heavily industrialized, Transnistria consists of 5 rayony 
(or districts) and the city of Tiraspol. It has a mixed population of 40.1 
per cent Moldovans (the largest single ethnic group), 28.3 per cent 
Ukrainians and 25.5 per cent Russians, according to the last USSR census 
in 1989. Until the 1960s Moldovans made up the absolute majority on the 
left bank, but their proportion declined as a result of centrally promoted 
immigration, particularly from the RSFSR, into the cities to man the 
factories. This population flow has increased in recent years, and many of 
today’s left-bank inhabitants emigrated from remote areas of Russia 
during the 1980s, including ‘President’ Igor Smirnov of the self-styled, 
breakaway ‘Dnestr Moldovan Republic’ (hereafter, DMR), who came 
from Siberia in 1985. Opposite the city of Tiraspol, where the Russians 
are concentrated and form a majority of the population, on the right 
bank of the Dnestr is the town of Tighina (Bender), an important junc¬ 
tion, finked by rail and road bridges. Bender, too, was industrialized 
and populated by Russian workers following the Second World War, 
and became an enclave of the left-bank located on the right bank of 
the river. 
Language and National Identity 
Under Gorbachev demokatizatsiya had led to demands outside RSFSR 
for de-russification and thus to strengthening the official role and status 
of the titular republican language. This manifestly challenged the privi¬ 
leged position of local Russians and russophones in those republics (who 
were often regarded anyway as occupiers, colonizers, or tools of Moscow). 
There was a backlash among russophones, especially where jobs were 
threatened. The ensuing conflict was exploited both by republican nation¬ 
alists and by communist opponents of reform, thus politicizing the 
language issue. When republics became independent, enshrining the 
titular language as the official language was closely bound up with the idea 
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of establishing and maintaining full independence. By this time, however, 
Russian and russophone minorities had become identified with opposition 
to democracy and independence. Finding themselves treated as second- 
class (and probably disloyal) citizens, they turned to Moscow for help. 
This only served to confirm the suspicion and mistrust of the newly 
independent states. Issues of language and national identity fuelled the 
series of conflicts which led to the break-up of the USSR. 
On 31 August 1989, in a highly charged atmosphere of rallies, strikes 
and demonstrations, Moldova became the first Soviet republic to pass a 
law that declared the language of the titular nation to be the official 
language of the republic. The language law also formally proclaimed the 
common identity of Moldovan and Romanian, and restored the Latin 
alphabet. (Following their annexation of Moldova in 1940, the Soviets 
insisted that Moldovan, written in Cyrillic script, was a different language 
from Romanian in order to promote the idea that Moldovans and 
Romanians are separate nations.) So important was the adoption of the 
language law within the context of the flowering of a non-Soviet, 
Moldovan national identity, that 31 August, Language Day, was subse¬ 
quently declared a national holiday. 31 August Street is today one of the 
main thoroughfares in Chisinau, the Moldovan capital. 
Despite the fact that the law provided for Russian to be the language 
of inter-ethnic communication, 100,000 ethnic Russians went on strike in 
support of retaining only Russian as the official language. The language 
reform was also unpopular with the Ukrainians and Gagauz, who now had 
to study a third language, Moldovan/Romanian. Indeed, language was the 
trigger for secession in Transnistria and Gagauzia. The issue of what to 
call the language (glottonym) was hotly debated prior to the adoption 
of Moldova’s new, post-Soviet constitution (1994), which defines the 
state language as ‘Moldovan’, rather than ‘Moldovan (Romanian)’ or 
‘Moldovan which is identical to Romanian’, the other options considered. 
In March and April 1995, thousands of students took to the streets 
chanting ‘Romanian is the official language’. 
The Strategic Significance of Moldova 
A distinction may be drawn between Moldova’s global strategic signifi¬ 
cance and its regional strategic significance. During the Cold War the 
territory of Moldova — in peacetime — formed part of the Soviet Union’s 
Odessa military district. In the event of war it would have been mobilized 
to provide support for a strategic offensive operation in the south-western 
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theatre of military operations against the Balkans, Greece and Turkey, 
with the Suez canal and the North African coast as its second strategic 
objective. The headquarters for this strategic axis was located in Chisinau 
(Kishinev). With the end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism, 
and the demise of the Soviet Union, Moldova has lost its global strategic 
significance. It is interesting to note, however, that General Lebed, the 
commander-in-chief of Russian forces in the Dnestr Moldovan Republic 
(DMR) between 1992 and 1995, has described the Dnestr area as ‘the key 
to the Balkans’, observing that ‘if Russia withdraws from this little piece 
of land, it will lose that key and its influence in the region’.1 
National Defence and Civil War 
Following the June 1990 declaration on state sovereignty, on 27 August 
1991 the Republic of Moldova proclaimed independence and, by Sep¬ 
tember, President Mircea Snegur had already signed the decree that was 
to lead to the establishment of national armed forces. In addition to the 
national army which is charged with ensuring the military security of 
the Republic, there are also the frontier troops of the ministry of national 
security and the interior ministry’s lightly armed carabinieri forces for 
the maintenance of public order. 1992 witnessed the establishment of the 
ministry of defence, the appointment of the first Moldovan defence 
minister, and the passing of defence legislation. 
Unhappily, the same year also saw the outbreak of a full-scale, local 
civil war with Transnistrian separatists strongly supported by elements of 
Russia’s highly politicized Fourteenth Army. Whether under the Soviet, 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or Russian flag, throughout 
1990 to 1991 and subsequently, the Fourteenth Army covertly provided 
the Transnistrian separatists with weapons, training facilities, manpower, 
finance, moral and administrative support; occasionally such transfers 
included whole sub-units from the Fourteenth Army. This provided a 
traumatic baptism of fire for the nascent armed forces of the republic: 
some 500 people were killed, many more wounded, while refugees 
perhaps numbered 100,000, although exact figures remain unclear.2 
Since late July 1992 the Moldovan army has been deployed on peace¬ 
keeping duties — highly significantly — on the territory of the republic 
itself. Flaving failed to secure any UN (or indeed any CIS) involvement 
in a peacekeeping role, President Snegur was finally constrained by 
Moscow to accept what was essentially a Russian peacekeeping force. 
The Yeltsin-Snegur agreement on 21 July 1992 provided for a cease-fire, 
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the creation of a security zone on both sides of the Dnestr river and the 
deployment of a joint Russian/Moldovan/DMR peacekeeping force under 
the day-to-day supervision of a trilateral Joint Control Commission.3 
Originally the peacekeeping forces comprised six Russian battalions 
(3,600 men), 3 Moldovan battalions (1,200 men), and 3 DMR battalions 
(1,200 men). As early as September 1992, Moldova publicly challenged 
the impartiality of the Russian peacekeepers, charging them with allowing 
the DMR separatists to maintain men and material in the security zone. 
The DMR, for its part, was able to continue to create and consolidate the 
structures of an independent ‘state’ (government departments, armed 
forces, border guards, banking system, etc) under the protection of the 
peacekeepers. 
Politics and Ideology 
The confrontation on the Dnestr is essentially a political struggle. In 
Moldovan eyes, the political and ideological forces that underpinned the 
abortive coup of August 1991, viz. hard-line communism, Russian nation¬ 
alism, the military-industrial complex, and the determination to preserve 
the Union state, have retained a power base in the heavily militarized 
region and russified industrial centres on the left bank. Troops of what 
has now become the Operational Group of Russian Forces in the Dnestr 
region of the Republic of Moldova (OGRF), commanded by Russian 
officers with a political axe to grind, so the Moldovans say, furthered and 
continue to further the cause of local Russian, or other non-indigenous 
factions, in a former Soviet republic against the properly constituted state 
authorities of the newly-independent host country. In short, the Russian 
military actively supported an armed insurgency whose aim was to 
establish on the territory of an internationally recognized sovereign state 
a Soviet-style outpost, the so-called DMR, in a post-Soviet world. 
The highly sovietized population of Transnistria, reinforced by a 
Russian industrialized workforce, suspicious of the free-market mentality 
of the peasantry living on the right bank of the Dnestr, alarmed by the 
restoration of the Latin alphabet, and by the declaration that Moldovan 
(i.e. Romanian) was to be the official language of the Republic together 
with Russian, by the adoption of a version of the Romanian tricolour as 
the Moldovan flag, and fearful of the possibility of unification of the new 
state with Romania, naturally enough, saw matters very differently. 
On 2 September 1990 Transnistria declared its secession from Moldova 
and the Transnistrians enthusiastically hailed the attempted coup in 
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Russia in August 1991 while, from the very beginning, western Moldova 
resolutely defied the putsch, vigorously supported RSFSR President 
Yeltsin’s democratic stand, and resisted peacefully, yet successfully, 
military attempts to impose the junta’s state of emergency. 
The DMR has subsequently played host to numerous representatives 
of Russia’s red-brown (communist-nationalist) ideological forces, includ¬ 
ing hundreds of Cossack mercenaries determined to ‘defend their blood 
brothers’ and to ‘hold the frontier of the Russian state’, together with a 
string of virulently nationalistic demagogues like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, 
Sergei Baburin, Albert Makashov and Viktor Alksnis, the last of whom 
described the DMR as the base from which the Soviet Union’s restoration 
would begin.4 Makashov was one of the principal leaders of the Moscow 
October 1993 insurgency (in which Baburin and Alksnis were also impli¬ 
cated), while Zhirinovsky (leader of the misnamed Russian Liberal 
Democratic Party which has secured an alarmingly high percentage of the 
vote in Russian elections) has spoken of transforming Moldova into a 
Russian guberniya, or province. Sovetskaya Rossiya has described the 
DMR as ‘an island of Soviet power’ and ‘a frontier of Russia’.5 
The Ethnic Factor 
The total population of Moldova is 4,367,000 of whom 754,000 live in the 
capital city, Chisinau. The largest ethnic group, the Moldovans 
themselves, number 2,800,000 (or 65 per cent of the total population). 
Of the three other major ethnic groups, the 600,000 Ukrainians (14 per 
cent) come second with 560,000 Russians (13 per cent) in third place, 
followed by the 153,000 Gagauz (who constitute 3.5 per cent of the 
population but who are concentrated in the southern corner of Moldova, 
along the border with Ukraine). Bulgarians account for 2 per cent of the 
total population. 70 per cent of Moldova’s Russians live in western 
Moldova, 30 per cent in the DMR. The ethnic mix in the DMR consists 
of 40.1 per cent Moldovans, 28.3 per cent Ukrainians, 25.5 per cent 
Russians and various other minor national groups. 
The Gagauz are Turkic speaking Orthodox Christians whose ancestors 
fled Ottoman rule in north-east Bulgaria during and after the Russo- 
Turkish war of 1806 to 1812. There have never, therefore, been any 
grounds for religious tension between them and the indigenous 
population. Most of the refugees settled in Bessarabia, which became 
Russian territory in 1812. Some 140,000 of Moldova’s 153,000 Gagauz are 
concentrated in south-western Moldova. 
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The DMR Russians, it must be emphasized, form but a minority in 
what they regard as their ‘little piece of Russia’. Indeed, numerically 
speaking, they constitute a minority within a minority, for they represent 
only 30 per cent of Moldova’s total Russian population and only 25 per 
cent of the total population of the left bank. However, given their strong- 
arm military backing and the de facto partition of Moldova, some 170,000 
DMR Russians continue to be in a position to constrain severely the social 
and political choices of the Transnistrian Moldovan and Ukrainian 
majority ethnic groups whom they have now effectively isolated from the 
Moldovan heartland and from the political process in Chi^inSu. 
The DMR Russians have never lost an opportunity to play the ethnic 
card for all that it is worth. Presenting themselves as an unfortun¬ 
ate minority whose human rights were being trampled underfoot by 
Chisinau’s repressive policies of enforced ‘romanianization’ and desoviet- 
ization, they have fuelled ultranationalist sentiments in Russia, and 
prevailed upon Moscow to adopt a robust posture with regard to the 
protection of Russian interests abroad. They have, of course, succeeded 
in securing Moscow’s ‘protection’ with the help of Russian peacekeeping 
forces and the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF). 
It is instructive to recall that in Moldova (as throughout the former 
Soviet Union), administration, the education system and the media greatly 
favoured the Russian population. Moldovan and Ukrainian schools and 
publications were far fewer than proportional representation of their 
populations would entail. Of Moldova’s 600,000 Ukrainians, only 52,000 
claim to be fully proficient in Ukrainian, while 220,000 say they no longer 
know their native tongue. Facilities for Ukrainians in the DMR are very 
poor, and today most Ukrainians there speak Russian. 
For all the inflammatory nationalistic and ‘pan-slav’ rhetoric that 
still emanates from Tiraspol (and still finds echoes in certain circles 
in Moscow), and for all the provocative manipulation of the ethnic 
card and of human rights issues, in general inter-ethnic relations in 
Moldova at large have not been adversely affected. More than 70 per 
cent of Moldova’s Slavonic population reside in western Moldova 
and do not appear to feel threatened to any significant extent follow¬ 
ing Moldovan independence. With few exceptions this Slavonic majority 
is strongly in favour of Moldova’s territorial integrity and the re¬ 
integration of Transnistria, and has not sided with the DMR Russians 
in any way. 
Military and para-military forces on both sides, including the 
combat elements that fought in the 1992 civil war, are ethnically mixed. 
Casualty figures correctly reflect the ethnic mix of the populations in 
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question and thus provide further grim evidence that the conflict is not 
an inter-ethnic dispute. On the left bank, for example, Moldovan 
casualties predominate, followed by Ukrainians and Russians. However, 
a great many Russians and Ukrainians — some of whom served with 
distinction — were killed or injured fighting for the Moldovan central 
government cause. A ‘Transnistrian people’ as such does not, of course, 
exist and the Moldovan civil war has not split the population of Moldova 
along ethnic lines. 
The Russian Army in Moldova 
Based in Moldova since 1956, the Soviet Fourteenth (Guards) Army, 
headquartered in Tiraspol, was transferred to the CIS Armed Forces in 
January 1992. President Yeltsin’s decree of 1 April 1992 subsequently 
placed what remained of the Fourteenth Army under Russian jurisdiction. 
Moscow equivocated and prevaricated with respect to the Fourteenth 
Army’s involvement in the 1992 conflict which culminated in the battle 
for Bender that was, in fact, won by the Dnestr insurgents with substantial 
support from the Fourteenth Army. The Russian army was said to have 
remained neutral, to have disobeyed orders, to have intervened as a local 
initiative, to have been ordered to make a show of force, to defend 
Russian-speaking areas, and to take retaliatory action against Moldova 
for committing crimes against Russians.6 
By late June 1992, when General Alexander Lebed was appointed 
army commander, Russian combat power in Moldova consisted essen¬ 
tially of one somewhat under-strength and under-equipped motor rifle 
division: the Fifty-Ninth Motor Rifle Division. Lebed accused Moldova of 
being a ‘fascist state’, said its leaders were ‘war criminals’, called the 
defence minister a ‘cannibal’ referred to Moldovans as ‘oxen’ and ‘sheep’, 
and described his army as ‘belonging to the Dnestr people’.7 Lebed 
predicted the end of Moldova’s independence and its return to a recon¬ 
stituted Union, and declared that the Fourteenth Army would remain in 
Moldova indefinitely. Russia’s Fourteenth Army continued throughout 
1993 and beyond to recruit residents of Moldova’s Transnistrian region in 
violation of international law. 
In October 1994, Moldova and Russia concluded an agreement for the 
withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army from Moldova over a period of three 
years, which for Transnistrian ‘President’ Smirnov was ‘unacceptable’, and 
for Lebed a ‘crime’. However, the withdrawal was to be synchronized 
with the settlement of the conflict in Transnistria. Moreover, from 
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1994 onwards Russia has sought to make its de facto military base in 
Transnistria de jure — a move that Moldova has so far been able to resist 
firmly.8 
Following Defence Minister Grachev’s April 1995 directive on the 
reorganization of the Fourteenth Army and Yeltsin’s June decree on 
removing Lebed from military service, Major-General Valeriy Yevnevich 
was appointed commander-in-chief of the renamed Operational Group 
of Russian Forces (OGRF) in the Dnestr region of the Republic of 
Moldova.9 All members of the OGRF must now hold Russian citizenship. 
There are hardly any delays over pay. At the OSCE Istanbul summit in 
November 1999, Russia again undertook to withdraw the OGRF, 
including the huge stockpiles of munitions located near Cobasna, by the 
end of 2002. By the turn of the century the overall strength of OGRF had 
already been reduced to about 2,500 men. 
Local Autonomy in Gagauz Yeri 
The self-styled Republic of Gagauzia proclaimed its independence from 
Moldova in August 1990. A six-hundred-strong force of irregulars — the 
so-called ‘Bugeac battalion’ (who were supported militarily and politically 
by the DMR separatists) — was formed to protect the interests of the 
breakaway republic. To this end the paramilitaries seized weapons and 
conducted occasional armed raids on government installations in southern 
Moldova. Following delicate and protracted negotiations between 
Chisinau and Komrat (the capital of the unrecognized republic), Moldova 
accorded a ‘special judicial status’ to Gagauz Yeri (the Gagauz Land) in 
January 1995. Moldova’s creation of an autonomous territorial unit as a 
form of self-determination for the Gagauz and a constituent part of the 
Republic of Moldova — the first move of its kind by an East European 
state — has been praised as a potential model for resolving ethnic disputes 
in post-communist Europe. A referendum was held to determine which 
villages would join Gagauz Yeri. Georgi Tabunshchik, an ethnic Gagauz, 
was elected to the post of bashkan (or governor), and there were elections 
to the legislative body for the region. 
In June 1995 after the elections, the then prime minister, Andrei 
Sangheli, declared an end to the conflict between the Gagauz separatists 
and Moldova. The Bugeac battalion was formally disbanded, an amnesty 
was granted for the handover of weapons and the paramilitaries were 
incorporated into the specially created, so-called ‘Military Unit 1045’ of 
the Interior Ministry’s carabinieri forces. It was to take some while, 
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as Vasile Uzun, the bashkan’s first deputy emphasized at the time, ‘for the 
rule of law to replace the rule of the gun’.10 Gagauz Yeri remains an 
economically backward area whose agricultural yield is particularly 
susceptible to Moldova’s recurrent droughts. But Moldova has ‘solved the 
Gagauz problem’, as the Turkish defence minister has put it, insofar, at 
least, that instability in the region no longer represents a threat to the 
integrity of the state. 
Partnership for Peace, Neutrality and NATO 
On 16 March 1994, Moldova became the twelfth state (and fifth former 
Soviet republic) to enrol in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro¬ 
gramme. (The DMR leadership deplored the fact that Tiraspol had not 
been consulted.) At the signing ceremony in Brussels, President Snegur 
highlighted his country’s policy of neutrality,11 pointing out that Moldova 
did not belong to the military structures of the CIS, and elected — unlike 
most of the earlier signatories — not to raise the possibility of eventual 
NATO membership. Snegur also said, however, that Moldova’s partici¬ 
pation in the PfP programme would help to strengthen the territorial 
integrity, political independence and national security of his country; 
moreover, the main obstacle to a settlement of the conflict between 
Moldova and Transnistria was the presence of Russia’s Fourteenth Army 
on Moldovan territory.12 
The new constitution adopted by the Moldovan parliament on 28 July 
1994 proclaims Moldova a neutral, sovereign, independent and indivisible 
state, with equal rights for all minorities.13 Article 11, in particular, stipu¬ 
lates that ‘the Republic of Moldova declares its permanent neutrality 
[and] does not admit the stationing of foreign military units on its 
territory’. The provisions of article 11 are reiterated in the foreign policy 
concept adopted by parliament in February 1995: ‘The Republic of 
Moldova is pursuing a policy of permanent neutrality, having undertaken 
not to participate in armed conflicts, in political, military or economic 
alliances having the aim of preparing for war, not to utilize its territory 
for the stationing of foreign military bases, and not to possess nuclear 
weapons, nor to manufacture or test them’.14 On 5 May 1995 parliament 
adopted a national security concept which yet again emphasized that 
‘Moldova is a demilitarized state and it will not permit the deployment of 
foreign troops or military bases on its territory and maintains relations of 
friendship and partnership with all countries’.15 On 6 June 1995 parliament 
adopted the military doctrine which ‘is determined by foreign and 
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domestic policy, by the constitutional declaration of permanent neutrality, 
[and] has an exclusively defensive character’.16 
Moldova has never regarded NATO enlargement in any way as a 
threat to its security, nor has it raised objections to eventual Romanian or 
even Ukrainian membership. Chisinau has always insisted that enlarge¬ 
ment should not take place to the detriment of Russia, or without 
taking Russia’s interests into account when admitting new members. 
Indeed, the importance of a special relationship between NATO and 
Russia, and between NATO and Ukraine, has been underscored. 
Chisinau has stressed that NATO enlargement must not create tensions 
or draw new dividing lines in Europe, but should lead to the consolidation 
of stability and security on the continent. Moreover, an enlarging NATO 
must provide security guarantees to neutral countries such as Moldova. 
Chisinau regards cooperation with NATO primarily as a means to support 
Moldova’s efforts to re-establish territorial integrity and to promote the 
withdrawal of Russian troops. Tiraspol, by contrast, points to NATO 
‘expansion’ as an additional justification both for the region’s separatist 
course and the continued presence of Russian troops in Transnistria. 
Moldova and Romania 
For nearly half a century of communist dictatorship following annexation, 
the border was sealed between Soviet Moldova and Romania. Despite 
the genuine ethno-linguistic links between Romanians and the majority 
of Moldovans, the Soviets enforced the notion (which is by no means 
wholly a fiction) of a separate Moldovan ‘people’ and ‘language’, (as 
distinct from Romanians and Romanian). In an address to the Romanian 
parliament in February 1991 (on the first official visit to Romania by any 
leader from Soviet Moldova since its annexation), the then President 
Snegur strongly affirmed the common Moldovan-Romanian identity, 
noting that, ‘We have the same history and speak the same language’, and 
referred to ‘Romanians on both sides of the River Prut’. In June 1991 
the Romanian parliament vehemently denounced the Soviet annexation 
of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, describing the territories as ‘sacred 
Romanian lands’. The Romanian foreign minister subsequently referred 
to the ‘evanescence’ of Romania’s borders with Bessarabia and northern 
Bukovina. 
Following cultural ‘romanianization’ and the eventual independence of 
Moldova, there was a general expectation especially in Romania, though 
also to some extent in Moldova (despite Chisinau’s doctrine of ‘two 
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independent Romanian states’), that the two countries should and would 
unite. The underlying feeling at the time was that the Romanians wanted 
their country (which they, at least, saw as having been dismembered by 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) to be reunited. The Moldovans, however, 
after their initial, and perhaps injudicious, acquiescence in the idea during 
their first stirrings of national self-awareness, clearly no longer shared the 
Romanians’ enthusiasm. In January 1993, four senior parliamentarians, all 
moderate advocates of unification with Romania, were forced to resign 
their posts.17 Throughout 1993 Moldova continued to distance herself 
from Romania and abandoned her notion of ‘two independent Romanian 
states’. Throughout the 1990s Moldova has striven to establish a truly 
independent, multi-ethnic state and there has been no desire to trade a 
Russian ‘big brother’ for a Romanian one. Opinion polls have consistently 
revealed that less than 10% of Moldova’s population support unification 
with Romania. 
In June 1994 Moldova dropped the Romanian national anthem 
‘Romanians, Awake!’ which it had borrowed in 1991, at which time even¬ 
tual unification with Romania was envisaged. Chisinau has repeatedly 
reproached the Romanian government for its unwillingness to come to 
terms with the idea of real independence for the Republic of Moldova: 
Romania should let Moldova ‘be master in its own home’ and ‘strictly 
respect the right of [Moldova’s] people to determine their own future’. 
Moldovan-Romanian treaty negotiations started as long ago as 1992. 
Given the special nature of their historical, ethnic, cultural and linguistic 
affinities, Moldovan-Romanian relations are, at the time of writing, very 
close, yet also rather delicate. 
Conclusion 
At the turn of the century there are no immediate external threats to the 
security of Moldova. The strengthening of the country’s independence 
and the restoration of its territorial integrity, together with the withdrawal 
of the Russian military presence in Transnistria are the major security 
goals. Despite the 1994 accord on Russian military withdrawal, despite the 
1997 Moscow memorandum between Moldova and the DMR committing 
the two sides to existence within a ‘common state’, and despite the 1998 
Odessa agreements on demilitarization and confidence building measures, 
the Russian army remains in Transnistria and the DMR leadership 
loses no opportunity to consoldiate and confirm the structures of an 
independent state. When Igor Smirnov was re-elected, in December 1996, 
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for another five-year year term as DMR ‘president’, he vowed that ‘we 
will strengthen the independence achieved through such difficulties and 
defended with blood’, and added, ‘Transnistria exists in fact; it is a reality’. 
The breakaway republic celebrated its ninth anniversary on Independence 
Day, 2 September 1999. 
It seems highly likely that for good, old-fashioned geo-political reasons 
Moscow will continue to pursue a policy of equivocation and prevarication 
that has characterized its military involvement in Transnistria since the 
creation of an independent Moldovan state in 1991. In one guise or 
another — OGRF, peacekeepers or military bases — there will almost 
certainly be a Russian military presence in Moldova as the Dnestr conflict 
smoulders on for quite some time to come. 
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The Conflict in the Transnistrian Region 
of the Republic of Moldova 
Adrian Pop 
The Roots of the Conflict 
Historically a disputed area between the Ottoman Empire, Poland, 
Ukraine and Russia, the area of land on the left bank of the Dnestr river 
was never part of an independent Moldova or Romania. From 1924 until 
1940, the area had the status of an autonomous republic within the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (known as the Moldovan Auton¬ 
omous Soviet Socialist Republic, or MASSR). In late June 1940, when 
northern Bukovina, a portion of northern Bessarabia and the counties of 
southern Bessarabia were all incorporated into Ukraine, the remainder 
of Bessarabia was merged with a portion of the existing Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. The new Moldovan Soviet Social¬ 
ist Republic (MSSR), representing ‘the reunification of the Moldovan 
population from Bessarabia with the Moldovan population from the 
Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic’, was officially incorpo¬ 
rated into the USSR on 2 August 1940.1 The status of the new entity was 
upgraded and Moldova became one of the constituent republics of the 
USSR in 1944. Soon afterwards, the MSSR was subjected to the general 
pattern of Moscow’s policy of divide et impera. The redrawing of its 
internal geographic and ethnic borders was accompanied by an active 
russification of the area. The Russians were encouraged to settle in 
Moldova, and in particular on the left bank of the Dnestr, throughout the 
1950s, 60s, 70s, and even 80s, and were granted most of the commanding 
posts in industry and administration. The consequence was an ethnic 
disequilibrium: out of the total population of the Transnistrian region of 
780,000, 40 per cent are ethnic Moldovans, 28.3 per cent are Ukrainians 
and 25.2 per cent are Russians. There is also an urban-rural ethnic 
imbalance: Moldovans predominate in the countryside, Russians and 
Ukrainians in the towns. In Tiraspol, the capital of Transnistria, for 
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example, only 18 per cent of its 195,000 people are Moldovans. Further¬ 
more, although Transnistria accounts for only some 12 per cent of the 
territory of Moldova and 17 per cent of its population, the region produces 
35 per cent of Moldova’s total national income, being the most industri¬ 
alized part of Moldova, the economy of which is otherwise predominantly 
agricultural. The area also accounts for a sizeable amount of Moldova’s 
electric power-generating capacity and provides vital rail links with 
Ukraine. Throughout the summer and autumn of 1991, the Transnistrian 
authorities, exploiting Moldova’s dependence on energey and raw 
material sources as a lever, disconnected Moldova from the only gas 
pipeline supplying the centre and the south of the country, leaving it with 
no gas supply.2 Later, in the early spring of 1999, the Transnistrian 
separatists tried to use the same lever of economic blackmail to coerce 
the people located in the Varni|a border area into joining their self- 
proclaimed republic. This is proof of the fact that, economically speaking, 
without the Transnistrian region, a fully independent Republic of 
Moldova is hard to conceive.3 
The Transnistrian region is also a strategic corridor towards the 
Balkans and Central Europe and, therefore, an important area of deploy¬ 
ment for Soviet/Russian military forces. In April 1992, the Fourteenth 
Army, based in Transnistria, was put under the jurisdiction of the Russian 
Federation. This, in turn, immediately created a problem concerning its 
legal status on the territory of a foreign state. An even more delicate 
problem was generated due to the fact that 80 to 90 per cent of the soldiers 
and 60 per cent of the officer corps of the Russian Fourteenth Army 
were permanent residents in the Transnistrian area.4 Throughout the last 
few decades, a special bond has developed between the population on 
the left bank of the Dnestr and the Russian military. As a result, on several 
occasions Transnistria’s own Dnestr Guards, formed in September 1991, 
with far superior fighting capabilities than those of the Moldovan 
government, was aided in its anti-constitutional military actions by troops 
belonging to the Fourteenth Army, 90 per cent of which were stationed 
in Transnistria. It is symptomatic that between 1991 and 1993, many 
officers and non-commissioned officers from the Fourteenth Army were 
transferred to the Transnistrian forces. The Fourteenth Army’s former 
commander, Lieutenant-General Gennady Yakovlev, became head 
of the defence and security department in the Transnistrian republic.5 
In addition to this, the ‘Dnestr’ diversionary battalion led by the ‘Trans¬ 
nistrian avenger’, Colonel Kostenko, proved to be a creation of the 
Russian special services.6 On several occasions, Lieutenant-General 
Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the Fourteenth Army between June 
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1992 and June 1995, stirred up deep emotions both in the Republic of 
Moldova and beyond with his inopportune declarations. In January 1993, 
for instance, he announced that Russia would soon open a consular 
mission in Tiraspol to grant Russian citizenship to local residents who 
desired it, as well as a military chair to train officers for the Russian 
forces at the local university. On the same occasion, previous public 
admissions that Soviet KGB officers formerly active in the Baltic States 
were now serving with the region’s secret police were confirmed by 
Colonel Vladimir Gorbov, formerly of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic’s KGB.7 
The Transnistrian leadership’s secessionist drive developed within 
the framework of Moldova’s drive for independence from Moscow in the 
last years of the existence of the Soviet Union. What the Transnistrian 
authorities feared most was that an independent Moldova would 
implement political and economic reforms that would put an end to the 
socialist way of life, and with it their privileges, and would impose a 
cultural ‘romanianization’ on the area, preparing the ground for its 
eventual unification with Romania. 
The first signs of civil disobedience came in August 1989, when the 
Moldovans were considering a new language law proclaiming ‘Moldovan’ 
— the same language as Romanian — the state language, and requiring 
that persons in managerial and civil service positions learn a minimal 
vocabulary in that language to enable them to communicate with non- 
Russian speakers.8 As a result, a two-hour warning strike took place on 
16 August in Tiraspol, and almost all of the town’s factories shut down on 
21 August to protest against the final draft of the law. Soon after, strikes 
spread to the main towns of the republic, and by 24 August more than 
fifty factories in Chisinau, Bender (Tighina), Rybnitsa (Ribnfia), Komrat 
(Comrat) and other cities had joined the strike begun in Tiraspol. Five 
days later, when the parliament was considering the law, 80,000 workers 
were on strike at a hundred factories. When the law was passed on 31 
August, the strikes intensified and continued for over a month in 
Transnistria’s urban areas. 
In January 1990, following the proclamation of the Gagauz auton¬ 
omous republic in November 1989, Tiraspol voted to become a 
self-governing, independent territory, the first vote of its kind pertaining 
to a city. Bender followed suit soon afterwards. Following the adoption 
of the tricolour flag, an adaptation of the Romanian flag, as the MSSR’s 
official symbol in April 1990, the local soviets of Tiraspol, Bender, and 
Rybnitsa refused to recognize it and continued to fly the communist flag.9 
On 19 August 1990, at a congress of Gagauz ‘people’s deputies’ that took 
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place in Komrat, a Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed. 
Following the same pattern, on 2 September 1990 in Tiraspol, an extra¬ 
ordinary congress of soviets’ deputies proclaimed the Transnistrian Soviet 
Socialist Republic as part of the USSR. 
On 3 September 1990, in order to counter the territorial dissolution 
of the republic, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova introduced the presi¬ 
dential rule, declaring the ‘congresses’ in Komrat and Tiraspol as anti- 
constitutional and the secessions as illegal. The Gagauz decision to hold 
elections in order to legitimize their republic led to the first outbreak 
of violence. As the election date approached, rival Gagauz and 
Moldovan political forces started to recruit ‘volunteers’. Militiamen from 
Transnistria entered the Gagauz region to support their fellow seces¬ 
sionists. Facing this potentially dangerous ethnic tension, on 26 October 
the Moldovan president, Mircea Snegur, declared a state of emergency 
in the five southern counties which comprise the Gagauz republic and 
despatched Moldovan Interior Ministry (MVD) troops to the region. Two 
days later, on 28 October 1990, the Gagauz leaders managed to elect 
their own Supreme Soviet. On 2 November, in the run-up to elections, 
militiamen seized the city soviet building in the city of Dubossary 
(Dubasari) as part of their ‘preparation’ for the elections. When the 
republican forces sought to retake the buildings, new militants joined 
forces on both sides and the mounting tension degenerating into a bloody 
conflict.10 Finally, on 22-25 November, following the example of their 
Gagauz counterparts, the Transnistrian separatist leaders organised 
elections for the ‘Supreme Soviet of the Dnestr Moldovan Republic’. 
Proof of the fact that Moscow did not play the role of a neutral 
spectator to all these events is revealed by the decree issued by Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev on 22 December 1990. The decree 
requested that the Moldovan parliament renounce its belief that the 
proclamation of the MSSR in August 1940 was illegitimate and to annul 
the new language law passed in August 1989. Furthermore, according to 
Gorbachev’s proclamation, the integrity of Moldova was to be guaranteed 
only within the USSR. 
The fact that, despite its ethnic connotations, the conflict in Trans¬ 
nistria was primarily a political and ideological one, was revealed on the 
occasion of the August 1991 coup d’etat in Russia. Whereas the Chisinau 
leaders promptly condemned the organizers of the coup, the separatists 
in Tiraspol, whose minds were set on reconstituting the Soviet empire, 
fully supported them. On 27 August 1991, at the request of about 600,000 
representatives of all Moldovan districts, the parliament in Chisinau 
proclaimed the Republic of Moldova as a ‘sovereign, independent, and 
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democratic state, free to decide its present and future without any inter¬ 
ference from outside’.11 
On 2 March 1992, the Republic of Moldova became a member of the 
UN — an event which suggested that the international community 
regarded the breakaway Gagauz and Transnistrian state entities as illegal. 
On the same day, and as a gesture of frustrated retaliation, the separatists 
provoked the incident in Dubasari that was to become the beginning of 
the armed conflict which lasted from March to July 1992. 
On 1 April 1992, President Yeltsin issued an important decree that 
transferred the Fourteenth Army to Russian jurisdiction. Consequently, 
following the international recognition of Moldova’s independence, its 
status became that of a foreign army illegally occupying the territory 
of a sovereign state. Totally ignoring this situation, on 19 May 1992, the 
commander of the Fourteenth Army issued the order to prepare its troops 
for ‘ground actions’. Light and heavy weaponry was delivered to the 
paramilitary units of the separatists. On 24 May, the deputy supreme 
commander of the CIS, General Stolearov came to Tiraspol, declaring 
that Transnistria and the Fourteenth Army represented Russian geo¬ 
political interests in the area. Encouraged by Moscow, the separatists 
organized a provocation in Bender. When the Moldovan authorities 
brought more troops to Bender, at the request of the local police, the units 
of the Fourteenth Army openly joined ranks with the separatists, partic¬ 
ipating in the fighting between 19 June and 7 July. Immediately following 
the outbreak of hostilities in Bender, and as a consequence of the success 
in combating the Moldovan military, General Lebed assumed operational 
leadership of the Fourteenth Army. He had been sent earlier to the 
region, clandestinely, under the name of ‘Colonel Gusev’ by the Russian 
ministry of defence. Lebed was now in charge of one of the largest arsenels 
of the former Soviet regime, which could be used in the event of a recon¬ 
stitution of the Soviet Union.12 Hence, as most of the available sources 
suggest, it is hard to believe that there was no advanced planning under¬ 
taken by the Kremlin or the Russian defence ministry for use of the 
Fourteenth Army in Transnistria, despite the claims of some Russian 
commentators.13 
Eventually, on 7 July 1992 at Limanscoe in Ukraine, the military 
representatives of Russia, Moldova and the Transnistrian republic agreed 
to an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 15 July 
in Varnita, and on 17/18 July in Bender, however, the separatist guards 
and their Cossack allies broke the ceasefire. Finally, on 21 July, after 
negotiations pursued through diplomatic channels, the Moldovan presi¬ 
dent and President Yeltsin signed a military convention providing for the 
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deployment of ‘disengagement forces’ from Russia, Moldova and Trans- 
nistria. Thus, in a single move, Russia managed to eliminate two potential 
major players in the Transnistrian conflict: Romania and Ukraine.14 
The Internationalization of the Conflict Resolution 
Initial international efforts to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict 
were complicated owing to the existence of two different regimes for 
monitoring the ceasefire and disengagement of troops: a quadripartite 
grouping, involving Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; and a 
tripartite grouping, comprising Moldova, Russia, and Transnistria. Owing 
to Moscow’s interest in remaining the sole arbiter and dealing directly 
with Chisinau (the Transnistrian area, at this point in time, being irrele¬ 
vant), the quadripartite framework quickly became obsolete. Another 
striking feature regarding the peace process was the fact that the 
Fourteenth Army, which had been instrumental in generating the conflict 
and had given arms and other support to the separatist forces, constantly 
aimed at performing the role of ‘peacekeeper’ in the old tradition of the 
wolf guarding the sheep. 
International efforts were initiated on 20 March 1992 in Kiev when the 
member states of the CIS, including Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, 
adopted a declaration on the situation in the Transnistrian district of 
the Republic of Moldova in which they reaffirmed their support for the 
territorial integrity of Moldova. 
On 23 March 1992 the ministers of foreign affairs of Moldova, Russia, 
Romania and Ukraine issued a declaration in which the preservation of 
the territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova was 
reiterated as being a fundamental part of the settlement of the conflict. 
A mechanism for political consultation among the four states was also 
created. On 6 April, during the first meeting under the terms of political 
consultation, a quadripartite commission was set up to implement 
decisions regarding a ceasefire and disengagement of forces. During the 
next meeting, on 17 April 1992, in which a representative of the chairman- 
in-office of the CSCE Council was present as an observer, the ministers 
approved the status of the commission. Unfortunately, these efforts did 
not meet with success, and as already noted, an alarming escalation of the 
armed conflict took place at the end of June. On 25 June 1992, on 
the occasion of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation summit, the presi¬ 
dents of the four states issued a communique concerning the situation in 
the left-bank Dnestr area. They proposed to the parties involved in the 
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conflict an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, the disengagement of 
the warring parties within twenty-four hours and the creation of security 
zones and corridors for the civilian population. The communique 
announced also that the Fourteenth Army should remain neutral and 
that Russia and Moldova should begin negotiations on the army’s 
status and the timetable for its withdrawal. The presidents of the four 
states also appealed to the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
the CSCE and the United Nations to participate actively in the resolution 
of the conflict. 
In July 1992 a new, bilateral phase in international efforts to solve the 
conflict by peaceful means began. The presidents of Moldova and Russia 
met twice in Moscow, on 3 and 21 July 1992. During the second meeting 
— attended also by representatives of the Transnistria region -— they 
agreed on a communique announcing the principles of conflict resolution: 
respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the 
Republic of Moldova; respect for human rights, including those of 
national minorities; a definition of the special status of the left-bank 
Dnestr region within the framework of the Republic of Moldova; the right 
of the Transnistrian population to decide its future in the event of a change 
in state regime in the Republic of Moldova; and a rejection of any actions 
preventing a peaceful solution to the conflict. The agreement signed on 
the same day (21 July 1992) provided for an immediate ceasefire and 
the disengagement of armed forces over a period of seven days in order 
to enable the setting up of a security zone between the parties. In addition, 
the agreement foresaw the setting up of a Tripartite Commission of 
Control (to include Moldova, Russia, and Transnistria) in Bender, 
which was authorized to take advantage of the presence of military 
observers nominated under previous quadripartite agreements, to take 
decisions, and to use military contingents supplied by the three parties. 
Bender was declared a zone with enhanced security and the Fourteenth 
Army was comanded to remain neutral, the army’s status and time-table 
for withdrawal being the object of future negotiations between Moldova 
and Russia.15 
After its admission to the CSCE on 30 January 1992, the Moldovan 
government, realizing that it had little leverage with Russia, tried to inter¬ 
nationalize the Transnistrian issue. Thus, from a very early stage in its 
development, the Transnistrian conflict entered the CSCE agenda. 
Following an appeal by the Moldovan government, the chairperson-in- 
office of the CSCE announced her intention to appoint a personal 
representative to investigate the situation at the fifteenth meeting of the 
Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) on 14 August 1992. Following visits 
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to Moldova (including Transnistria), Romania, Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation, the personal representative submitted his recommendations. 
This led to the decision of the CSO on 4 February 1993 to send a CSCE 
mission to Moldova. The mission, which was deployed in Moldova from 
April 1993, laid out the basis for future negotiations. It recommended that 
the Transnistrian region should be granted a special juridical status within 
the Republic of Moldova. The recommendation was flexible enough to 
provide for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the republic and 
to counter Tiraspol’s insistence on forging a ‘confederation’ with 
Chisinau. Additionally, in an attempt to counter the Transnistrian leaders’ 
tendency to block the negotiations regarding the withdrawal of the 
Russian forces by making their agreement conditional upon Transnistria 
obtaining a status akin to that of a separate state, the CSCE mission 
endorsed the position of the Moldovan government that the withdrawal 
of Russian forces should be unconditional. But the mission was only partly 
successful in carrying out its mandate. Whereas the Moldovan government 
was fully co-operative, the Transnistrian authorities, probably with 
Russian support, prevented the mission from attending the meeting of the 
Joint Control Commission (JCC), which had been convened to supervise 
the implementation of the July 1992 agreement. On the grounds of alleged 
safety risks to its members, the Transnistrian authorities also obstructed 
the JCC’s free movement in the security zone. After several appeals by 
the CSO of the CSCE, and more than a full year of negotiations, an 
agreement on the principles of co-operation between the CSCE mission 
and the JCC was signed on 20 July 1994.16 
Five Years of Deception (1994-1999) 
On 28 April 1994, Mircea Snegur and Igor Smirnov signed the Parcani 
agreements that marked the beginning of negotiations regarding the status 
of Transnistria. Soon afterwards, the Moldovan side confirmed its 
willingness to reach a lasting political settlement by inserting into the 
new constitution, adopted by the Moldovan parliament in July 1994, 
a provision (article 111) stating that ‘special conditions and forms of 
autonomy, defined according to special statuses by organic laws, can be 
granted to the localities on the left bank of the Dnestr river’. Unfortun¬ 
ately, Moldova’s willingness to give a special status with large self- 
governing competence to the eastern districts of the country, within a 
united and undivided Republic of Moldova, was not met with a similar 
openness by the Transnistrian authorities which kept insisting on the 
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creation of an independent state. The irreconcilable position taken by the 
leaders in Tiraspol, was illustrated by the celebration by the Transnistrian 
leaders of ‘Independence Day’ on 4 September 1995.17 The ‘Declaration 
of the Statehood of the Moldovan Trans-Dnestr Republic’ was issued on 
5 February 1998. In addition to this, the Tiraspol regime has constantly 
tried to obstruct the activity of the OSCE mission in Moldova, culminating 
in its declaration in March 1997 which pronounced that the head of the 
mission, Ambassador Donald Johnson, was a persona non grata.18 
Eventually, partly due to the mediation of Russian Foreign Minister 
Evgheni Primakov, Tiraspol was forced to accept an article referring to a 
common state in the memorandum which formed the basis for future 
negotiations. Furthermore, on 20 March 1998, agreements on preliminary 
confidence building measures between Chisinau and Tiraspol were signed 
in Odessa, which included the reconstruction of the bridge in Dubasari, 
one of the two bridges destroyed during the 1991 conflict. 
Despite the conclusion of hostilities, the so-called ‘Dnestr Moldovan 
Republic’ has become a centre for the production and sale of all kind of 
weapons (the artillery systems BM-21 ‘GRAD’, mine launchers, anti-tank 
grenade launchers, anti-personnel mines, and so on). There is plenty of 
evidence that the area has become a bridge in the international arms trade 
— arms originating from this region have been used in military conflicts 
in Russia and the Caucasus — and that Russian and Ukrainian mafiosi 
have shown an increasing interest in acquiring weapons from the region. 
With regard to the issue of the withdrawal of the Fourteenth Army, on 
21 October 1994, prime ministers Victor Chernomyrdin and Andrei 
Sangheli signed an intergovernmental ‘agreement on the legal status, 
procedure and timetable of the withdrawal of Russian military units 
temporarily located on the territory of Moldova’. This document provided 
for the full withdrawal, within three years of signing, of the Russian forces 
and their equipment from Moldovan territory. This is in full accordance 
with the Moldovan constitution which explicitly forbids the deployment 
of foreign troops on the country’s territory (article 11). Although Moldova 
had originally desired a faster timetable for withdrawal, the government 
finally accepted the Russian argument that, given available railway 
capacity, some three years would be necessary to transport the Fourteenth 
Army, together with its ammunition, back to Russia. In addition to this, 
the Moldovan authorities had to commit themselves to build accommo¬ 
dation in Russia for the returning armed forces. 
In practice, the agreement was rendered inoperative from its inception 
due to the reinterpretation of two clauses by the Russian side. The first 
one concerns the ‘synchronization’ of the withdrawal with the final 
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political settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In other words, the very 
army which had triggered the conflict was to withdraw only if and when 
resolution of the conflict was achieved. It is interesting to note that the 
Russian foreign ministry reiterated this position even after February 1996, 
when Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe. This was stated in 
total disregard of one of the explicit conditions of Russia’s acceptance on 
the Council, namely, to begin the withdrawal of troops within six months 
of admission. The second reinterpretation refers to the fact that while the 
agreement spoke of synchronizing the two processes of withdrawal and 
conflict resolution within the three-year period, Moscow has insisted on 
an open-ended time-scale to settle the conflict.19 
Furthermore, while initially defining the October 1994 agreements as 
an executive agreement, which did not requiring parliamentary ratifi¬ 
cation, the Russian government changed its position immediately upon 
signing and submitted it for ratification to the Duma. In its turn, the Duma 
voted against troop withdrawal and in favour of Transnistria’s secession 
from Moldova. The end result was that in contrast to the Moldovan 
government, which ratified the agreement promptly, at the time of writing, 
the Russian Federation had not yet fulfilled internal procedures for the 
agreement to come into force, more than five years after signing the 
agreement. 
Moreover, President Yeltsin, the Russian foreign ministry, and the 
Russian military jointly requested, on several occasions, that the Moldovan 
government grant the Russian troops peacekeeping status, as well as 
basing rights, as a rationale for keeping the Fourteenth Army in Moldova. 
At times, units of the Army — renamed the Operational Group of Forces 
in Moldova in the summer of 1995 — even transferred from the left bank 
of the Dnestr to Bender, which is within the right bank security zone, for 
‘peacekeeping’ duties, thus violating the Yeltsin-Snegur agreement which 
denied the Fourteenth Army a peacekeeping mandate.20 
In spite of these actions, in February 1997 President Yeltsin reaffirmed 
Russia’s commitment to withdraw its troops.21 In fact, by that time, a 
significant reduction of Russian troops had already taken place. From the 
30,000 Soviet troops that were originally stationed in Moldova, the 
strength of Russia’s Fourteenth Army deployed in the Transnistria region 
had dropped to approximately 6,000 troops by 1997. At the same time, 
however, the number of Russian soldiers that had joined either the 
Transnistrian army or the peacekeeping forces in the region had grown.22 
Recently, another twist in the official Russian attitude towards the issue 
of troop withdrawal has been discernable. As posited on 17 March 1999 
by Vladimir Rahmanin, the spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry, 
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Russia is not considering the withdrawal of its troops from the Trans- 
nistrian area for the time being, but only the implementation of the 
weapon and ammunition withdrawal plan for the ex-Fourteenth Army 
which was agreed on 23 December 1997. Rahmanin added that only the 
completion of a bilateral protocol between the Russian Federation and 
the Republic of Moldova concerning military property could provide the 
necessary legal basis for an eventual withdrawal of the Russian troops 
from Transnistria. 
Another source of concern closely connected with the presence of the 
Russian troops is the issue of withdrawing the military equipment 
and weapons of the breakaway Transnistrian army. In accordance with 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and its provisions 
regarding unrecorded equipment, the weapons and military equipment 
held by the separatist forces have to be withdrawn into Russian territory, 
due to the fact that they originally came from the weapon stores of the 
Russian troops deployed in Transnistria. Quite apart from the fact that 
these weapons have become the object of ‘dirty deals’, weapon stores 
such those in Cobasna (Kolbasna), a town near the Ukrainian border, 
present the area with security risks not only because of their military 
potential, but also, since they contain old ammunition that cannot be 
withdrawn and has to be destroyed on the spot, they could well have 
damaging ecological consequences.23 
Recent developments, including the decision of the Russian Duma 
early in March 1999 to declare the Transnistria region an area of excep¬ 
tional strategic interest, suggest that the Russians envisage the formation 
in Moldova of a territory with the status of the Kaliningrad region. Taking 
into consideration the possible establishment of official inter-state 
relations between the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian 
republic, the tentative opening of a Russian consulate in Tiraspol, as well 
as the Russian reference to the Fourteenth Army’s ‘pacifying’ role in the 
region, it appears that the prospects of solving the Transnistrian dispute 
are even more uncertain than they were five years ago.24 
Conclusion 
First, and contrary to the commonly-held view, the Transnistrian issue 
began not so much as an ethnic or national conflict, but as a political and 
ideological one. Soon it acquired an important economic component, as 
well as a crucial strategic dimension. Secondly, the presence of the Russian 
Fourteenth Army in the Transnistria region has been a constant military, 
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material and politico-moral support for, and a guarantee of, the separate 
status of the self-proclaimed Dnestr Moldovan Republic, as well as a 
visible symbol of the Republic of Moldova’s ‘limited’ sovereignty and 
a continuing threat to its independence. The continuous presence of 
Russian forces in the region has a potential destabilizing effect on coun¬ 
tries neighbouring Moldova, such as Ukraine and Romania. Thirdly, the 
Transnistrian regime lends its support to dissenting movements through¬ 
out the former Soviet states. The mafia-style government in Tiraspol 
has become part of an entire network of criminal structures throughout 
the CIS. Finally, in spite of extensive efforts at conflict resolution at 
the international level (CSCE/OSCE, UN, NATO), as well as at the 
quadrilateral (Moldova-Romania-Russia-Ukraine), trilateral (Moldova- 
Russia-Transnistria, and Moldova-Russia-Ukraine, respectively), and bi¬ 
lateral levels (Russia-Moldova, and Moldova-Transnistria, respectively), 
little progress has yet been made towards reaching ‘normalcy’. 
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and principality of Moldova, 25, 34, 
36, 38, 56 
Antonescu, Ion, 114-6,143-51,153, 
156-61 
Antonescu, Mihai, 144,146,156,160 
Armenians, 19, 29, 32, 35, 79, 85 
Austria, 50, 57, 67,101,168; see also 
Central Powers and Habsburg 
monarchy 
Baia: 8,10, 21; Catholic bishopric in, 9 
Banulescu-Bodoni, Gavril, 78, 83-4, 
86, 88, 90-1,116,135 
Bender, 27-8, 31-2, 58, 67, 79,165, 
178,182,184,191,197, 207, 209, 211, 
214; see also Tighina 
Bessarabia: acquisition by Russia, 67; 
autonomy in, under Russian rule, 
76-7, 83-4; economy of, in 
nineteenth century, 93-5; economy 
of, in interwar period, 108-10; 
etymology of, 74-5; ‘russification’ in, 
84-93; ‘romanianization’ in, 106-8; 
union with Romania, 99-102; see 
also Southern Bessarabia 
Bistrifa: monastery, 15, 24, 33, 36; town 
of, as trading centre, 18 
Black Sea: as ‘Turkish lake’, 27, 68; 
Greek colonies on, 4; Republic of 
Moldova and access to, 163,175; 
trade on, and principality of 
Moldova, 10-11,18-19, 63 
Bogdan, first ruler of principality of 
Moldova, 8-9,11-13,15 
Bolgrad, district of, see Southern 
Bessarabia 
Braila, 28, 32, 69 
Bucharest, treaty of, 67, 74-5 
Bugeac, 28, 32, 67, 74-5, 79-80,128; 
‘Bugeac battalion’, 198 
Bukovina, 64, 81, 97-8,101,113-15, 
117,140,143-7,149-50,158-60,190, 
200, 205 
Bulgaria, 16, 20, 34, 54, 68, 73,101, 
113,171,175,195 
Bulgarians, 4,13-16, 24, 34, 40, 44, 61, 
71, 74, 79-82, 94,103,110,134,169, 
195 
Byzantium: 4-5, 7,11,13,19, 34, 36, 
40, 47-8,124,126-7; Byzantine 
church, 4,12-17, 25, 35, 37 (see also 
Orthodoxy); ‘Byzantine 
Commonwealth’, 25, 58, 61; 
influence of Byzantium at Moldovan 
court, 4, 13, 15-17,19, 24, 26, 33-5, 
37, 40-1, 50, 57-8; influence of 
Byzantium mediated through 
principality of Moldova to Russia, 
62; law of, in principality of 
Moldova, 50; tax collectors from, 6 
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Cahul, district of, see Southern 
Bessarabia 
Callimachi family, see Phanariots 
Calvinism, 35, 37-9, 41-2, 62; see also 
Protestantism 
Cantacuzino family, see Phanariots 
Cantemir, Dimitrie, 19, 40, 43-8, 60, 
63, 74-5,105-6,119,130 
Capriana monastery, 33, 37, 88 
Carlowitz, peace of, 45, 47 
Carol II, king of Romania, 112-5 
Catherine the Great, 51, 66, 75,115 
Ceau$escu, Nicolae, 6, 44, 120,125 
Central Powers, 96, 98-101 
Cetatea Alba, 4,11,17-18, 20, 22, 71, 
83, 107,117,139; see also Akkerman 
Chilia, 11,17-18, 21-2, 27-8, 56, 67, 69, 
75, 79, 83,117 
Chisinau: 88, 90, 92, 94-5,146,163-4, 
170-1,182,192, 200, 207-8, 213; 
eparchy of Chisinau and Hotin, 78, 
116; General Kiselev’s description 
of, 94; refugees in, after Russian 
revolution, 105; Sfatul Jdrii in, and 
union with Romania, 99-102 
Constantinople: 4-5,11,13, 16,18-20, 
22-4, 28, 30, 33-8, 40, 44-56, 61, 
63-9, 71, 78, 131-2; patriarchy of, 25, 
36, 47, 55,129 
Cossacks, 28, 31-2, 40, 61,184-5,195, 
209 
Costin, Miron, 26, 38, 43,129 
Costin, Nicolae, 26, 38, 43,129 
Cumans, 7, 75,125 
Daco-Romans, 6-7, 44, 57, 60, 91,122 
Danube river: as Republic of 
Moldova’s outlet on the Black Sea, 
163,175; Byzantine limes on, 5; 
Daco-Roman presence north of, 6; 
Danube fortresses on, 27-9; lower 
Danube as border of Bessarabia, 
74-5; Roman withdrawal behind, 5; 
Russian economic and foreign 
policy aims on, 63, 69, 71, 80,117 
Dnestr Moldovan Republic, 166,186, 
191,193,208,216 
Dnestr river: as border between 
Russia and principality of Moldova, 
65, 73; as eastern border of 
interwar Romania, 102; as eastern 
border of Russian-ruled 
Bessarabia, 3, 67, 74-5; as eastern 
border of principality of Moldova, 
12-13,17-18; as eastern border of 
Republic of Moldova, 2; Turkish 
raia-s on, 27-8, 30, 46-7 
Dobruja, 20, 28, 80 
Dosoftei, metropolitan of Moldova, 
36, 39, 42-3, 45, 61 
Drago$, ‘founder’ of principality of 
Moldova, 8-10, 26, 43,129 
Dubasari (Dubossary), 117,164, 
183-4, 208-9, 213 
France, 49, 51, 59-60, 65, 67, 68-74, 
98,103,106,112 
Gagauz, 80, 82,123,134,137,169, 
192,195,199, 207-9 
Gagauzia, 189,192 
‘Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic’, 
121, 208 
Gagauz Yeri, 123,198-9 
Galicia: 9,18, 23, 33; metropolitanate 
of, 13-14 
Galicia-Volhynia, 9,11 
Germans, 10-11,15,18-19, 40, 56, 70, 
79, 81-2, 86, 98,100-1,103,113, 
134,137, 145-8,150-3,155-8; see 
also Goths and Saxons 
Germany, 34, 98,101,109,112-14, 
116,120,143,145-8,190; sec also 
Central Powers 
Gheorghe Duca, ‘ruler of Ukraine 
and Moldova’, 43^1, 50, 61 
Gheorghe $tefan, 36, 42, 44, 61 
Ghica family, see Phanariots 
Goths: 5; and etymology of ‘Moldova’, 
10 
Greece, 34, 56,193 
Greek language, 14-16, 26, 38-43, 
50-1, 56, 60,130-1 
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Greeks: 4,11,13-16, 24, 29, 34-5, 37, 
39-42, 44-5,47-51, 53-61, 64-5, 73, 
79, 85,169; ‘Greek Project’ of 
Catherine II and Joseph II, 66; 
Greek revolution in principality of 
Moldova, 59, 83,135; see also 
Phanariots 
Gypsies, 40, 79, 82,134,143-5,147-9 
Habsburg monarchy, 31, 41, 45, 47, 
51, 59, 63-5, 73, 81, 96, 98,101, 
124,134 
Halippa, Pantelimon, 90, 96-7,101 
Hotin: 7,13,17-18, 21, 28, 31, 67, 82, 
117,139,147; establishment of 
eparchy of Chisinau and Hotin, 78, 
116; transformation of Hotin into 
Turkish ‘raia’, 46-7 
Hungarians, 6-11,17,19-21, 57,103 
Hungary, 4,11-12,14,17-23, 27, 45, 
47, 71,102,113-14,124,143,145, 
156,159 
Ia$i: 30-1, 35-6, 42, 57-8, 62, 92,108; 
academy in, 38-9, 41, 60; Greek 
printing press in, 50, 61; Jews of, 
146-7; pro-Russian demonstration 
in, 72; Romanian government exiled 
to, 98, Romanian printing press in, 
38, 42-3; Russian consulate in, 64; 
treaty of, 65-7 
Inochentie, the monk, 87-8 
Iorga, Nicolae, 6, 48-9, 51, 53, 86, 98, 
115,125 
Ipsilanti family, see Phanariots 
Ismail: 56, 67,75, 83, 85,104,139; 
district of, see Southern Bessarabia; 
transformation into Turkish ‘raia’, 28 
Ivan III, 23-4, 61,128 
Jerusalem, patriarchy of, and 
principality of Moldova, 25, 34, 36-8 
Jews, 1, 40, 57, 79, 82, 93-4,103,105, 
110-11,115,143-58,169 
Kiev: 4,13, 36, 38, 44, 78, 89, 93, 96-7, 
128, 210; academy in, 38-9, 40-1; 
Eudoxia of, wife of Stephen the 
Great, 23-4; metropolitanate of, 
13-14,16, 37, 39, 62, 78, see also 
Movila, Petru 
Kievan Rus’, 9 
Kiselev, General Pavel, 69, 79, 94 
Kishinev, see Chisinau 
Krupenski, pro-Russian boyar family, 
75, 90, 95,102,137 
Kuchuk-Kainardji, treaty of, 63-4, 67-8 
Language, 3, 5-7,14-16, 26, 38,40, 
42-4, 50-1, 73, 78-9, 84-93, 96-7, 
105-8,111-12,118-24,139,182, 
186-7,190-2,194,196, 207 
Lebed, General Alexander, 184,193, 
197-8, 206, 209 
Lvov, 11,18, 33, 36, 38^14 
Maramure$: and founding of 
principality of Moldova, 8-9; 
monastery of Peri in, 129 
Marghiloman, Alexandru, 82, 98,100-1 
Mavrocordat family, see Phanariots 
Mehmed II, the ‘Conqueror of 
Constantinople’, 20, 22 
Michael the Brave, 32, 61,119 
Moldavia, 2,10 
Moldova: etymology of, 10; 
metropolitanate of Moldova and 
Suceava, 13-14,18, 31; Principality 
of: and loss of Bessarabia, 67; 
Dnestr border of, 17; early economy 
of, 10-11,18; foundation of, 7-8; 
union of, with Wallachia, 72; pro- 
Russian sentiment in, 72; see also 
Republic of Moldova 
Moldova, river, 8,10 
Moldovan language, see Language 
Moldovans: Latin origins of, 43, 48, 
59-60, 71, 74; see also Language 
Moldovan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (MASSR), 
111-12,117,119,138-9,181,190, 205 
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MSSR), 117-21,139,163-4,170, 
181-2,189,190, 200, 205, 207-8 
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Monasteries: 2,15, 24-5, 33-6, 38-9, 50, 
54, 62, 86-7,129,133; Hesychast tra¬ 
dition in, 15-16, 61; in Phanariot era, 
55; secularization of, 72 ; dedicated 
monasteries, 36-7, 41,129; painted 
monasteries, 33-4,133; see also 
Capriana, Bistrija, Mount Athos, 
Neamf, Putna, and Trei Ierarhi 
Mount Athos, 16, 25, 34, 36-7, 55,128 
Movila family, 31-3, 36, 39, 45 
Movila, Petru, 37-40, 62 
Muscovy, 23-4, 33, 40, 60; see also Ivan 
III 
Neamf: monastery, 13,15-16, 24-5, 
61-2; fortification of town, 18 
Odessa, 89, 94, 97,100,110,116,131, 
143^1,151-2,160,170-1,190,192, 
209, 213 
Old Church Slavonic, see Language 
Orthodoxy: 4, 9,12-17, 23-5, 53, 55-6, 
74; Armenian Orthodoxy, 19; 
‘Bessarabian Metropolitanate’, 
122-3; Orthodox church in interwar 
Bessarabia, 91, 108; Romanian 
Orthodoxy in war-time Transnistria, 
116 
Ottomans, 20-3, 27-31, 44—7; see also 
Phanariots, Russo-Turkish Wars 
and Turks 
Paisie, the monk, 62 
Pavel Lebedev, archbishop, 86, 88,108, 
135 
Pechenegs, 7,127 
Pelivan, Ion, 90, 92, 96-7, 99,109 
Petru Mu$at 1,12,14-15,17, 23 
Petru Rare§, 27, 29, 31, 33—4, 36 
Phanariots, 41, 45, 47-56, 58-60, 63-5, 
75-7, 83,130,135 
Pocufia, 23,128 
Poland, 11-12,13,17-18, 21, 23, 31, 33, 
35, 38, 41, 45-6, 81-2, 112,143, 
155-6, 205 
Poland-Lithuania, 4,17,19, 23, 36, 
38-41,44, 61,125, 128 
Poles, 19, 21-3, 25, 28, 31-2, 35, 40, 
44-5, 72, 85,106,169 
Protestantism: 34-5, 42; Hussitism, 19; 
see also Calvinism 
Prut river: as Romanian/Soviet border, 
116; as western border of Hotin 
‘raia’, 47; as western border of 
Russian Bessarabia, 17, 67, 73,189; 
‘human chain’ across, 121 
Putna monastery, 24-6, 61, 64 
Republic of Moldova: and CIS, 122, 
166,193, 210; and EU, 124,168-9, 
175,177; and NATO, 122,199-200, 
216; and OSCE, 123,185-6,198, 
213, 216; and relations with 
Romania, 121,165, 169,189, 200-1; 
and relations with Russia, 123, 
172-4,183-6,193-5,197-8, 201, 
206-16; see also MASSR, MSSR, 
Russians, Transnistria 
Roma, see Gypsies 
Roman Catholicism: 4, 7-8,12-14, 
17-21, 23, 38-9, 44, 47, 62,168; 
Counter-Reformation and, 36, 41; 
see also Uniate church 
Romania: 6; and Bessarabian question 
post-1945,119-20; and relations 
with Russia in late nineteenth 
century, 72-^1; and Transnistria 
during the Second World War, 
114-16,143-61; see also Moldova, 
Republic of 
Romanian language, see Language 
Romans, 5-6, 59-60, 91,122 
Russia: and acquisition of Bessarabia, 
67; as protectors of Orthodox 
Christians in the Ottoman Empire, 
63, 68, 71, 73; Cantemir and, 45-7; 
early political and religious links 
between, and principality of 
Moldova, 60-7; loss of, and return 
of, southern Bessarabia to, 71, 85, 
88; relations with principalities in 
nineteenth century, 68-74; relations 
with principality of Moldova in 
seventeenth century, 44-5; see also 
Index 223 
Bessarabia, Bucharest, treaty of, 
Kuchuk-Kainardji, treaty of and 
Ia§i, treaty of 
Russian language, see Language and 
Bessarabia 
Russians: as minority in Russian-ruled 
Bessarabia, 80, 82-3, 85; as minority 
in interwar Bessarabia, 103,105, 
110,139; as minority in MSSR, 
117-18,140,182,191, 205; as 
minority in Republic of Moldova, 
169,192,195-7,205; as minority in 
Transnistria, 145,191-2,194-7, 205 
Russo-Turkish convention, 65, 67 
Russo-Turkish wars, 63, 70, 73, 75,195 
Ruthenes, 3, 9,10, 38, 39, 40, 61, 62, 
79, 80,106,125,129,134 
Saxons, 10; see also Germans and 
Goths 
Serbia: 16, 20, 71; ‘Morava School’ of, 
and influence in principality of 
Moldova, 15 
Serbs, 4, 24, 34, 36, 40, 61, 71, 73 
Siret: 10; Catholic bishopric in, 12,19 
Siret river, 7-8, 10, 67 
Slavonic, see Language 
Slavs, 5-7, 9,13, 44, 60-1, 71,118; see 
also Bulgarians, Serbs, Russians, 
Ruthenes, Ukrainians 
Smirnov, Igor, 182,191,197, 201, 212 
Snegur, Mircea, 183,193,199-200, 203, 
208, 212, 214 
Southern Bessarabia: 80, 71, 83, 85, 88, 
107; district of Bolgrad in, 71, 85-6, 
88, 91; district of Cahul in, 71, 85-6, 
88, 91; district of Ismail in, 71, 85-6, 
88, 91,117; see also Bugeac and 
MSSR 
Soviet Union, 1-3, 57, 68,103,105-6, 
108,110-15,116-20,122,138-9, 
143-8,151,157-8,164-7,172,175, 
181-2,187,189-93,195-6, 203, 205, 
207-9, 214, 216 
Stalin, Joseph, 117-18,190 
Stephen the Great, 19-27, 29, 31, 33, 
36, 60, 64,128 
Stere, Constantin, 92, 98,101,136 
Suceava: 10,13,16,18, 35, 64; 
Armenian bishopric in, 19; 
Stephen the Great’s painted 
church in, 33 
Suleiman the Magnificent, 27, 31 
Sulima, Dimitrie, 84, 86, 89, 91,116, 
135 
Tatarbunar, communist rebellion in, 
104,110 
Tatars, 7,13,17-18, 21-3, 28-9, 32, 74, 
79, 80,128 
Tighina: 7,17, 82, 94,165,178,182, 
191, 207; transformation into 
Turkish ‘raia’, 27-8, 31; see also 
Bender 
Tiraspol, 111, 117,139,160,164-5, 
169-71,177-8,182-3,185-6,191, 
196-7,199-200, 205, 207-9, 212-13, 
215-16 
Transnistria: 118-19,181-216; crisis in, 
and Republic of Moldova’s 
economy, 169-72, 206; Fourteenth 
Army in, 183-5,193,197-9, 206, 
209-16; Romania’s interwar claim 
to, 115-16; see also Dnestr 
Moldovan Republic, MASSR, 
MSSR and Republic of Moldova 
Transylvania, 6-9,11,18, 25, 27, 32-3, 
35, 37-8, 42, 45, 47, 59, 70-2, 91-2, 
97-9,101-3,110,113-14,143,145, 
155-56,159 
Trei Ierarhi monastery, 35, 38, 42 
Turkey, 124,171,193,199 
Turks: in Russian Bessarabia, 82, 
134 
Jamblac, Grigore, 16, 26 
Ukraine, 3, 31, 44-6, 62, 68, 69, 78, 80, 
82,100,104,106,115,117,125,137, 
140,144-5,147,150,155,157-8, 
163-5,169-71,173-5,181-3,186, 
190,195, 200, 205, 206, 209-10, 212, 
215-6 
Ukrainian language, see Language 
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Ukrainians, 1-2, 80, 82, 84,100,103-7, 
111, 117-18,125,139,143,145-6, 
150,152-5,169,182,191-2,195-7, 
205; see also Ruthenes 
Uniate church, 36,41, 59, 62 
Ureche, Grigore, 9, 26, 38-9, 43,126, 
129 
Urussov, Sergei, 87, 94-5 
Varlaam, metropolitan of Moldova, 37, 
38-9,42-3, 62 
Vasile Lupu, 28-9, 32, 35-44, 49, 62, 
129 
Voronin, Vladimir, 122-4 
Wallachia, principality of, 2, 4, 7,11, 
13-15,18, 20, 23-4, 27, 29, 32, 35, 41, 
46-8, 50-2, 55-6, 59-61, 63, 65-9, 
71-2, 74-5, 79, 83, 88,102,126,128, 
130,135,143,145,155,189 
Wallachians, 14,16, 21, 24, 28, 33-4, 
43-4,49, 58, 60, 64, 65-6, 69-70, 
73 
Yeltsin, Boris, 184,193,195,197-8, 
209, 214 


